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Abstract  
 
The present thesis takes as its main object of study the features and solidity of U.S.-
Jordanian relations in the 2000s. While the power disparity between the U.S.A, as the 
sole superpower in the current international system, and Jordan, as a small state, is 
undeniably huge, it is claimed that the relations between the two countries are rather 
power relations, especially during the unprecedented era of U.S. power and unilateralism 
during President G.W. Bush’s two terms. This thesis, however, argues that these relations 
between the two countries are better explained by attributing a level of a mutually agreed 
relative autonomy to the weaker side, Jordan.   
 
The thesis therefore uses the work of Ikenberry on U.S. liberal hegemony in its relations 
with its allies combined with some elements of small states’ politics in order to examine 
the dynamics and interactions between the two countries in more detail and accuracy, to 
assess the features of the relations between the U.S.A and Jordan in the recent historical 
and Middle Eastern context. To do that, the thesis explores three main issues that have 
shaped these relations in general and had extra weight in shaping these relations in the era 
of President G.W. Bush and King Abdullah II; these issues are the security cooperation 
between the two countries in the global ‘War on Terror’, the U.S. promotion of 
democracy in the Middle East and Jordan, and the tri-dimensional relations between 
Jordan, Israel and the U.S.A. 
  
The usage of liberal hegemony and small states’ politics in investigating these 
contemporary issues establishes the originality of this thesis by providing a more accurate 
 3
and fresher interpretation of these relations, which adds new scope to our understandings 
of power relations in the Middle East. This usage of the theoretical framework allowed 
the thesis to discover unseen realities regarding U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s in 
the sense of Jordan’s ability to manoeuvre and to avoid U.S. exigencies while 
simultaneously maintaining a strong alignment with the U.S.A     
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Introduction        
 
This thesis explores U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The choice of this topic and its 
time scope, the 2000s, as the focus for this thesis was due to different reasons. Since King 
Abdullah II succeeded to the Jordanian throne in 1999 he aimed at making U.S.-
Jordanian strategic relations the cornerstone of the Jordanian foreign policy (Lasensky, 
2006: 11). Although both King Hussein, the late King of Jordan, and his son King 
Abdullah II were pro-U.S.A and moderate monarchs, King Abdullah II differs from his 
father in some ways; he is more pro-globalization and favours open economic policies, 
and his attention to the Jordanian-U.S. relationship, including supporting U.S. policies 
and strategies, is more intense (Andoni, 2000: 77). This change in the Jordanian style of 
leadership concurred with new challenges in the Middle East and new changes in global 
politics. In 2000, for example, the presidential election in the U.S.A resulted in new 
leadership that lasted until 2008, which has been the focus of many debates regarding its 
new perspectives towards international affairs, particularly the Middle East. These 
changes in the leaderships of both the U.S.A and Jordan had an impact on the relations 
between the two countries, and will influence these relations in the years to come. 
 
While the U.S.A has a considerable impact on events all over the world, this fact is more 
salient in the Middle East than in other regions mainly because of the region’s instability 
and economic importance for the U.S.A. This reality has been noticeably clearer during 
the Bush era (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 30). In addition, the well-known U.S. 
diplomat Nicholas Burns argued that the focus of the U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s 
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was in Europe, as a result of the end of the Cold War; whereas during President Bush’s 
era, the U.S. foreign policy focus shifted towards the Middle East, mainly because the 
U.S. national interests were at stake in this region (Burns, 2006: 3). This increase of 
attention given to the Middle East in Bush’s foreign policy has influenced U.S.-Jordanian 
relations in different ways.  
 
Although the 1990s witnessed remarkable events, such as the end of the Cold War at the 
international level and the peace process in the Middle East regionally, these topics have 
been already covered by other researchers. In addition, these events have lost their 
relative importance and direct influence over the current relations between the U.S.A and 
Jordan. Nevertheless, this thesis is addressing the relations between the U.S.A and Jordan 
in a period of time that is very recent and close to the preceding era, analysing the new 
dimensions of relations that evolved during previous periods of time to produce new 
developments in relations, because of the many events that took place with greater 
reciprocal importance for both countries.                                                                                                             
 
The years since 2000 until the time of writing this thesis witnessed different events that 
are of great importance to the U.S.A and have influenced its policies towards the Middle 
East, including with Jordan, such as the re-emergence of the neoconservatives in the 
U.S.A, and their influence over the U.S. administration and policymaking; the increasing 
debate on the unilateral tendency in the U.S. foreign policy; the catastrophic terrorist 
events of September 11, 2001, and its consequences such as the Global War on Terror; 
terrorist plots in different countries in the Middle East (including Jordan); U.S. 
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democracy promotion initiatives in the Middle East; the war  and regime change in Iraq 
in 2003; the continuation of the no war no peace status in the Middle East regarding the 
Arab-Israeli conflict; the increased presence of Iran in the region, and its nuclear 
ambitions; the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah; and finally and significantly, the absence of 
genuine counterbalancing of the U.S. hegemony in world politics; all of these events have 
influenced the features of U.S.-Jordanian relations in different ways. These events and 
realities inspired the researcher to investigate U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. As a 
result, this research will provide a much needed analysis of U.S.-Jordanian relations in 
the current international and Middle Eastern contexts, which have particular importance 
for Jordan.  
 
This thesis will explore the temptation of applying U.S. liberal hegemony, a paradigm 
applied by John G. Ikenberry to his interpretation of the U.S. relations with democratic 
and industrialised countries in Europe and Asia (Ikenberry, 1999), combined with small 
states’ politics to U.S.-Jordanian relations since the 2000. The essence of this thesis is in 
the applicability of the liberal hegemonic paradigm to the relations between a small 
Middle Eastern country, where the influence of regional politics is very high and 
democracy is still at early stages, with the U.S.A during an era of an unprecedented U.S. 
power, and the remarkable influence of the neoconservatives over its policymaking who 
favour the practice of such power. Therefore, assessing the interactions between the 
neoconservatives’ policies and liberal hegemonic ideas and assumptions in a different 
context from the one Ikenberry has used, I believe, is what makes this thesis unique and 
original. By applying the chosen theoretical framework and methodology to answer the 
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research questions, and to test the hypothesis, I expect that this thesis will contain 
sufficient originality to justify a PhD degree. 
 
The findings of this empirical research, which are highlighted in the conclusion (chapter 
seven) of this thesis, indicate that there is strong potential for gaining solid and original 
knowledge of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The theoretical combination will 
strengthen this thesis’ originality in different ways; it will result in an assessment of the 
adequacy of the two works, liberal hegemony and the one of small states in more 
contemporary and different contexts. The interaction between the two works in empirical 
cases will examine and test the solidity of their basic arguments and principles, and will 
illustrate their defects and explanatory power. The thesis will therefore establish a claim 
to originality in both the theoretical and empirical arguments that are important to our 
understanding of IR in both branches; academia and practice. Analyzing U.S.-Jordanian 
relations and testing such a theoretical framework during years that witnessed intensity of 
unprecedented simultaneous events mentioned above are of great significance to evaluate 
the ability of these relations to withstand challenges and to assess the ability of this 
theoretical framework in providing a sophisticated understanding of U.S.-Jordanian 
relations in an intense context.             
 
While this thesis aims to assess liberal hegemonic foreign policy theory combined with 
small states’ politics empirically in order to analyze the policy processes and outcomes of 
U.S.-Jordanian relations since 2000, it will explore and answer a related group of 
questions that are concerned with the level and nature of Jordan’s independence and 
 16
manoeuvrability as a small state in its relations with the U.S.A, the sole military 
superpower active in the Middle East at the current time. The purpose and argument of 
these questions are to test and assess the following hypothesis, which assumes that there 
are realities and mechanisms determining U.S.-Jordanian relations. This hypothesis is: 
 
Although U.S.-Jordanian relations are undeniably asymmetric, for a range of 
reasons to be explored in this thesis, Jordan has had and retains a higher 
level of freedom of movement within the relationship than conventional 
foreign policy theories predict, and it will ask how far the dynamics of that 
relationship are better explained by liberal hegemonic theory than other 
alternatives (neo-realism in particular).           
 
To achieve this aim, the thesis explored existing literature on U.S.-Jordanian relations in 
the recent Middle Eastern historical context to analyze the interactions between the two 
countries. This allowed the researcher to figure out the features of U.S.-Jordanian 
relations since the 2000, and how far they are compatible with Ikenberry’s argument 
regarding U.S. grand foreign policy with its major allies. In order to strengthen the 
judgment regarding these claimed features, the researcher interviewed a group of highly 
experienced Jordanian policymakers in different security and political establishments to 
identify their perspectives regarding the nature of relations between the two countries. 
The focus on the Jordanian side of the story is based on the belief that the small and weak 
state in any relations is the one that is more sensitive and concerned about its 
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independence and manoeuvrability in its relations with the strong state, as Ikenberry and 
Hey argued (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008: 157; Hey, 2003). 
 
For that reason, the Jordanian interviewees are more adequate in expressing Jordan’s 
perspective and sense regarding its independence and manoeuvrability in its relations 
with the U.S.A. Resultantly, the argument of this thesis is a reflection of the Jordanian 
interpretation and perspective on U.S. Jordanian relations in the 2000s. However, it must 
be asserted in this regard that while most of the interviewees were Jordanian, the choice 
of those interviewees and questions were intended to achieve the required impartiality. 
To achieve that, some of the interviewees were retired and highly experienced politicians 
from previous eras, former security officers, figures who were not involved in the 
policymaking during the time of the interviews, and other figures in the opposition. A list 
of the interviewees will be provided in the bibliography of this thesis. 
 
This thesis is composed of two consistent main parts; the first part is composed of the 
first three chapters. Chapter one addresses the historical background of the U.S. policies 
in the Middle East and the main pillars of U.S.-Jordanian relations. Chapter two explores 
the debate between the leading theoretical approaches in IR, neorealism, and 
neoliberalism, in order to explain the adequacy of the conceptualised theoretical 
framework used in this thesis, which is liberal hegemony combined with small states’ 
politics. Chapter three is concerned with the methodological characteristics of this 
research, which are embodied in the interconnectedness and reciprocal influence of the 
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research characteristics and core theory and methods of this thesis, resulting in raising the 
research questions that explore the empirical chapters that follow.  
 
The second part of this thesis is composed of three empirical chapters (four, five and six). 
In these chapters I provide a critical analysis of U.S.-Jordanian relations regarding three 
main themes concerning the two countries in the 2000s, by responding to the research 
questions that are structured and formulated by the interaction of the theoretical 
framework and the rest of the literature discussed in the first part of this thesis. Chapter 
four addresses the security cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan, chapter five is 
concerned with the U.S. democratisation initiatives and the Jordanian response to them, 
and chapter six explores the Jordanian relations with Israel in light of U.S.-Jordanian 
relations regarding security cooperation and democratisation, respectively discussed in 
chapters four and five.  
 
It is essential to mention that the three ideas that underpin these chapters are interlocked 
and compatible. The War on Terror and democratisation in the Middle East are 
compatible with the Israeli interests and major pillars of the U.S. foreign policy towards 
the Middle East under the influence of the neoconservatives; as Martin Indyk has argued, 
President Bush’s vision of a New Middle East is one of democracy, peace and order; 
therefore, regime change, particularly involving radical organisations that are threatening 
Israel and political reform in the region, were major U.S. strategies in the region during 
Bush’s era (Indyk, 2006: 3). Chapter seven concludes this thesis by clarifying and 
summarising the main arguments and analysing the main findings and results of this 
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thesis; this chapter also provides the features of this thesis and what it stands for in terms 
of originality and significance.  
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Chapter One: Background of the U.S. involvement and policies in the Middle East 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter highlights the salient motivations and policies of the U.S.A in the Middle 
East. The chapter also explores both the history of the U.S.-Jordanian relations and the 
development of these relations in different historical contexts. The main aim of this 
chapter is to figure out and identify the main U.S. aims and policies in the Middle East in 
different historical contexts in order to allocate the position of Jordan in U.S.-Middle 
Eastern interactions, with extra emphasis on G.W. Bush’s era. This historical 
investigation is essential to provide a general and comprehensive understanding of U.S. 
relations with the Middle East to facilitate exploring the pillars of the Jordanian foreign 
policy and its relations with the U.S.A accordingly. These relations were highly 
influenced by both the U.S. foreign policy in the region and regional politics associated 
with different historical contexts.  
 
The chapter starts with general identifications of the geopolitical significance of the 
Middle East to the U.S.A. Then the chapter starts reviewing the U.S. policies during the 
Cold War and in the 1990s in order to arrive at the status of the U.S. policies in the 
2000s, which is the main theme of the current U.S.-Jordanian relations. Afterwards, the 
chapter looks at the main characteristics and events that shaped U.S. foreign policy 
during the 2000s and its strategies towards the Middle East accordingly. This cohesive 
exhibition of U.S. foreign policy and its strategies in the Middle East during the 
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Presidency of G.W. Bush is followed by general identification of the Jordanian foreign 
policy and the main issues that are of concern to U.S.-Jordanian relations since the 
succession of King Abdullah II. While the study of U.S.-Jordanian relations must be 
started off by general understanding and awareness of regional and international factors 
that affect these relations, this chapter is designed to allow the researcher to investigate 
and critically analyse the main current features and pillars of U.S.-Jordanian relations in 
the 2000s, which is the main theme of this thesis.     
  
1.2 The Middle East in World Politics        
  
Historically, most of the previous empires that had global hegemonic aspirations were 
interested in the Middle East for its strategic importance, whether for geopolitical 
reasons, trade, or for its different natural resources (Khalidi, 2004: 75). The strategic 
location of the Middle East between Asia, Africa and Europe attracted the attention of the 
U.S.A after the Second World War; this attention was intensified after the British-Iranian 
oil crisis in the early 1950s and the resultant potentiality of the Communist and Soviet 
accessibility to the region (Heiss, 2006: 78). This importance of the Middle East and the 
containment of influence of the Soviet Union played a substantial role in shaping the U.S. 
policies toward the Middle East and its European allies. For example, the U.S.A 
supported Britain in its crisis over Iranian oil but undermined it a few years later in the 
Suez crisis in 1956. Both U.S. policies aimed at the same ambition; ensuring its oil 
supply and inhibiting the Soviet presence in the region. These aims, as well as supporting 
Israel and other allies such as Jordan, and stabilising the region, were salient in the U.S. 
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foreign policies in the Middle East, in spite of the occasional dissatisfaction of some of its 
crucial European allies (Heiss, 2006: 89). In addition, the dynamics of the region, and 
events such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq-Iran war (1980 to 1988) and the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 made the U.S.A ever-vigilant in the politics and the developments in the 
Middle East regardless of other powers’ considerations (Heiss, 2006: 92).   
    
The orientation and focus of many U.S. scholars and studies about the Middle East were 
shaped by the desires and interests of U.S. officials towards the region, especially at early 
stages of the U.S. involvement in the area (Bilgin, 2005: 77). Therefore, some scholars 
argued that the term “Middle East” is a meaningless concept, lacking historical and 
cultural unity; for example, Robert Cox stated that all regional terms are for someone and 
for some purpose (Cox, 1981); as a result, the term “the Middle East” is believed to be 
conceptualised by Britain and the U.S.A to serve the geopolitical interests of these 
powers by organising their actions and policies into this region among the expanded 
foreign policies of these two powers (Bilgin, 2005: 80). In other words, as Ali Dessouki 
and Jamil Matar asserted, the term “the Middle East” is a political one, for political 
purposes. They preferred the term “the Arab System or World”, as the term “the Middle 
East” weakens the Arab System by including other nations and countries in the region 
(Bilgin, 2005: 81).   
 
The Arab Regional System concept is based on the assumptions that the security and 
interests of the Arab countries are linked together and differ from those of non-Arabic 
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countries in their midst (such as Israel, Turkey and Iran), and also from the interests of 
superpowers such as the U.S.A (Bilgin, 2005: 85). Therefore, there were rejections in 
many Arab countries, especially by Islamists and Arab Nationalists, of the term “the 
Middle East” lest that Middle Eastern classification would de-emphasise the Arabic and 
Islamic characters of the region. Interestingly enough, in the post-Cold War era, many 
countries such as Jordan adopted many policies which were more compatible with the 
New Middle East than with the Arab Regional System, such as peacemaking with Israel, 
consolidating its ties with the U.S.A and seeking its own individual security plans and 
arrangements that contradicted with the old Arab Security System. No less importantly, it 
is believed that these policies have their origins in previous eras of the post-Cold War 
period, as we shall see regarding Jordan in the subsequent section (Bilgin, 2005: 131).     
 
Although the applicability of the Clash of Civilisations thesis by Samuel Huntington was 
relatively dismissed by the governments of both Western and Muslim countries, it 
became more influential as far as terrorism is concerned. However, the study of Muslim-
Western relations is a major component of the study of Middle Eastern politics and 
international relations in general; therefore, it should be perceived in a broader and more 
complex manner than as a source of a terror threat or exploitation (Murden, 2002: 186). 
For example, Fred Halliday argues that although there were some ideas and beliefs 
among the Arabs and Muslims similar to those of Samuel Huntington of a clash of 
civilisations and hostility between the West and Islam even before Huntington’s 
contribution to the theme (Halliday, 2005: 156), the relations between these countries and 
the West were not shaped merely upon such a clash of beliefs and ideologies but also 
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upon a clash or harmony of some ties of interests, just like any relation among these 
countries or with other external powers, not to mention that the threat, whether military or 
economic, posed by the Middle East towards the West is limited or non-existent 
(Halliday, 2005: 159). 
 
Some people argue that the capacity of the Arabic and Islamic countries is limited and 
that made them receptive to the dominant secular state system, where the nation, territory 
and sovereignty of the state are the main the characteristics of the international system, 
allocating a very limited role to religions. In another words, the current international 
system, with the U.S.A at the top of it, would not accept or tolerate an active religious 
authority, whether domestically or internationally; therefore, and for a variety of reasons, 
most Arab and Muslim states behaved according to their individual and national interests. 
Many of these interests are with a limited, well-organised and united impact of Islamism 
or Arabism on these states’ foreign policies, to the extent that their behaviours clashed 
between each other over security issues and over different national interests of these 
states (Murden, 2002: 188). 
  
1.3 The U.S.A and the Middle East during the Cold War 
 
Although the United States had been interested in the Middle East since the early 
beginning of the twentieth century, it became more involved in the region during the 
Cold War (Hinnebush and Etheshami, 2002: 57). During the Cold War the security of the 
Middle East was perceived from a Western and a U.S. perspective as the preservation of 
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Western and U.S. interests in the region. The threat of the Soviet Union’s influence to 
harm the flow of the Middle Eastern oil at reasonable prices to the West, the stability of 
friendly regimes to the U.S.A, and preventing the emergence of a regional hegemonic 
power hostile to the West were fundamental issues to the West in general and to the 
U.S.A in particular during this period (Bilgin, 2005: 1). This “top-down” Western 
conceptualisation of Middle Eastern security, based on the presence of external threats 
and influence of superpowers in the region, resulted in the validity of allies to the West in 
the region (Bilgin, 2005: 2). It is vital to point out in this regard that a major 
characteristic of the Middle East in the postcolonial era was that the region was divided 
into two camps: those who desired to continue cooperation and to have strong 
connections with the West and the U.S.A, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia; and those 
who wanted a closer connection with the Soviet Union, such as Syria and Egypt. Both 
camps aimed to ensure their stability and independence from regional and international 
powers by allying themselves with one of the major blocks at that time (Hinnebush and 
Etheshami, 2002: 58). 
 
While the main aims of the U.S. policies and strategies in the Middle East during the 
Cold War were to counter the Soviet and Communist influence in the region, to guarantee 
the flow of oil to the industrial world, mainly to the West, and to sustain the security of 
Israel and the stability of the region, the U.S.A implemented several strategies to achieve 
these aims, such as the Baghdad Pact in the 1950s, a defence treaty initiated by the 
U.S.A, Turkey, Iran and Iraq to create an alliance system within the Middle Eastern 
countries to resist the Soviet influence. Moreover, the U.S.A created the Tripartite 
 26
Agreement with France and Britain to limit arms sales in the region in order to establish a 
balance of power between Israel and the Arab countries who were involved in the conflict 
in order to achieve stability in the region (Hinnebush and Etheshami, 2002: 59). In 
addition, between 1947-1959 the U.S.A also initiated a programme called “Point Four” 
which aimed to aid many countries in the Middle East military and economically; during 
this period the U.S.A spent $2.94 billion in the Middle East in order to help these 
countries in their developmental programs and to bring them closer to the U.S. orbit; 
Jordan received $12.7 million from the U.S.A, which was a huge amount of money for a 
country like Jordan in that period of time (Bryson, 1977: 174).  
 
These U.S. policies and the increase of the U.S. involvement in the region were 
simultaneous with the increase of the presence of the Soviet influence, especially after the 
remarkably decreased presence of the British and French influence in the region after the 
Suez war in 1956. The aims of Point Four, as claimed by President Truman, were to 
achieve collective security in the region, reforming the political and economic situations 
of these countries and to create a stable region. However, Thomas Bryson claims that 
many people perceived these programmes as a U.S Trojan horse for the economic 
penetration and political domination of the Middle East (Bryson, 1977: 175). Contrary to 
this perception, Bryson, himself, argues that the U.S.A was the first superpower that used 
economic and military assistance effectively in the Middle East as part of its foreign 
policy during the Cold War, and these aids were essential in fostering fledgling countries 
and regimes (Bryson, 1977: 204).  
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The Truman Doctrine in 1947 also aimed to aid Middle Eastern countries to maintain 
stability in the region in order to guarantee that U.S. strategic interests would not be 
challenged by the growth of the Soviet influence in the Middle East. The U.S.A need for 
Middle Eastern oil was essential to sustain its economic growth and its capacity to 
support and aid the rebuilding programmes of its European allies after the devastation of 
the Second World War (which aid itself aimed to contain the increased influence of the 
Soviet Union in Europe) (Little, 2003: 120). During the beginning of the Cold War the 
Middle East witnessed major events such as the creation of Israel in 1948, and the 
increase and activation of Arab Nationalism among the Arab countries in the 1950s. That 
resulted in regime change in Egypt and Iraq, from pro-Western monarchies to national 
revolutionary regimes in these two countries which were a challenge and threat for other 
conservative regimes such as those in Jordan and Saudi Arabia (Bryson, 1977: 174). 
 
The U.S. strategies mentioned above could not also prevent the establishment of close 
ties between the Soviet Union and some Arabic countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt 
in the 1960s, all of which are Jordan’s neighbours. Noticeably, although the U.S.A during 
the Eisenhower era was supportive of Jordan and was willing to continue this support, the 
U.S.A was ready to sacrifice the monarchy to appease Arab nationalists, to reduce the 
Soviet influence in the region; only the determination and the “spunk” of King Hussein of 
Jordan, as President Eisenhower himself stated, sustained the U.S. support of Jordan at 
that time. The Jordanian regime fought against Communism in Jordan and in the region, 
which was a major aspiration and aim of the Eisenhower doctrine; to support countries 
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and regimes which fought for themselves and for U.S. interests, not merely depending on 
Western help in the battle against Communism (Satloff, 2003: 128).  
 
The growth of Arab nationalism in Egypt and Syria and the close ties between these 
countries and the Soviet Union resulted in the appliance of the Eisenhower Doctrine 
(1957-1959). This doctrine was a U.S. commitment to the fulfilling of any military or 
economic requests to any country in the Middle East in order to help these countries to 
counter the Soviet Union and its clients’ influence in the region. Interestingly, it has been 
argued that Jordan was one of the first countries that the Eisenhower Doctrine was 
applied to. The lack of stability in the region, reflected in regime change in some 
countries, and Jordanian economic needs made President Eisenhower himself announce 
in April 1957 the U.S. commitment to the stability and integrity of Jordan as well as the 
importance of supporting Jordan economically (Bryson, 1977: 209). Moreover, although 
Jordan was not part of the Baghdad Pact, after the collapse of the pact in 1958 Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia were the closest Arabic countries to the U.S.A (Bryson, 1977: 209). In 
addition, the U.S. relations and support to Jordan were enhanced remarkably after 1957 
when Britain terminated its treaty with Jordan and halted its aid; the U.S.A compensated 
Jordan with its military, economic, and diplomatic needs. As a result, between 1952 and 
1970 Jordan received more than $500 million in economic aid and $200 million in 
military aid from the U.S.A. Although the U.S.A was ostensibly relatively impartial 
during the “Arab Cold War” in the 1960s, it remained close to and aware of its allies such 
as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In 1970, when Jordan witnessed a civil war, the U.S.A 
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warned that it will not accept any external intervention in the Jordanian affairs and 
accelerated a proposed aid package to Jordan in that year (Bryson, 1977: 259).                          
 
1.4 The U.S.A and the Middle East after the Cold War  
 
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc the U.S.A remained 
deeply involved in the Middle East. It believes in the importance of the region and of the 
necessity of its containment policies in the region, such as those towards Iraq and Iran. It 
perceived the regimes of these two countries (Iran after the revolution and Iraq under the 
rule of Saddam Hussein) to be hostile to the security and stability of the region as well as 
to be threats to U.S. interests and friendly regimes in the Middle East (Hinnebush and 
Etheshami, 2002: 60). According to El-Shazly and Hinnebush, the inability of the Arab 
countries to achieve their internal and external security and stability in the region resulted 
in a remarkable role for non-Arabic regional powers such as Israel, Turkey, and Iran in 
Arab affairs; more importantly, these situations increased U.S. hegemony in the region 
(Hinnebush and Etheshami, 2002: 87).  
 
Murden argued that the U.S.A, as a hegemonic security manager in the Middle East, 
placed itself at the centre of the Middle Eastern politics and compelled the countries of 
the region to deal with America’s unprecedented power and influence in the region 
(Murden, 2002: 44). In addition, the U.S.A continued to perceive the Middle East through 
the same lenses that it used during the Cold War, focusing on military means to achieve 
its goals. However, many scholars, such as Sayigh, argue that the end of the Cold War, 
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and the major events in the region such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the peace 
process, and the decline of Arabism resulted in questioning the validity of perceiving the 
Middle East as a unified region shaped by one system. He argues that the fragmentation 
of the Middle Eastern state system lessened the cooperation within the region to the 
extent that it became a “region without regionalism” (Bilgin, 2005: 11). This is not to 
argue that there is not a desire for cooperation and interest in regionalism among the 
Arabic countries; what should be mentioned here is that in the 1990s the geopolitics of 
the Middle East were substantially affected by the U.S.A. and its interests in the region 
(Bilgin, 2005: 12). As a result, the politics of the Middle East were affected by the 
changes of the strategies, policies, and aims of external powers, especially the U.S.A. 
Consequently, defining and clarifying the politics of the Middle East is complex as they 
were changeable according to changes in the U.S. strategies in the world in general since 
as well as its specific involvement in the region (Bilgin, 2005: 68).  
 
The presence and the influence of the U.S.A. increased and evolved in the Middle East 
markedly after its victory in the Gulf War in 1991. This overwhelming victory was 
simultaneous with its victory in the Cold War, resulting in more U.S. hegemony and 
superiority in the Middle East in the 1990s than in the rest of the period since 1945. To 
maintain its strength in the region and to achieve its vital interests there the U.S.A. had to 
protect its allies, solve major disputes between them, and increase its political and 
military accessibility into the region (Murden, 2002: 47). Therefore, the Arab-Israeli 
peace process was in the interests of the U.S.A. in order to stabilise the region. However, 
the complexity of achieving agreements over many issues, such as Jerusalem and the 
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Palestinian refugees, made a full deal between the two parties unattainable. In addition, 
the U.S. impartiality as arbiter made the Arabic countries suspicious of the U.S. 
hegemonic ambitions in the region (Murden, 2002: 55). 
 
Pinar Bilgin argues that the U.S. approach towards the security of the Middle East in the 
post-Cold War era remained military and based on a “top-down” approach. One of the 
main reasons behind the insecurity and instability of the Middle East is the presence and 
activeness of multiple approaches of security in the region with different aims and 
initiatives. These approaches, whether backed by the U.S.A or Arab nationalist 
governments and Islamist groups, made the stability of the region difficult to accomplish 
(Bilgin, 2005: 156).  
 
The threats posed by Iran and Iraq to Gulf countries as well as to Israel committed the 
U.S.A to the security of these countries, mainly because Iran and Iraq had the desire to 
threaten these countries and because they potentially had the desire to possess Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD). They also rejected any peace settlement with Israel in the 
region and their rejection of any security alliance in the region which the U.S.A is in the 
centre and favour of (Murden, 2002: 56). Therefore, many of the U.S. security practices 
and initiatives in the Middle East were accused of aiming only to achieve military goals 
and were state-centric, neglecting regional actors, concerns and preferences. However, 
the term “the Middle East” and what it entailed remained strong compared with other 
terms and concepts such as the Arab Regional System, mainly because the advocates of 
the term “the Middle East” such as the U.S.A, Turkey, Israel and the pro-U.S. Arabic 
 32
countries are the major players in the region, especially since the Gulf War in 1991 
(Bilgin, 2005: 126).    
 
The end of the strategic and ideological rivalry between the U.S.A and the USSR, and the 
acceleration of the erosion of economic, cultural, and political barriers between states had 
a noteworthy impact on world politics in all regions, including the Middle East. However, 
there was resistance to many of these trends from Middle Eastern governments, they were 
suspicious of losing control over their economies and general policies, not to mention 
their suspicion of U.S. strategies in the region, and of globalisation in general (Halliday, 
2005: 133). Meanwhile, one of the major consequences of the end of the Cold War on the 
Middle East is that for the first time in the last two centuries Russia did not have any 
direct borders with the Middle East and, consequently, became sidelined in the politics of 
this region (Halliday, 2005: 136). Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War and the demise of 
the USSR, and the neutralisation of Iraq by the Gulf War did not result in harmonious 
relations between the U.S.A and all Arab countries; the U.S. policies continued to be 
perceived as biased in favour of Israel, and there was popular dissatisfaction with the 
increase of U.S. hegemony and presence in the region, which resulted in the increase of 
anti-Americanism and terrorist attacks on different U.S. targets, most notably 9/11, which 
itself led to extra U.S. involvement in the region and intensified the interest and 
importance of the region to the U.S.A (Halliday, 2005: 143). 
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1.5 The U.S.A and the Middle East in the 2000s 
 
The focus of this thesis is the relationship between the U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s, 
and while this period witnessed dramatic events and changes in U.S. perspectives towards 
international affairs that influenced its relations with Jordan in different ways, the 
sections below will provide more focussed analysis of the main U.S. perspectives and 
strategies in the 2000s that are of concern to this thesis before starting to look at the 
major events and issues that are concerning Jordan regarding its relations with the U.S.A 
in the 2000s in the remainder of this chapter.  
 
1.5 .1 U.S. Unilateralism and the G. W. Bush Presidency 
 
According to Mohamedi and Sadowski, one of the major criticisms that the Bush 
administration made of the Clinton administrations was that Clinton’s foreign policy 
resulted in many U.S. involvements in issues and disputes around the globe of limited 
concern to the U.S. national interest and security. They accused these policies of 
endangering the U.S. national interests in many places and occasions (Mohamedi and 
Sadowski, 2000: 13). Therefore, at the beginning of President Bush’s era, U.S. foreign 
policy focussed only on issues with vital and direct impacts on U.S. national interests. 
Issues such as peace in the Middle East and democratisation were perceived by the U.S. 
administration as being of secondary importance. Consequently, there were no direct 
interventions of President Bush in peacemaking and diplomacy in the Middle East as 
there had been by Clinton. Bush’s policy toward Iraq was clear from the beginning, and 
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centred on regime change. In other words, U.S. foreign policies at the beginning of 
President Bush’s era used to be selective in their engagement in international affairs and 
were perceived as preferring a unilateral approach, especially towards the Middle East 
(Mohamedi and Sadowski, 2000: 14).  
 
The growth of U.S. power and its unprecedented status in the world made it easier to 
ignore and abandon secondary relations and actors in international politics (Ikenberry, 
2003: 533). It has been argued that the growth of U.S. power could increase its tendency 
towards unilateralism; on the other hand, some U.S. scholars assert that U.S. 
unilateralism does not cover and is not embedded in all matters and issues related to its 
foreign policy; issues related to economic relations with other states continued to be 
guided by a multilateral attitude under G.W. Bush (Ikenberry, 2003: 540). The issues on 
which the Bush administration was most averse to multilateralism were arms control and 
the use of its force when its security was under threat, mainly because the U.S 
administrations believed that unilateralism serves the U.S. interests in these matters more 
than any other alternatives (Ikenberry, 2003: 544).       
 
In the early twenty-first century some scholars of international affairs and U.S. foreign 
policy such as Krauthammer argued that the U.S.A should exploit the uni-polarity of 
world politics to enhance its position and global status (Krauthammer, 2001).  Other 
scholars such as Nye believed that the U.S.A had to reshape its foreign policy and the 
way it perceived the world, especially after 9/11. Nye’s expectations appeared to be 
realised when President Bush shifted his focus from dealing only with key players and 
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major powers in the world and gave extra attention to small and weak actors and states 
and nongovernmental organisations in a globalising world (Nye, 2003: 61). Moreover, 
Nye argued that the U.S administration realised after 9/11 how the “democratisation of 
technology” and “privatisation of war” dramatically illustrated the importance of giving 
considerable attention to these issues, which are more connected to small actors in 
international affairs (than the Bismarckian great power games of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries), and their impact on U.S. security and hegemony in different ways 
(Nye, 2003: 62).  
 
Some voices favoured “soft unilateralism” during the first term of Bush’s presidency; his 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, believed that the U.S.A should have good connections 
with the main international institutions, and must make some consultations with main 
actors in the world and its allies in different regions while shaping its foreign policy. On 
the other hand, the majority of the U.S. administration favoured the use of “hard 
unilateralism”; they believed that the U.S. actions should come first then international 
cooperation came as a result of the U.S. actions. They accused international cooperation 
and coalition of being inefficient, causing vacillation and harm to U.S. security and 
interests (Mohamedi and Sadowski, 2000: 15). Therefore, there was no consensus among 
the U.S. foreign policy makers and scholars about which strategy the U.S.A should 
follow after 9/11. They were divided into two camps: some people believed that the 
U.S.A should act by adopting a cooperative approach with its allies and international 
institutions (“Wilsonians of the right” or “multilateralists”); the other group believed that 
the U.S.A must act alone regardless what other actors may think or prefer (“Jacksonian 
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unilateralists” or “unilateralists”) (Nye, 2003: 62). From Nye’s point of view, using only 
unilateral policy and depending heavily on the use of hard and military power without the 
agreement and support from allies and international community would result in limited 
desire of other states to cooperate with the U.S.A in its crucial strategies such as the War 
on Terror. Therefore, the willingness of a state to cooperate with the U.S.A to counter 
terrorism depends on its own self-interest in doing so, as well as the attractiveness of the 
U.S. policies and strategies (Nye, 2003: 63).  
 
There are different dimensions of criticising President Bush’s foreign policy; some neo- 
liberals argued that his administration undermined the robustness and efficiency of 
international principles and institutions which have shaped the international order during 
the second half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, realists were aware of the 
U.S. failure to achieve strong international support for its foreign policy, which might 
have reduced the desire of regional powers to bandwagon with the U.S.A, which may 
have resulted in an increased possibility of the desire of those states to gravitate against 
the U.S.A (Hastedt, 2006: 83).  
 
1.5.2 9/11 and U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
During the Cold War, small states used to be either pro-West and pro-U.S. or pro-Soviet. 
Many expected that the demise of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and 
consequently limited U.S. involvement in regional politics would result in more freedom 
for smaller states to manoeuvre and to engage in multiple alignments. However, the U.S. 
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involvement in the Middle East did not decrease after the Cold War; remarkably, after 
9/11 the U.S. administration perceived states that do not join the U.S. coalition against 
vaguely-defined terrorism as part of the evil block (“axis of evil”) allied with Al Qaeda. 
In other words, the U.S.A perceived itself and the world as if they are again in a new 
global war, and in a death match between two hostile camps (Mohamedi and Sadowski, 
2000: 21).  
 
Walt argues that many countries joined the U.S. coalition to fight terrorism not only 
because they perceive terrorism as an international threat, but also because the U.S.A 
made it clear that neutrality is not an option for them and because these states found 
fighting terrorism a great opportunity to achieve their own domestic and international 
aims, including their interests with the U.S.A (Walt, 2002: 61). In addition, according to 
Buzan, one of the main differences between the Cold War and the global War on Terror 
is that the latter embedded and legitimised U.S. unilateralism in the making of its foreign 
policy and its dealings with other countries, as well as dealing with international issues 
(Buzan, 2006: 1102). This might be right in the aftermath of 9/11, but to what extent 
unilateralism will continue serving the U.S.A and its foreign policy in future is something 
that cannot be taken for granted, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
The events of 9/11 and their consequences, mainly the global War on Terror, resulted in 
refocusing and redefining U.S. foreign policy, which was accused by many scholars of 
losing its purpose since the end of the Cold War (Hastedt, 2006: 21). However, apart 
from counter-terrorism, U.S. foreign policy lacked certainty and suffered from a lack of a 
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typical and defined foreign policy problem. U.S. foreign policy towards specific issues or 
regions used to be shaped and affected by the history and the origins of its policy toward 
these issues and regions; the policy towards Eastern Europe, for example, had to take a 
new dimension after the demise of the Soviet bloc that it never took before. Similarly, 
although the U.S.A has had long historical involvement in the Middle East, the events of 
9/11 made the U.S.A adopt new strategies and policies in the region, mainly because the 
Bush administration could not deal with the new challenges in the Middle East by 
referring to previous experiences and strategies which were used to tackle different 
challenges and consequences in the region (Hastedt, 2006: 22). 
 
Since the beginning of the Cold War the U.S.A was very generous and supportive to its 
allies such as Jordan; the events of 9/11 did not significantly alter the status quo ante. 
Halliday argues that it is misleading to believe that major events in the international 
arena, such as 9/11, changed everything (as is often claimed by mass media and 
politicians alike), or that they have not changed anything, including the U.S. relations 
with its allies (Halliday, 2002: 213). Therefore, U.S. diplomacy post 9/11 aimed to obtain 
the support of other states in its War on Terror, not only by encouraging them to 
participate in the international efforts to fight terrorists outside their borders, but also to 
fight terrorist supporters and sympathisers within their borders and societies. To do so, 
the U.S.A helped the governments of these countries to develop their abilities to obtain 
efficient skills to deal with and fight local and international terrorism. In addition, U.S. 
diplomacy not only targeted the governments of these countries, but also tried to obtain 
public support for its War on Terror (Hastedt, 2006: 83).  
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Although the Bush administrations disagreed with the Israelis regarding how to solve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, U.S.-Israeli ties were enhanced remarkably after the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11. In addition, these events made the relationship between U.S. 
policymakers and some thinkers in the academic elite closer; the U.S. administration 
became more aware of the ideas of Samuel Huntington, Daniel Pipes, and Bernard Lewis 
of the inevitability of the clash between the U.S.A and the Islamists, and of the necessity 
of containing the latter; these ideas had notably less influence during Clinton’s 
administrations (Little, 2006: 45).  
 
One of the major difficulties that U.S. policy (arguably mistakenly) faced during the 
Presidency of G.W. Bush in the Middle East was that it was trying to achieve all of its 
strategic aims simultaneously. These aims were vital for the U.S.A, such as controlling 
the region, with its rogue states and their unconventional weapons ambitions; controlling 
the oil industry; fighting terrorism; and shaping the region in favour of its national 
interests generally (Plamer and Plamer, 2004: 261). Although these aims overlapped and 
were located in the same region and time, all of them needed specific strategies and 
policies. Fighting terrorism is an aim which needs a global strategy and needs the 
cooperation of many groups and parties; the U.S.A is believed to face many obstacles to 
tackle it alone because this catastrophe is global in nature (Plamer, and Plamer, 2004: 
262). After 9/11 the U.S. administration launched many policies embodied in the War on 
Terror to disrupt the Islamist’s presence all over the world; in addition, the U.S.A waged 
different wars on different fronts, but basically for the same aims and reasons. The war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq aimed at regime change in these countries which were hostile to the 
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U.S. security and interests in the region. Moreover, some may argue that the increase in 
U.S. support to Israel after 9/11 and the encouragement given to the Palestinian people to 
marginalise Yasser Arafat aimed also at regime change in the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
by more moderate leadership (Hudson, 2005: 298). 
 
1.5.3 The Neo-Conservatives and the Middle East  
 
The main ideological beliefs of the “neoconservatives” are that the U.S.A has an 
exceptional role in defending liberty and democracy. They are committed to U.S. 
primacy and perceive the world as anarchical; therefore, they assert that the use of U.S. 
power to advance U.S. security and interests is justifiable (Owens, 2008: 25). In addition, 
the neoconservatives believe that U.S. power should be used for moral reasons such as 
the spread of democracy and liberalism; not for the sake of these values themselves, but 
to enhance U.S. security and interests. They believe that international conflicts are 
struggles and conflicts over ideologies and values; they also perceive that international 
law and international institutions are too weak and inefficient in achieving international 
security, justice and stability; therefore, they assert that it is the duty of the U.S.A to 
address these goals, which are better achieved by a unilateral approach (Fukuyama, 2006: 
49).   
 
The neoconservatives who surrounded President G.W. Bush had a special perspective 
toward the Middle East and Israel. These views clashed with other views from different 
executive branches and backgrounds in the U.S. administration (Hudson, 2005: 302). In 
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addition, Escobar argues that the U.S. foreign policy directions during Bush’s presidency 
were a reflection and an implementation of the beliefs and ideas of a think tank based in 
Washington which started to flourish in 1997, and manifested itself in the Project For The 
New American Century (PNAC), a document published in September 2000 by a 
conservative lobbying group. This group of scholars admire the unilateral approach and 
the importance of advancing the U.S. economic and military capabilities in order to be 
the uncontested world hegemonic power in the twenty-first century, and to manipulate 
international affairs in favour of U.S. security, interests, and principles (Escobar, 2003: 
26). This group also admires the Reaganite strategy which was based on the necessity of 
preparing for and preventing all possible security challenges in the future by depending 
on a bold foreign policy which promotes American principles abroad, even if that would 
require regime change in some countries (Escobar, 2003: 26).  
 
There has been an increase in the influence of the Christian Right movement, with an 
alliance with the pro-Israeli lobby and think-tanks, in the making of the U.S. foreign 
policy toward the Middle East during President G.W. Bush’s years. Although the salience 
of the Christian Right has continued since the 1970s, the election of President Bush in 
2000 and the events of 9/11 gave this group the opportunity to enter the political 
mainstream more strongly and effectively (Wanger, 2005: 217). There are several reasons 
for the growth of the Christian Right in the U.S.A and its connection and alignment with 
pro-Israeli organisations. Firstly, the imminence of the start of the third millennium made 
the American public more aware of religious beliefs and closer to religious materials such 
as books and films. Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union made both the Christian 
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Right and the Zionists search for a new enemy in order to justify many ideological beliefs 
and policies. Thirdly, the timing of the rise of Islamic extremists in the Middle East was 
simultaneous and compatible with the religiosity of the American people and the search 
for a new enemy for these movements (mentioned in the previous two reasons). Fourthly, 
the increased presence of the neo-conservatives in the U.S. administration after the 
election of Bush, who converged with the Christian Right and the Zionists on many 
points, made the implementation of their beliefs and policies more achievable (Wagner, 
2003: 236-237). 
 
There were great connections, similarities and reciprocated influence between the 
(PNAC) group, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and the Likud party in Israel, 
especially in the way they perceive Islam as a threat, and in the way they identify their 
countries interests in the Middle East. For example, among these issues was the 
restoration of the Hashemite monarchy, the current ruling family in Jordan, in Iraq; an 
option was prevailed among these organisations during the preparation for the campaign 
for regime change in Iraq (Escobar, 2003: 31). In addition, it has been claimed by the 
Bush administration that one of the main aims for the war in Iraq and removing Saddam 
Hussein from power was to establish democracy in Iraq as a model and as a starting point 
for democratisation and transformation in the entire Middle East. All of these policies and 
visions were an embracement of the neoconservatives’ doctrine in the Middle East, as a 
new phase in the role of the U.S.A in the world (Khalidi, 2004: 39).  
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Many scholars believe that U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East is profoundly 
connected with U.S. domestic politics; for example, Quandt argued that the Middle East 
is one of the most central regions in the calculations of U.S. policymakers, including the 
president, mainly because of the awareness that whatever policies might be adopted 
towards this region will have an impact at home, whether on economic or security 
policies. In addition, most of the U.S. foreign policy actors are involved in and concerned 
with the policies towards the Middle East, especially the policies which deal with highly 
important issues for both the U.S.A and the Middle East (Hudson, 2005: 296). However, 
the compatibility of the neoconservative hegemonic vision and ambition and the Israeli 
vision in sharing many strategies and concerns in the Middle East contradicted with 
democratised governments and people freely expressing their views, whether in the 
U.S.A or in the region (Khalidi, 2004: 53). As a result, Alam argued that one of Bush’s 
strategies in the War on Terror after 9/11 was to magnify and fuel the threat imposed by 
terrorists to prepare the world and the American public for different policies and a long, 
protracted war wherever it suits U.S. interests and hegemony (Alam, 2003: 6). 
 
The neoconservatives’ foreign policy differs from other realist and liberal U.S. foreign 
policies that are using consultation with the members of the region and other major 
powers, soft power, diplomacy, aid, military assistance and the use of multilateral 
approach. Although the main U.S. interests in the region remain the same, the success of 
the neoconservatives will depend not only on the resistance of other U.S. foreign 
policymakers and players in the U.S.A but also the resistance and the interaction of the 
Middle Eastern actors with this neoconservative project (Hudson, 2005: 305). 
 44
1.5.4 U.S. Security Perspective in the 2000s 
 
The garrisoning of U.S. troops in many regions all over the world for long periods of 
time, such as those in Germany and Japan after the Second World War, the former 
Yugoslavia since the mid-1990s and Central Asia and Afghanistan after 9/11 are all 
indications of the U.S. tendency to locate its military bases in every vital strategic region 
in the world. The Middle East is no exception; many U.S. troops remained in the Gulf 
countries after the Gulf War in 1991, not to mention the increase of these troops after the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Blum, 2003: 9). This distribution of U.S. military forces aimed 
to maintain regional and international order, which serves U.S. hegemony in these vital 
regions and prevents the emergence of any challenger to U.S. interests in them, 
consequently preventing the emergence of any challenger to U.S. hegemony in the world. 
In addition, the expansion of the U.S. influence and intervention in many international 
affairs increased or at least remained as if the Cold War was still progressing, to the 
extent that many people perceive its growth, influence and military presence everywhere 
as a growing empire all over the globe (Blum, 2003: 14).  
 
A hegemonic power usually represents different strategies and visions of civilisation. 
This representation and dissemination might be military or cultural, and so may be the 
resistance to it. Because of the fact that hegemonic power has different interests outside 
its borders, its self-defence might take place inside other countries’ borders. In addition, 
to defend interests and ideas in other countries, it may assume that these interests and 
ideas are part of a global project which is believed to be universally accepted and 
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manifestly desirable (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1380). According to PNAC, the U.S.A has an 
unprecedented opportunity to increase its hegemony in world politics and to enhance its 
security, economy, and wealth with the help of its allies and friends all over the world. 
Moreover, the PNAC asserted the vitality of the universality of the U.S. hegemony; the 
report argued that maintaining the U.S. superiority in military and security affairs through 
extra-territorial and security cooperation with other countries is a major component of the 
U.S. global leadership (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1393). 
 
It has been argued that most U.S. presidents found that issues related to foreign affairs 
have several dimensions which intersect and overlap; for example, George Shultz stated 
that U.S. foreign policy is about repeatedly dealing with the same issues in different faces 
and interpretations (Hastedt, 2006: 21). As such, according to Pipes, Islamic 
fundamentalism replaced the Communist threat to the U.S.A and to the international 
order. He argued that Islamic fundamentalists are more hostile to the U.S.A than the 
Communist ideology, mainly because of the means they use and the deep differences 
between the West and Islamic fundamentalist views towards everything in life (Gerges, 
1999: 24). Even before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many scholars of U.S. foreign policy 
and policymakers believed in the incompatibility between the U.S. interests in the Middle 
East and political Islam; they perceived political Islam as a vital combatant to U.S. 
interests and desires in the region (Gerges, 1999: 24).  
 
Lieven, among many others, argued that the U.S.A is the superpower without any 
challenger military, ideology or economically. Even countries such as China and Russia 
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are building economic and elite ties with the U.S.A, which inhibit any serious clash 
between these powers. Therefore, Lieven argues that the U.S.A does not need to worry 
about major powers; rather it should worry about international terrorism and radical 
religious organisations (Lieven, 2002: 246). The great danger of terrorism is posed by the 
possibility that different terrorist organisations, ethical, religious, separatist and others 
start to work together to challenge the current international order. Therefore, most 
countries in different regions, including major powers, claim to support the U.S. War on 
Terror (Lieven, 2002: 249). Additionally, the National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (NSS) in 2002 indicated that there a great threat is imposed by rouge 
states and terrorist organisations. More dangerously, the NSS indicated that these states 
and organisations might have the capability of using weapons of mass destruction in 
attacking the U.S.A or its allies. This vitalised the strengthening of alliances between the 
U.S.A and its friends and allies in counterterrorism issues to overcome this major threat 
(NSS, 2002: 14). 
 
The U.S.A assumed that its allies would welcome many U.S. initiatives in this regard. In 
addition, it is expected from U.S. allies to counter terrorism at different levels, 
internationally, regionally, and domestically (Wanandi, 2002: 184). This made many 
scholars and U.S. policymakers argue that although the U.S. administration was willing 
to lead an international coalition against terrorism, it did not have to consult all its allies 
about all the details of its policies and strategies (Wanandi, 2002: 184). Therefore, the 
neoconservatives’ desire of reshaping the security of the Middle East is based on the 
belief of the U.S. “just cause” and on the overwhelming power of the U.S.A However, 
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some may argue that history shows that direct control of the Middle East by Western 
powers proved to be ephemeral and costly (Hudson, 2005: 5).  
 
  
Richard B. Myers, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, asserted in 2004 that the 
first priority to achieve the U.S. national security is winning the War on Terror. 
According to the National Military Strategy of the United States (NMS) in 2004, the first 
line of the defence of the U.S.A is abroad, by working with U.S. allies against mutual 
enemies, especially with those who are close to terrorist’s sources (NMS, 2004: 2). 
Preventing attacks on the U.S.A or on its interests in many regions requires vigilant 
intelligence and cooperation by the U.S.A and its partners. Therefore, the cooperation 
between the U.S. armed forces and those of friends and allies, especially in countries 
which have terrorism origins, will contribute to a better international counterterrorism 
environment (NMS, 2004: 10). As a result, this cooperation is expected to enhance the 
stability of key regions and prevent conflicts that may cause threats to U.S. interests. 
Moreover, security cooperation, including intelligence cooperation, leads to better rapid 
crisis response and preventing surprise attacks (NMS, 2004: 12). 
 
The NMS in 2004 also asserted that achieving U.S. security and strategies requires the 
global presence of the U.S. military, and obtaining intelligent information from different 
allies. However, it argues that although the U.S. overseas presence is essential and can 
take different faces, it should result in improving the regional actors’ and allies’ abilities 
(NMS, 2004: 25). This has also been asserted in NSS in 2006. According to Korb and 
Boorstin, treating developing countries as allies and partners, especially in key regions 
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and issues, is more efficient than imposing policies upon them in building a better 
coalition and inducing cooperation (Korb and Boorstin, 2006: 13).  
 
Halliday argued that one of the major dimensions of globalisation is international security 
and stability, which is the responsibility of all states in all regions, especially those who 
suffer from the lack of it, such as those in the Middle East (Bilgin, 2005: 166). Therefore, 
the future of the security and economy of many states in the Middle East is determined by 
the fear of their policymakers of being marginalised in a more globalised world, and that 
is what made many of them, such as Jordan, support and participate in many global and 
U.S. initiatives (Bilgin, 2005: 169).     
   
1.5.5 U.S. Democratisation in the Middle East 
 
The rise of nationalism and statehood in each modern Arabic country, especially after the 
Second World War, aimed to unite each country with its multiple and complex ethnicities 
and religious beliefs to withstand internal and external threats. However, the policies 
adopted by the governments of these countries to achieve this national unity and identity 
were at the expense of democracy and development (Khalidi, 2004: 68). Noticeably, the 
emergence and the continuity of similar regimes which share many characteristics, such 
as being undemocratic, politically stagnant, and inefficient in economic and 
socioeconomic advancement, were simultaneous with the extraordinary involvement of 
the U.S.A in the affairs of these countries. The promise of these national regimes to free 
the Arab countries from colonial powers led to dependence on the U.S.A regarding their 
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external and internal security and affairs, which made the entire region susceptible to 
U.S. intervention and hegemony (Khalidi, 2004: 70).  
 
The U.S. criticism of the Arab democratic status targeted its allies in the region, such as 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as its foes such as Syria and Iraq. Since 9/11, promoting 
democracy in the Middle East has been espoused as one of the major aims of the U.S. 
administrations. It is believed that not only has democracy become one of the weapons to 
counter terrorism, but it is also a major element of the U.S.A and the neoconservatives’ 
world-view (Dalacoura, 2005: 963). Therefore, promoting democracy in the Middle East 
was embodied in different ways and levels; the Bush administration focussed its 
discourse on the importance of spreading democracy in the region by initiating the 
Middle East Partnership Initiative (METPI) in 2002, which aimed to encourage the 
countries in the region to promote economic, educational, political and social reforms 
which would lead to liberalising and modernising the governments, societies, and 
economies of these countries in order to foster the people’s conditions and eliminate 
extremism (Dalacoura, 2005: 964).  
            
Many U.S. foreign policy scholars and policymakers, such as Martin Indyk (Indyk, 1992: 
30) and Judith Miller (Miller, 1993: 52) believed that serious political reforms and free 
elections in the Arabic countries would weaken pro-U.S. governments in the Middle East, 
and would be an opportunity for the Islamists to seize power with their hostile anti-
American agenda. Therefore, these people rationalise their acceptance of authoritarian 
and semi-democratic regimes in the region as the lesser of two evils (Gerges, 1999: 27). 
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Moreover, they believe that the current regimes are very efficient and cooperative with 
the U.S.A and its policies and strategies in counter terrorism. This group of scholars, who 
were termed as the “Confrontationists”, perceived political Islam as a devastative threat 
to the U.S. interests in the region; they urged the U.S governments to support any regime 
or policy in the Middle East which crushed the Islamists (Gerges, 1999: 30). 
 
 The counter argument to the “Confrontationists” was embodied in the ideas of the 
“Accommodationists”; this group believed that the marginalisation of the Islamists by the 
U.S. government and by the undemocratic regimes in the region; the U.S. support of 
those corrupt, autocratic regimes and refusal to deal with the Islamists; and the 
unconditional U.S. support for Israel were the main reasons for the radicalization of the 
Islamists and their hostility towards the U.S.A (Gerges, 1999: 31). Therefore, Dalacoura 
rightly stated that, in reality, U.S. policies toward the Middle East were driven by 
neoconservatives’ beliefs in the sense that the U.S. interests in the region were best 
served by combining two strategies together; promoting liberalisation and 
democratisation in these countries in order to guarantee their continuous cooperation with 
the U.S.A in the future, and the use of hard power to ensure the efficiency of the U.S. 
strategies and interests in the region simultaneously (Dalacoura, 2005: 974). 
  
Islam as a religion, tradition, and as a political ideology is still very strong in many 
Arabic countries. Although the extent to which these shared threads are translated to 
common international policies among these countries is still debatable, Islam remained 
and is exploited as the legitimising power for many regimes in the Middle East and those 
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resisting these regimes as well (Murden, 20002: 186). As a result, the U.S. governments 
became suspicious of the validity of promoting democracy in this region if that would 
increase the political power of anti-American movements (Dalacoura, 2005: 973). This 
fact not only made the U.S. government reluctant to promote these programs, but also 
lessened the U.S. credibility among many people in the region. U.S. policies and 
initiatives were perceived by many people in the region to be inconsistent and aiming 
only to achieve its own interests, such as protecting Israel and increasing the U.S. 
influence and hegemony in the Middle East regardless of the democratic and human 
rights standards in the region (Dalacoura, 2005: 973).  
 
For many reasons that most Middle Eastern countries share in common, there is limited 
evidence that U.S. aid is an efficient tool in promoting democracy in the Middle East 
(Knack, 2004: 260). Khalidi argued that enhancing democracy in the Middle East does 
not require Western intervention and American enlightenment; Khalidi asserts that there 
are origins and buds of democracy in most Middle Eastern countries and a rejection of 
the perceptions of incompatibility between Islam and democracy (Khalidi, 2004: 62). In 
addition, Chollet and Goldgeir also doubted and questioned the possible success of the 
U.S. policies which were intended to promote a new Marshal Plan in the Middle East and 
Africa in April 2002 (Chollet and Goldgeir, 2005-06: 13). They argued that the European 
needs and circumstances after World War Two were different from those of the Middle 
Eastern countries and people at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The analogy 
between Europe and the Middle East might not lead to the same success if a similar 
Marshal plan in the Middle East was promoted. It has been argued that although the 
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U.S.A has been aiding Egypt intensively since the peace agreement with Israel in 1979, 
this did not prevent the remarkable growth of anti-Americanism and radicalism among 
the Egyptian population (Chollet and Goldgeir, 2005 -06: 16).  
 
In order to get the desirable outcomes of any assistance policies towards the Middle 
Eastern countries, it is essential first of all to encourage the governments and the people 
of these countries to fight corruption, adopt the rule of law, respect human rights and 
adopt open economic market policies to foster and develop civil societies in these 
countries (Chollet and Goldgeir, 2005-06: 17). However, I may argue that U.S. aid and 
political support to the current regime in Egypt, despite the negativity of it for America’s 
image in Egypt, prevented the Islamists from seizing power in the most populous Arab 
state, where the Islamists have been always powerful. If that had happened, another Iran 
(in a Sunni style) would have entered the region, which might have been very dangerous 
for U.S. interests and the stability of this vital and troubled region. The sections below 
will highlight more specifically the pillars of the Jordanian foreign policy and its 
interactions with the U.S.A, in order to allocate them in subsequent chapters of this thesis 
within the new pillars of the U.S. strategies and foreign policies that have been discussed 
in this chapter.   
 
1.6 Jordanian Foreign Policy and its Relations with the U.S.A 
                                                                             
The foreign policy of any state is about choices, aims, values and principles that the state 
gives an account of and considers when shaping its foreign policy. Moreover, the 
 53
challenges and threats that a state is facing and the sacrifices it has to make in order to 
achieve its desirable and vital aims are highly influential in the making of its foreign 
policy (Hastedt, 2006: 20). Ryan argues that Jordan is a relatively small and weak 
country compared with its surrounding powerful neighbours. However, its geopolitical 
importance and location gave it a considerable attention from regional powers as well as 
superpowers, which enabled it to survive and become an active partner in the Middle East 
(Hey, 2003: 137). For example, during the Cold War, Jordan was perceived by the 
Western superpowers as a conservative resisting player against radical Arabic Nationalist 
movements with strong ties to the Soviet Union, in addition to which it was a potentially 
moderate power in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its utility to U.S. foreign policy 
objectives and its own need for Western economic and military support fostered strong 
relations between Jordan and the U.S.A (Hey, 2003: 138).  
 
1.6.1 Regional and Domestic Politics  
 
There are many events and process in the Middle East which have made Jordan safer and 
more protected from external and internal threats. The elimination (or at least the 
reduction of) Pan-Arabism after the Arab defeat in the Six Days war in 1967 and the 
peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1979 made a new open war between Israel 
and other Arabic countries unlikely.  In addition, the victory of the Jordanian regime in 
1970 in expelling the forces of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) eliminated 
the internal threat that resulting from the demographic changes in Jordan after the 1967 
war (Hey, 2003: 140). 
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Jordan’s economic weakness remained a major factor in shaping its foreign policy; 
therefore, its full support of Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-1988) was unsurprising, 
mainly because the Jordanian-Iraqi economic ties were vital for both countries during that 
period. Not only did Jordan benefit economically from Iraq during this war, but also 
received financial support and oil supply from other Gulf countries who viewed the 
Iranian revolution as a major threat to the region. The Jordanian backing of Iraq in that 
war also enhanced the regime’s reputation domestically; Saddam Hussein was believed to 
be the advocate of the Arab cause during that decade, especially given the limited 
Egyptian role in Arab affairs in that period  as a result of its unexpected peace agreement 
with Israel in 1979 (Shulman, 2006: 3).  
 
The regime’s survival and the state’s security were always paramount factors in the 
making of Jordanian foreign policy; however, the Jordanian leadership managed, 
relatively successfully, to combine the regime’s interests and legitimacy with national 
interests. For example, Jordan was noticeably absent from the international collation led 
by the U.S.A against Iraq in the Gulf War (1990-1991). Although Jordan condemned the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it kept its ties with Iraq very strong, not to mention that the 
public support for Iraq in Jordan was very high. This policy, however, harmed the 
Jordanian relations with the U.S.A and the Gulf countries remarkably; Jordan lost much 
international aid, from the U.S.A and from Gulf countries, and was regionally and 
internationally isolated due to its position in the war (Swaidan and Nica, 2002: 2).  
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Jordan found that by using its geopolitical status and joining the peace process between 
the Arab countries and Israel which was initiated after the 1991 Gulf War would help 
Jordan to reengage in regional and international politics and to achieve its needs and 
security. As a result; making peace with Israel in 1994 was a great opportunity to change 
the regional circumstances that were binding Jordan from achieving its interests and to 
rebuild its relations with the U.S.A in order to sort out many of its vital concerns 
regarding its economy and security (Hey, 2003: 141). Therefore, Jordan shifted its 
foreign policy toward Iraq by becoming more critical of the Iraqi regime in the mid 1990s 
and managed to rebuild its relations with the Gulf countries, especially with Saudi 
Arabia, and enhance its ties with the U.S.A and Britain (Hey, 2003: 142).  
 
1.6.2 Liberalisation and Jordanian Foreign Policy 
 
Brand argued that the Jordanian leadership was worried about the remarkable success of 
the Islamists in the election of 1989, which came as a result of the liberalisation process 
in that year (Brand, 1999: 53). In addition, while one of the reasons for supporting 
Saddam Hussein during that war was domestic pressures on King Hussein, it was vital for 
the Jordanian regime later to manipulate the domestic sphere to accomplish the required 
compatibility between the new Jordanian foreign policies and major regional and 
international changes such as the defeat of Iraq, Jordanian economic needs, the peace 
process, the end of the Cold War and the increase of the U.S. involvement and power in 
the region accordingly. Therefore, the Jordanian regime adopted many restriction policies 
from 1989 to 1993, and many laws were revised, such as the electoral law and press law, 
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in order to guarantee a limited presence of Islamists in future parliaments. These 
decisions aimed to enable the regime to have more autonomy and freedom from domestic 
pressures in the making of its foreign policies. Needless to say these changes and 
preparations by the Jordanian government occurred alongside the negotiations for a peace 
treaty with Israel, which was expected to be opposed by the Islamists (Brand, 1999: 58).  
 
According to Wiktorowicz, political liberalisation and civil society empowerment in 
Jordan as well as in many other countries in the Arab World were termed “Defensive 
Democracies” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 46). These policies were argued to be promoted by 
the regimes of these countries and were not a natural development of these societies 
generated by the people or regimes of these countries to achieve valid and genuine 
democracies. Furthermore, it is believed that the aim of these policies was to ensure and 
enhance the survival ability of these regimes in the face of economic and political crisis 
rather than increasing political freedom and participation. These kinds of policies helped 
the regimes of these countries to achieve better control and manipulation of social and 
economic spheres, as new factors and players started to emerge increasingly and actively 
in these societies in facing different crises in these countries (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 50).  
 
Jillian Schwedler argued that it took King Hussein five years of hard working and many 
serious and sensitive decisions had to be taken by Jordan, such as the peace treaty with 
Israel, to rebuild Jordan’s ties with the U.S.A and to ensure its stability and vital needs 
(Schwedler, 2003: 23). Therefore, it became vital for the Jordanian regime not to be very 
sympathetic to Jordanian public opinion regarding foreign affairs, especially when these 
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opinions clashed with Jordanian foreign policy towards the U.S.A and other crucial 
issues, such as Israel, peace in the region, and the Islamists. As a result, King Abdullah II 
is aware of the danger of jeopardizing Jordan’s ties with the U.S.A, especially after what 
Jordan experienced because of its sympathy towards Iraq in the Gulf War (Schwedler, 
2003: 23). 
  
In his speech to the Jordanian parliament in October 1994 (after the signing of the peace 
agreement between Jordan and Israel), President Clinton emphasized the importance of 
promoting democracy and resisting terrorism and extremism in the region in order to 
foster peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East (Gerges, 1999: 54). However, 
Haass and Paris questioned the validity of Clinton’s policies of promoting the 
democratization of the Middle East. They argued that such policies would harm U.S. 
interests in the Middle East, believing that wide political participation in Jordan would 
have risked the peacemaking between Jordan and Israel, and lessened Jordanian 
cooperation with the U.S.A; therefore, they believed that supporting the current political 
status quo in Jordan is an essential strategic requirement (Gerges, 1999: 114). 
 
1.6.3 The Peace Agreement and U.S.-Jordanian Relations 
 
After the peace agreement with Israel in October 1994 the U.S.-Jordanian bilateral 
relations improved remarkably; in 1996 the U.S.A treated Jordan as a Major Non-NATO 
ally (MNNA), which is an unusual and privileged status. Jordan benefited a lot from this 
treatment, mainly in the form of military aid and increased security support and 
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cooperation from the U.S.A. This, beside the peace agreement with Israel, resulted in 
increasing Jordan’s role as an active player in different kinds of cooperation with 
different major actors in the region such as Turkey, Israel and Egypt. In addition, Jordan 
showed a remarkable flexibility in its foreign policies to obtain relatively good relations 
with the main players in the Middle East as well as with the U.S.A. Although Jordan was 
concerned about its security from external threats, it was also motivated by its domestic 
needs and affairs, political as well as economic (Hey, 2003: 143). 
 
In October 2000 Jordan and the U.S.A signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between 
the two countries in order to eliminate all of the tariffs and other barriers in trade between 
the two countries within ten years. It is argued that these agreements are used by the 
U.S.A only to encourage its partners to adopt liberal economic and political approaches 
(Rosen, 2004: 62-65). However, the FTA gave Jordan the privilege to become one of 
only four countries in the world at that time (after Canada, Mexico and Israel) to have 
such an agreement with the U.S.A. For the U.S.A, trade with Jordan is not important due 
to the smallness of the Jordanian market compared with other partners, but this agreement 
aimed to achieve a political rather than an economic goal; the U.S.A aimed to support its 
foreign policy in the Middle East by projecting its image as a great supporter of its 
strategic allies in this region by empowering and supporting them in order to further their 
policies in the region. On the other hand, for Jordan, the agreement achieved essential 
political and economic vital goals; Jordan was rewarded for its compliance with the peace 
process and supporting different U.S. policies in the region. In addition, this agreement 
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removed any discriminatory measures against Jordan in its trade with the U.S.A, which 
increased remarkably after the signing of this agreement (Rosen, 2004: 62-65).  
 
1.6.4 Jordan and King Abdullah II 
 
There are some similarities and differences between King Abdullah II, who succeeded to 
the Jordanian throne in February 1999, and his father King Hussein, who ruled Jordan 
from 1952 until his death in 1999. Both of them were pro-Western and moderate 
monarchs, but from his first year in office King Abdullah II lessened Jordan’s focus on 
regional politics to enhance domestic affairs and developing the Jordanian economy, by 
integrating it in the global economy to become part of regional Pax Americana (Andoni, 
2000: 77).  
 
According to Andoni, although King Abdullah II was against the embargo of Iraq, he was 
uncritical of the U.S. policies in the region as well as in the world; neither was he critical 
of the Iraqi regime (Andoni, 2000: 80). Moreover, King Abdullah II believed that the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is the main obstacle for the modernisation and development of 
Jordan and the region which can only be achieved by U.S. involvement in the region and 
its domination of world affairs. Therefore, King Abdullah II supports the different 
interests and policies of the U.S.A in the region and in the world. Notably, unlike King 
Hussein, King Abdullah II’s policies and beliefs have not faced major internal and 
regional challenges, mainly because of the absence of the legacy of the Cold War and 
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pan-Arabism and their impact on Jordan and on the region, not to mention the increased 
ability of the Jordanian regime in manipulating internal affairs (Andoni, 2000: 81).  
 
From his accession to the throne King Abdullah II realised the weaknesses and the 
problems that the Jordanian economy was facing, and the depressing social impacts of 
these problems. The main political concern of these problems was that they could reach a 
level that might jeopardize the stability of the country at early stages of his era. 
Therefore, he supported privatisation and reform policies of the Jordanian economy as 
the sole solutions for these problems; it is worth mentioning in this regard that such 
solutions and policies are compatible with the U.S. vision (Andoni, 2000: 85). 
Consequently, his first visit to the U.S.A and Europe in May 1999 aimed to ensure 
economic aids and debt relief from these countries. However, the U.S. government 
conditioned its support for the “new Jordan” upon it remaining a moderate and 
cooperative partner with the U.S.A and its policies in the region, supportive of the peace 
process in the Middle East (Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 1999: 30-31). 
 
Nonetheless, according to Vogt, the U.S. support of Jordan did not prevent the emergence 
of anti-Americanism among some Jordanian people and some political powers and 
parties. Many U.S. aid programs to Jordan were accused by these groups, especially the 
Islamists, of being associated with normalisation attempts with Israel, which they believe 
to be harmful to Jordan (Faath, 2006: 139). On the other hand, it is argued that anti-
Americanism in Jordan is not profoundly oriented by ideological or cultural beliefs and 
differences; rather, the major factor that fuels anti-Americanism in Jordan is the U.S 
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foreign policy in the region, especially regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq 
(Faath, 2006: 140). 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a general description of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle 
East and the position of Jordan within these policies and strategies accordingly. In 
addition, the chapter highlighted the main concerns of Jordan and the pillars of the 
Jordanian foreign policy since King Abdulla II succeeded to the throne. This historical 
revision of U.S. strategies and concerns in the Middle East aimed to understand the 
standing point of U.S. strategies and concerns in the region during the Presidency of 
G.W. Bush in order to be aware of the international and the regional environments that 
Jordan was operating in when conducting its relations with the U.S.A.  
 
It has been mentioned in this chapter that in the early 1990s Jordan did not support the 
U.S.A in the Gulf War of 1991, then later it shifted its foreign policy towards Iraq by 
being more critical of Saddam Hussein and closer to the U.S.A. Although these policies 
and shifts in Jordan’s foreign policy  proved to be costly internationally and domestically, 
they manifested the ability, and more importantly the necessity, of Jordan to manoeuvre 
and to act freely, occasionally with balanced calculations of international, regional and 
domestic factors. In addition, it is salient also from this chapter that Jordan has been 
significantly dependent on the U.S.A in many of its pivotal needs; therefore, the chances 
for Jordan and its relatively new monarch to succeed in practicing such kinds of 
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manoeuvring not only depend on Jordan’s desires and its regional and domestic 
calculations, but also on the features of the relations between the two countries and the 
U.S. interactions and responses to these policies, especially in a more uni-polar world 
with more tendency towards bold unilateralism in U.S. policies, especially in the Middle 
East, after 9/11, which this thesis will examine more deeply in later chapters.  
 
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that the events of 9/11 and the neo-
conservatism of U.S. foreign policy added new dimensions to U.S. policies in the Middle 
East. These policies influenced its relations with Jordan remarkably, especially those 
such as the intensification of security cooperation between the U.S.A and its allies in 
different counter-terrorism strategies and the U.S. democratisation process to erode 
extremism in these countries. These U.S. dimensions and policies have huge 
consideration and calculations of Israel and its prevailing importance for the U.S.A as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, especially from the neoconservative perspective. 
Therefore, the impact of these U.S. policies on U.S.-Jordanian relations will be explored 
in depth and will occupy chapter four regarding U.S.-Jordanian security cooperation, 
chapter five regarding U.S. democracy promotion in Jordan, and chapter six regarding the 
consequences of these U.S. policies on the tri-dimensional relations between the U.S.A, 
Israel and Jordan. Each of these chapters will explore the features and the pillars of U.S.-
Jordanian relations regarding these issues during the 2000s. It is important to stress here, 
given the resources available, that these chapters will focus slightly more on Jordanian 
experiences in U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s regarding the issues mentioned 
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above. This is largely because Jordanians, as the weaker side in these relations, are best-
placed in order to assess how far Jordan is independent in its relations with the U.S.A.       
 
It is clear however that the neoconservatives and U.S. policies in the region are 
overlapping and reciprocal. According to the key neoconservative figure Robert Kagan, 
the U.S. approach after 9/11 was driven by two motivations: national security and 
ideological and moral commitments (Hudson, 2005: 299). This illustrates that the U.S. 
foreign policy during the Bush era was driven by a contradicting combination of some 
realist and idealistic motivations in its foreign relations, including with its historical 
allies. Therefore, the chapter that follows will investigate the main theories of IR in order 
to figure out the appropriate theoretical framework by which the relations between the 
U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s can be successfully investigated.  
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Debate and U.S.-Jordanian Relations: Deriving a Liberal 
Hegemonic Approach 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the main theoretical concepts of IR that this thesis is concerned 
with. The overreaching aim of this chapter is to provide an identification and justification 
for the theoretical framework that is used for this thesis. This aim will be fully 
accomplished in the following methodology chapter. The reason for this delay of 
identifying and justifying the theoretical framework used is due to two reasons; firstly, 
the chosen theoretical framework and its two main concepts or pillars are derived from a 
process of including and excluding some concepts from a set of independent theories and 
paradigms of IR that are addressed in this chapter. Secondly, while this thesis is aiming to 
obtain reliable knowledge regarding the subject matter, the theoretical framework is 
designed to be compatible with the main methodological characteristics of this academic 
inquiry, which are going to be addressed in the following chapter. As a result, the specific 
aim of this chapter is to conduct an analysis and comparison of the main theories and 
paradigms that the theoretical framework is composed of in order to verify the adequacy 
of the norms that compose it.  
 
The chapter starts by highlighting the logic behind theories of IR in order to be aware of 
the quality and type of the required theoretical framework while establishing the core 
theory for this academic investigation. Then, as this thesis investigates the relationships 
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between a superpower and a developing country, a brief discussion of how applicable the 
main theories of IR are to such relations will be provided. These two sections provided 
the researcher with guidelines for the next step of this chapter while exploring the debate 
that took place in the 1990s and 2000s among the main two paradigms of IR; neorealism 
and neoliberalism. This debate will conduct a process of including as well as excluding 
some norms from these two leading approaches in order to compose the theoretical 
framework of this research. The chapter will justify the derivation of liberal hegemony as 
a result of this debate and its adequacy for this thesis compared to other alternatives such 
as the theories of hegemonic stability and American empire. Based on this debate, the 
chapter highlights two paradigms and their adequacy for this study: U.S. liberal 
hegemony and small states’ politics. These two paradigms underlie the theoretical 
framework, in which a combination process of their main concepts is performed in the 
methodology chapter, based on the chosen methodological characteristics of this 
research, which will be tested and judged empirically in the subsequent chapters to the 
following chapter.   
 
2.2 The Importance of Theories in Studying International Relations 
 
International politics is a very wide field and covers all aspects of the political life of a 
state and its interactions with other states, in a complex firmament of internal and 
external conditions and variables. Therefore, scholars of international politics need IR 
theories to provide them with an organised generalisation of international politics. 
Moreover, IR theory helps in narrowing and focusing attention on the main actors and 
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issues in this field and how they affect the ways states behave, perform, and interact in 
order to have greater ability to understand and predict the outcomes of the interplay 
between internal and external actors in foreign policymaking (Weber, 2001: 126). In 
addition, a major reason for studying and using theories of IR is to facilitate making this 
field more sensible; theories provide scholars of world politics with conceptual 
frameworks by which they can interpret different events at the international arena that 
resulted from a variety of motivations and aims more accurately (Burchill and Linklater, 
2005: 17).  
 
IR theories are the lenses through which scholars observe the world to give them a clearer 
vision about their objects, in order to obtain better understanding of the logic and nature 
of relations between states. Therefore, a theory of IR should be able to describe, explain, 
and predict the behaviour of states and the outcomes of this behaviour with an ability to 
generalise its assumptions (Neuman, 1998: 14). Moreover, any theory of IR should be 
able to narrow down its scope of inquiry by being selective in choosing the most 
important and decisive factor or factors as the level of analysis and inquiry (Burchill and 
Linklater, 2005: 13). However, theories of IR not only differ in the object or the level of 
analysis as the main actor in the field, they also differ in the purpose and method in 
investigating each level of analysis. As a result, they help to include as well as to exclude 
different components according to their importance for the state and its foreign policy or 
their importance in particular events and relations at the international arena. Each theory 
has its own understanding and perspective of international politics based on different 
realities, cases and historical contexts. However, many theories and concepts have 
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derived and evolved from the debate between the main assumptions of major theories in 
IR, such as neorealism and neoliberalism (Ayoob, 1998: 31).  
 
2.3 Developing Countries and International Relations Theories 
 
While the major component of the core theory of this thesis is Ikenberry’s liberal 
hegemony, and while Ikenberry argues that liberal hegemony is exclusive to advanced, 
industrialised and democratic countries (Ikenberry, 2001), this section provides a vital 
discussion about the adequacy of theories of IR in general in the study of developing 
countries in order to justify the usage of some concepts of major theories in IR from 
which Ikenberry’s liberal hegemony derives. 
     
Some scholars such as Singer and Wildavsky believe that understanding world politics 
should be based on a division between the politics of the North and the South of the 
globe. They argue that the Northern countries are democratic, peaceful, powerful, and 
prosperous, whereas the South is a zone of turmoil, underdevelopment, dictatorships and 
conflicts. One aspect of this is the claim that the interaction and the mutual influence 
between the two parts of the world are limited (Neuman, 1998: 4). In other words, some 
scholars argue that world politics is based on separation rather than interrelatedness 
between the parts of the world. Accordingly, theories of IR and their main assumptions 
may suit one part of the world or a set of states, but not necessarily the other. 
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On the other hand, other scholars such as Ayoob argue that the developing countries are 
an important and active part of the international system (Ayoob, 1995). Ayoob asserts 
that the growth in interdependency of world politics makes the periphery a major 
component in the understanding of world politics and in achieving the stability of the 
entire system, resulting in a considerable weight of developing countries in super powers’ 
calculations. For that reason, Ayoob rejected the idea of two separate international 
systems and emphasized the existence of one wide, interlocked, international system, 
which includes both developed and undeveloped countries and zones in one world 
(Neuman, 1998: 5). For example, the policymakers of Middle Eastern countries as well as 
those of major states and superpowers who are involved in the region are aware of the 
fact that the politics of the Middle East cannot be fully understood independently from 
world politics and major events in the international arena (Halliday, 2005: 20). As a 
result, one of the major facts of Middle Eastern relations and its relations with 
superpowers is the interlocking of regional and international affairs and crisis and the 
interlocking of the policies implemented by these superpowers (Halliday, 2005: 131).  
 
Some scholars believe that modern theories of IR are Eurocentric and originate in the 
U.S.A, they believe that these theories aimed to explain the international politics in the 
West and they can also be generalised to the rest of the world (Neuman, 1998: 2). On the 
other hand, some scholars questioned and doubted the adequacy of generalising these 
theories; they also questioned the applicability of many basic concepts of these theories 
to non-Western countries, such as the concepts of rational choice, the state or the nation 
state, sovereignty, and international alliance (Neuman, 1998: 7). For example, Ayoob 
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argues that neorealism and neoliberalism, as the main paradigms of IR, are mainly 
designed to tackle the relations between great industrial powers only. These theories 
based their assumptions on the Westphalian style of state, which is not the case of many 
developing countries, mainly because they neglect many domestic factors that are still 
strong in determining the foreign policies of these countries (Ayoob, 1998: 37). More 
importantly, neorealism and neoliberalism emerged and evolved in the developed world 
during the twentieth century based on loaded and rich historical interactions between 
these states and on the development of previous ideas and arguments accordingly. During 
the emergence of these two leading theories, however, many developing countries, until 
now in some cases, were still at early stage of the state-making process which took place 
in Europe and the West in the seventeenth century. In other words, Ayoob claims that the 
current premature and untimely progress of the developing countries’ international 
politics undermines the applicability of these two leading theories to these countries 
(Ayoob, 1998: 41).  
 
However, while the purpose of this chapter is to select and justify a theoretical 
framework for this thesis, it is essential to tackle these major two theories using a 
selective approach in order to establish the core theoretical concepts which are going to 
be tested empirically in this thesis. Not less importantly, while this thesis addresses the 
relations between the U.S.A and Jordan as a developing country, the assessment of the 
theoretical framework will be of great importance for this debate and the robustness and 
adequacy of the norms of these theories. Most important of all, the core theory of this 
thesis is not neorealism or neoliberalism; it is a conceptualised theory that includes and 
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excludes some norms from these two major theories, and from other norms such as small 
states’ politics and U.S. liberal hegemony. This core theory resulted from considering the 
disparities between the two countries, the U.S and Jordan, in terms of power and other 
different characteristics.     
 
2.4 Neorealism 
 
The emergence of any international concept or theory does not take place in a vacuum, 
their engagement and presence in the field based on their sense and power. Major 
historical events in the international arena encouraged the emergence and the shape of 
some theories of IR (Nye, 1998: 235). However, while historical and international events 
encourage the emergence of theories, they can also limit their power and adequacy. For 
example, the implications of international cooperation enhanced the conceptualization 
and the identification of the state’s different interests, contrary to the realist thought 
which focuses its attention on the security and survival of the state and its focus only on 
power politics (Nye, 1998: 240).  
 
From a realist perspective the state is the main actor in IR and there is no higher authority 
than it. Moreover, the clash of interests between states is inevitable. Therefore, the major 
aim of the state is to achieve its survival by adopting a self-help approach and possessing 
power. No less importantly, the sovereignty of the state is paramount to international law 
and cooperation. As a result, policymakers and heads of state must be free in their 
choices in order to protect their states’ vital interests. Realism also assumes that people 
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are misanthropic by nature and aim to dominate other countries, even by force, which 
makes absolute trust between states impossible, even between allies. Therefore, for 
realists, stability at the international arena results from a balance of power between states, 
whereby no single state or group of states has the ability to overpower others (Kegley, 
1995: 5). 
 
The power of realism in predicting and analysing international affairs and the behaviours 
of states were salient during war times, such as the period between the First and the 
Second World Wars. However, the effectiveness and relevance of realism lessened when 
the international conditions changed to more harmonious and peaceful relations between 
states (Kegley, 1995: 6). Therefore, while the increase of international trade and stability 
which were simultaneous with huge critics of classical realism in the 1970s, the 
emergence of Neorealism in Waltz’s book Theory of International Politics in 1979 aimed 
to refresh and to provide a supplementary approach to classical realism by describing 
many aspects of international politics that started to decline after the Second World War 
(Nye, 1998: 240). The main achievements of Waltz and neorealism were that they 
defined and described the international system and structure well enough in order to be a 
basic and a discrete framework of explaining the state’s behaviour and international 
politics in general (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993: 23). 
 
The claim that neorealism is more scientific than other theories of IR, especially 
liberalism, gave it some privilege in the study of world politics in the post-war era 
(Forde, 1995: 141). For Waltz, what makes neorealism more scientific is its sharp focus 
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and narrow scope on the structure of the international system, which enables neorealism 
to be more predictive, empirical and wide-reaching. There are many debates and studies 
on the adequacy of focusing merely on the structure of the international system, however, 
rationalism is a basic element of the neorealist understanding of international politics and 
the behaviour of states in an anarchical world (Forde, 1995: 142). For neorealists, there 
are two features related to the structure of the international system which characterise the 
system: the configuration of the system, whether it is a multi-polar or bipolar system; and 
the permanent anarchical nature of any international system (Forde, 1995: 145). 
 
Neorealist theory of IR is based on the idea of system, structure and units. The 
international system is a group of states (units) and the behaviour of each unit is 
important for all of the others. Moreover, understanding the interactions between states is 
very important in order to perceive the nature, logic and the coherence of the system 
(Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993: 29). For Waltz, neorealism is based on the ideas that:  
political structure is the organizing principle of the international system, the differences 
are in the unit’s functions and capabilities (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993: 36). Therefore, 
Waltz’s understanding of power is as a means for the state rather than a desire; he 
believes that states’ foreign policies aimed not only to achieve their survival, but also 
other aims such as gaining wealth, prosperity and influence (Donnelly, 2005: 42). Waltz 
argued that international politics is better understood by relying on a systematic theory by 
emphasizing the importance of the structure of the international system where the units 
interact (Waltz, 1986: 71). Therefore, the position of the state in the system and how it is 
arranged and positioned within the system are very important in understanding the 
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international system and the behaviour of the states within it. As a result, it is the system 
and its structure, not the states themselves, which are able to position the states in the 
system and determine their place, behaviours, and policies within it (Waltz, 1986: 71).  
 
Neorealists hold that the international system is a coherent but anarchical structure by 
spontaneous coexistence and interactions between the sovereign states, which all aim to 
survive and act without external constraints. Therefore, self-help is the main motivation 
of the behaviours of all states in the international system, although they differ in their 
behaviours, all aim to survive in an anarchical world (Waltz, 1986: 85). The structure and 
shape of the international system, from Waltz’s point of view, are determined by two 
interrelated factors: firstly, the behaviours and the interactions between states in the 
international system; and secondly, the capabilities of states, as well as the distributions 
of these capabilities among them (Waltz, 1986: 90, 91). Therefore, the distribution of 
power and capability between the actors and the change of this distribution are the 
driving forces behind the change in the nature of the international system, as well as the 
change in the nature of the behaviours and interactions between its units, the states 
(Waltz, 1986: 92). For neorealists, what also identify the international system are the 
interactions between states and the regularity of their behaviours; moreover, the ordering 
principle (anarchy), the functions of the states and the distribution of capabilities and 
power are also main factors that shape the international system (Nye, 1998: 241).  
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Waltz argued that the international system is anarchical in nature and lacked international 
government to force order within the system; moreover, he insisted that although 
international organisations do exist and sometimes function effectively, they could not do 
so without the acquiescence and the support of the state (Waltz, 1986: 81). Therefore, 
there is always a possibility of the use of force and violence in relations between different 
states. In this regard, Waltz argued that the use of force and violence is associated with 
the nature of men, whether it is within the states or among them, regardless of the 
presence of the government or an agent, nationally or internationally (Waltz, 1986: 98). 
In an anarchical system, Waltz argued, units are alike and they behave similarly, 
therefore, the use or the non-use of force does not distinguish domestic politics from 
international politics. The difference between the national and international systems is in 
the presence of a hierarchy of government which monopolises the legitimate use of 
power to organise the relations between the members such as the one in the state itself. 
On the other hand, at the international level the main doctrine is self-help in the absence 
of a legitimate international hierarchy, so each state has to protect itself by any affordable 
means (Waltz, 1986: 100). 
 
Neorealism tried to interpret the behaviour of states and international conflicts by 
focusing on the impact of the anarchical environment which is imposed on the states and 
on the system. Neorealism assumes that the dynamics of the international system and 
structure compel the state to behave in a certain way, therefore, to understand the 
behaviour of the state it is important to understand the international environment and the 
situation and the position of the state within the international system, and how that affects 
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its performance (Shimok, 1992: 293). As a result, neorealism constitutes a 
conceptualization framework of IR which differs from classical realism, although some 
scholars (such as Keohane) believe that neorealism is solely a systemization attempt of 
classical realism (Shimok, 1992: 296).  
 
Neorealists refused to explain international politics by referring merely to the 
characteristics of the state or the human, they argue that what determines the state to be 
cooperative or aggressive are the international system in which the state acts and the 
distribution of power among states in the system (Shimok, 1992: 298). Moreover, Waltz 
argued that change in the international structure will affect the behaviour of the states and 
the outcomes of their interactions (Kegley, 1995: 74). Neorealism assumes that the 
survival of the state and its security are paramount to economic prosperity and 
interdependence, which may harm the state’s sovereignty and freedom of action in a 
competitive and anarchical system; therefore, international cooperation and economic 
motivations will always be bound to how secure the state feels in an anarchical world 
(Burchill, 2005: 66). 
 
Waltz asserted that states, if they have the choice, prefer to maintain their positions in the 
system rather than to maximize their power (Waltz, 1979). As a result, balancing against 
strong states is the expected behaviour of weaker states rather than bandwagoning, 
especially when major changes in the distribution of capabilities take place. According to 
Keohane, the ambiguity which neorealism is facing is that it is focusing on the 
capabilities of the states whereas its implications stress external threats and influences 
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that the state is facing in the international system (Keohane, 1984). In addition, Walt 
argues that states not only aim to counterbalance superior power, but also possible 
threats; for example, many states chose to ally themselves with the U.S.A despite the fact 
that it was more powerful than the Soviet Union during the Cold War mainly because the 
Soviet Union was perceived as a greater threat to many weaker and smaller countries 
(Keohane and Walt, 1988: 171). Walt argues that what determines whether a state is a 
threat to another state or not are its proximity, offensive capability and intentions. 
Moreover, he believes that balancing is more prevalent than bandwagoning because states 
bandwagon only in certain situations, such as when the state is very weak, suffers from 
unavailability of allies, and when the policymaker of these states believe that the 
appeasement of the threatening power could work effectively (Keohane and Walt, 1988: 
172).  
 
Neorealists assume that the inequality of different sources of power between states makes 
any cooperation between them result in unequal distribution of the expected gain. 
Moreover, because of the anarchical nature of the international system, which includes 
the potentiality of war and the security dilemma which states live in, the state must not 
compromise or disarm itself, even if that will result in more cooperation and gains for 
both states. Waltz justifies such policies mainly because in doing so the state will put its 
security and survivability at risk from the other state, which would gain more and 
enhance its capability (Waltz, 1986: 102). 
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There are other ways in which the structure of the international system limits cooperation 
between states; a state avoids cooperation with others lest it become too dependent on 
them. Small states are likely to import and export more because of their limited resources 
and markets, which makes them more interdependent on others. In order to enhance well-
being, cooperation between states should be based on a division of labour, which can 
result domestically from an imperative act by the government, but this cannot be done 
internationally (Waltz, 1986: 103). On the other hand, because neorealism does not give 
much credit to human nature and condition, some people may argue that there is in fact 
an opportunity for optimism in international politics. This optimism is derived from the 
belief that anarchy has not been proven to be an immutable feature of international 
politics. Moreover, neorealism does not perceive conflicts between states as inevitable if 
the security and the interests of these states are achieved and met (Shmoke, 1992: 299). 
When the level and capacity of the interactions between states are very high and when the 
foreign policies of these states aim to engage in interdependency then the volume, speed 
and the reliability of the interaction and cooperation between states may override the 
anarchical nature and the structure of the international system (Buzan, Jones and Little, 
1993: 78). According to Buzan, scientific and technological developments increased the 
exchange among nations in order to achieve prosperity and welfare resulting in more 
interdependency and cooperation between them. However, the limitation of trade and 
international economic interdependence between the East and the West during the Cold 
War were major reasons for the limitation of international cooperation, and peace in 
general during this period of time (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 124). 
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For neorealists, wars take place between states because “there is nothing to prevent them” 
(Waltz, 1979: 113). Therefore, the first priority of the state is to survive and to protect 
itself from external aggression instead of achieving the individual’s well-being. 
Moreover, from a neorealist perspective, states aim to maintain their position in the 
international system by increasing their capabilities and being aware of other states’ 
capabilities. Therefore, neorealists believe that the aim of relations with other states is not 
to achieve the highest possible gain, as neoliberals believe, but to prevent others from 
advancing their power lest they became more powerful than others. Neorealism assumes 
that because the state is a positional actor in the international system this lessens its desire 
to cooperate, because the gain that will result from its cooperation may change and 
enhance the position of other states, which may be in favour of other states. Meanwhile, 
neoliberals expect that anarchy will impede cooperation between states because of the 
possibility of incompliance by some states to rules and agreements, and because of the 
possibility of cheating and defection between states while cooperating with each other 
(Grieco, 1995: 161).                
 
There are different neorealist views of the criteria for power. They argue, for example, 
that international order derives from two concepts; balance of power or hegemonic 
stability. The theory of hegemonic stability is based on two propositions; firstly, the 
accomplishment of order in the international system is normally created by a dominant 
power, such as Great Britain in the nineteenth century, and the U.S.A from the mid-
twentieth. Secondly, the role of a hegemonic power as a stabilizing actor is crucial to 
maintain order in world politics (Keohane, 1984: 31). Hegemonic power must 
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accomplish accessibility and control over raw materials, resources, and markets, as well 
as the capacity of obtaining greater industry. Moreover, hegemonic power must have 
enough military power in order to be able to protect and maintain the international order 
and its hegemony from adversaries, and their temptation to change the international 
system and its structure, and controlling vital regions (Keohane, 1984: 39).  
 
However, Keohane argued that international cooperation and the establishment of 
international regimes which are based on hegemonic stability would be impotent if based 
merely on the realist concept of power and interests. In other words, Keohane asserted 
that international cooperation and order do not coexist with hegemony in the long run. 
Although he believed that hegemony may help at the beginning of establishing an 
international regime, because it facilitates cooperation between states, it is not a 
requirement for the maintenance of such a system (Keohane, 1984: 32). Moreover, 
Keohane argued that the empirical evidence for the validity and continuity of the 
hegemonic stability theory is weak, citing the case of Britain in the nineteenth century 
(Keohane, 1984: 38).  
 
Despite its popularity and relative success, neorealism faces much criticism and 
limitation in its capacity in interpreting international affairs. Although neorealism claims 
that it takes side with the American revolutions of realism and science against idealism 
and traditionalism, in practice it reduced the importance of politics by perceiving and 
interpreting it through analogizing politics to economics, as well as applying scientific 
methodologies to technical enterprises (Ashley, 1984: 227). Ashley also argued that 
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neorealism adopted only the importance of power from classical realism, and took from 
science the significance of increasing control. This selective approach perceived power as 
a rationale without limits, and resulted in a positivist structuralism which deals with the 
given order as the natural and permanent one leading to limitation in political discourse 
and subordinating all social practices that are important to social learning and change to 
the static of control (Ashley, 1984: 228).     
 
There are other criticisms of Waltz and neorealism, including that Waltz focussed too 
much on the system and the structure of the system, neglecting other important actors. 
Moreover, many scholars accused neorealism of being narrow and static. For example, 
Cox (1986) and Ashley (1988) argued that the reason behind the narrowness of 
neorealism is its marginalisation of other agents which are important to political 
outcomes. Similarly, scholars such as Keohane and Nye argued that there are un-
structural incentives behind many behaviours of the state (Keohane and Nye, 1987). The 
charge that structural realism is too static based on Waltz’s belief that the continuity of 
the nature of the international system and its structure are over change. Therefore, Waltz 
was accused also of keeping the variables of his theory to a minimum (Buzan, Jones and 
Little, 1993: 24, 25, 26).  
 
Keohane argued that Waltz had an over-militarised conception of power, let alone that he 
ignored the impact of the international economy on international politics and on the 
behaviour of the state. In support of Keohane’s points, Ruggie justified his accusation of 
neorealism as being too narrow and static by claiming that Waltz ignored the density of 
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the interactions between states in the system, which takes different levels in different 
issues, which are highly important for any state. Waltz assumed that the differentiation 
between states can be used as characteristics of the structure, whereas Ruggie stated that 
states evolve and change, and consequently their functions within the structure will 
change and evolve as well (Nye, 1988: 242). Thus, although neorealism highlighted the 
importance of the international system and the role of the hegemonic power, which will 
be of concern while discussing the theoretical framework of this thesis, it does not 
provide us with an adequate and sufficient explanation about international affairs under 
the current international conditions, especially those which concern the relations between 
small states and the U.S.A in the 2000s. Therefore, an optimistic and more dynamic 
vision and perspective of international affairs are required, especially in an apparently 
more changeable and dynamic world.  
 
2.5 Neoliberalism  
 
The contradiction between realism and liberalism is relatively similar to that between 
reality and aspiration; however, the aspirations of many countries and indeed of many 
relations are embodied in many policies between these countries, which have a great 
impact on the realities of the nature of these relations.   
 
The main assumptions of the liberal theory are that humans are good by nature and 
willing to cooperate with each other, and that collaboration between them is possible. In 
addition, liberals believe that negative human behaviour such as wars, selfishness, and 
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aggressiveness are the results of bad institutions and bad structural arrangements (in 
short, bad government) which encourage people and politicians to behave in such ways. 
Moreover, they believe that wars can be avoided by eradicating the anarchical conditions 
which could be eliminated by collective international efforts (Kegley, 1995: 4). 
According to many liberals, such as Kant, the nature of the relations between people as 
well as between states is based on harmony, peace and cooperation (Kant, 2006). 
Moreover, liberals believe that people are capable of being peaceful by nature, but 
undemocratic regimes and corrupted governments use wars and international conflicts as 
means to enhance their power and wealth, because wars and conflicts provide politicians 
with the conditions that help them to remain in power and increase their authority by 
increasing taxes and reducing liberty, controlling the people and the political life in their 
countries (Burchill, 2005: 58).  
 
The common threads of liberal internationalist theory are the beliefs in the progress of 
human freedom, the increase of cooperation among nations, and the importance of 
modernization and democracy as the driving forces behind cooperation and human 
development. On the other hand, because of the scepticism of the high level of optimism 
of human progress, some liberals such as Stanley Hoffmann (Hoffmann, 1981) and 
Robert Keohane (Keohane, 1989), argued that liberal international theory, which is based 
on a relative and cumulative progress of humanity, leads to the belief that the individual 
is not and should not be the only major actor or the level of analysis in liberal 
international theory (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 121).  
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The main aims of international cooperation for liberals are to maximize benefits, to 
minimize the damage of interaction between states, and to increase the possibility of 
achieving national and international security, peace, justice and welfare for all states and 
people (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 110). For liberals, mutual interest is a main reason 
for cooperation between states, and this mutuality of interests will grow as a result of the 
spread and intensification of international interdependency and democratic values among 
countries. In addition, the development of industry and the spread of advanced 
technology in information and communications foster connectivity between countries. As 
a result, states will be more able to monitor each other and be more aware of their 
interests, resulting in a reduction of the negativity of relative gain and an increase of 
interdependency between countries. The help of the international organisations in this 
regard will make it more difficult for any state to cheat or to resort to the use of coercive 
power in dealing and interacting with other states (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 119). 
 
According to Carr (Carr, 1945: 5-6), many wars took place between states in the 
eighteenth century in order to increase the wealth and power of these states; this was 
simultaneous with the belief that the wealth and the power of the state can only be 
enhanced at the expense of other states’ wealth and power, mainly because of the belief 
that wealth and power were a fixed quantity and not susceptible to increase and share 
(Burchill, 2005: 62). Barriers between states increase or at least maintain a high level of 
nationalism among the people of these states, which lessens the mutual interaction and 
understanding between these peoples (protectionism). Therefore, the tension and the 
likelihood of conflicts between these countries increase. On the other hand, free trade 
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breaks the divisions between states and enhances the possibility of peaceful achievements 
for all sides. In addition, trade increases the contact between different cultures and 
civilizations, which mitigates the differences and enhances the mutual recognition 
between different peoples (Burchill, 2005: 63). According to classical liberals such as 
Adam Smith and Tom Paine, free movement of commodities, capital, and people across 
the world would extirpate the origins of wars and conflicts (Burchill, 2005: 64).  
 
The heart of the modern interdependence theory is based on free trade between countries. 
States engage in free trade in order to eliminate the possibility of conflicts between them 
by increasing the common interests and values among them. According to Robert 
Keohane, the main assumptions of neoliberalism are that the state is a rational actor 
which does not behave by self-abnegation but seeks the possible maximization of its gain 
under the conditions of stability in the international regime (Keohane, 1984). Moreover, 
Keohane believes that world politics are not completely dominated by cooperation and 
harmony; discord is a common fact in world politics and this is why for neoliberals such 
as Keohane the idea of international regime is highly important to maintain cooperation, 
which erodes the origins of conflicts (Hobson, 2000: 95).  
 
It is vital to highlight, however, in this regard that international cooperation is not always 
antithetical to hegemony. Hegemony can create order based on asymmetrical relations 
and cooperation. At the same time, international cooperation can be facilitated by the 
international regime and can exist without the presence of hegemonic power (Keohane, 
1984: 50). Cooperation between countries is a political process which starts in the 
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perception by each state of its preferences and interests and how they differ according to 
other states. Therefore, cooperation is the result of the adjustment of these interests and 
policies between these states, even if these adjustments include the negative inducement 
of one party (Keohane, 1984: 53). 
 
Cooperation between states may result from a reaction to an existing or potential conflict. 
The idea of absolute harmony between states in world politics envisioned by the founders 
of the League of Nations and the United Nations is becoming a utopian and vanishing 
one because of the increase in the complexity of the international economy and its impact 
on domestic issues and policies in each country (Keohane, 1984: 55). Therefore, discord 
and the impediment of international cooperation are the results of the lack of trust and 
communications between states (Keohane, 1984: 69). Meanwhile, some neoliberals such 
as Robert Axelord accept some realist views, especially about the role of the state and 
anarchy. He believes that the state cooperates with others but aims to achieve the most 
possible absolute gain regardless of other states’ gain and satisfaction (Grieco, 1995: 
159).                                         
 
According to Schumpeter, wars are the result of the aggressive instincts of the minority 
who obtain power, therefore the solutions and strategies to demise the reasons behind 
wars are democracy and free trade (MacMillan, 1995). By establishing the liberal state, 
which is based on individual rights, freedom, equality, and representative government, 
the desires and incentives for wars and conflicts will be reduced (Burchill, 2005: 59). 
Peaceful foreign policies of democratic states are the results of shared democratic and 
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liberal principles and values and the reciprocal recognition and commitment to the role of 
international law. Some liberals assert that liberal states do not engage in international 
conflicts unless in the cases of self-defence or humanitarian reasons, wherein the other 
side is usually an undemocratic state (Burchill, 2005: 60). Neoliberalism assumes that the 
government of a democratic country where the role of law and people’s rights, dignity, 
freedom and participation in political life are all guaranteed will deal with other countries 
in the same manner in which it deals with its people; as a result, its foreign policy will be 
peaceful and civilised (Burchill, 2005: 67). 
 
Many scholars of IR argued that the spread of democracy in the world after the end of the 
Cold War empowered the liberals and the Wilsonian vision of a peaceful world (Kegley, 
1995: 10). For example, Francis Fukuyama argued that the spread of democracy and 
legitimacy, which are based on liberal principles, among states in the world would result 
in the reflection of these ideas at the international level and in the relations between 
countries and their foreign policies (Burchill, 2005: 57). Therefore, a reciprocal 
recognition between states would create a peaceful international order. On the other hand, 
neorealists responded to the liberal approach by claiming that the moral aspiration which 
liberalism overvalues will be challenged by the reality of the absence of an international 
hierarchy, and the fact that anarchy is a major permanent fact of the nature of world 
politics. In addition, neorealists claim that anarchy caused the homogenization of states’ 
foreign policies by socializing with each other under the strategy of power politics 
(Burchill, 2005: 57). 
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For Keohane, international regimes are autonomous from international anarchy and the 
distribution of power. Therefore, cooperation between states is engineered and 
constructed by the international regime. States value and consider long-term gains, which 
are provided and enhanced by the international regime, and while states are international 
agents’ powers, they can negotiate with each other and reach agreements. Meanwhile, the 
international regime helps states to overcome anarchy; however, all of these 
achievements and roles given to the regime cannot take place without making the 
international regime equipped with the sufficient autonomy from anarchy and hegemony 
(Hobson. 2000: 96). By contrast, hegemonic stability theory, derived from neorealism, 
assumes that cooperation and order take place only by the enforcement of the hegemonic 
power, mainly because states do not cooperate voluntarily and spontaneously. Therefore, 
cooperation and order are not granted forever; they depend on the hegemonic state’s 
power and policies and on the distribution of power. This, from the neorealist 
perspective, makes the decline of the hegemonic power and the decline of international 
order and regime linked together. Consequently, neoliberalism claims that it is superior to 
neorealism in explaining and analysing the continuity and efficiency of the international 
regime, regardless of the existence of a hegemonic power (Hobson, 2000: 98). 
 
For many liberals, international order can only be achieved with the help and support of 
international institutions. According to Stephen Krasner, the origin of neoliberal 
institutionalism emerged as a result of the problems that neorealist hegemonic stability 
theory suffered from, especially its limited predictability of the continuity of the free 
trade regime and international cooperation post-1970s (Hobson, 2000: 95). Liberal 
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institutionalism and neorealism theories of IR agree upon the basic role of the state in an 
anarchical environment, however, liberal institutionalism believes that there is a high 
possibility of cooperation between states under the supervision and coordination of 
international institutions. For liberal institutionalism, international institutions offer the 
member state the opportunity of widening and broadening their interests, as well as 
chances of extra participation in world politics, which will help the state in identifying 
and achieving its interests under a set of agreed international manners and rules. Thus, 
international institutions are the stabilisers and organizers of international politics by 
orienting the member states behaviour in certain international issues and manners 
(Burchill, 2005: 64).  
 
International rules and agreements increase the ability of the international system and 
regime to predict and organise the behaviours of different states to the extent that 
cooperation between them can take place without the presence of a dominant power to 
enforce order. As a result, international regime, from liberal institutional perspective, 
enhances trust and stability in an anarchical international environment (Burchill, 2005: 
65). Moreover, Keohane argues that the role of the international institutions is not only to 
provide and enforce the rules of the international regime, but also to provide the states 
with information about each other and about the international system to make anarchy 
more malleable (Hobson, 2000: 102). Although Keohane concurs with Waltz on the 
importance of the outside-inside perspective in analysing the state’s behaviours, Keohane 
focussed on the role of the international regime and institutions and their impact on the 
state’s behaviour (Keohane, 1984: 26).  
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The main role and duty of the state according to liberalism is to meet its citizen’s 
economic and social needs; moreover, when the state become socially adaptive it 
possesses an agential power at the international arena which makes it contribute to world 
peace (Hobson, 2000: 64). However, the First World War, which took place at the apogee 
of the era of classical liberal internationalism, which is based on the minimalist role of 
the state, caused major criticism of this approach which could not prevent the emergence 
of anarchical environment. Moreover, for neoliberals, a positive state which is more 
active in the international arena is a requirement for world peace and welfare (Hobson, 
2000: 73). For neoliberals such as J.A. Hobson, the capacity of the state to intervene 
against the negative economic impacts of capitalism, whether domestically or 
internationally, is important to achieve reconciliation in the struggle between classes and 
elites. Although Hobson believed that free international trade is essential for international 
peace, it will not evolve naturally without intervention of the state. In addition, Hobson 
argued that mitigating anarchy by achieving collective security by and for all states needs 
a commission of states able to use its power to foster peace and prevent wars (Hobson, 
2000: 80, 81). As a result, some scholars, such as Hedly Bull, argued that the sovereign 
state is the best political institution which is able to create international order and 
eliminate anarchy (Hobson, 2000: 89).  
 
Other scholars, such as Lake, argued that the increase of economic interdependence 
resulted in a reduction in the role of the state and an increase in the role of private 
organisations, whether within the state or among states (Kegley, 1995: 11). The people’s 
impact on the government and its foreign policy became more salient regarding many 
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international issues. In other words, neoliberalism made it clear that domestic and foreign 
politics are linked together and the boundaries between states are irrelevant; this 
Wilsonian vision was based on the belief that less barriers between countries would lead 
to less wars between them. Therefore, some neoliberals rejected the realist claim of the 
centrality of the state in world politics; instead, they believed that international 
organisations and agencies are the main actors at the international arena. Moreover, they 
believed that the contemporary modern state is decentralised, locally and internationally 
(Grieco, 1995: 153). 
 
Liberals believe that states became more dependent on each other economically, making 
wars very costly for them, and this prevents wars. According to Mitrany, for example, the 
spread of industrialization and democratization made most states focus increasingly on 
welfare, economic growth, prosperity and social security. Therefore, they became less 
concerned with power politics and international prestige to the extent that made them 
perceive others as partners to cooperate with rather than enemies and rivals, as realism 
would like us to believe (Grieco, 1995: 154).  
 
According to Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, the international society is best defined as a 
group of states and independent political communities which by their interactions and 
communications with each other establish rules and institutions in order to achieve their 
common interests and maintain arrangements between each other (Buzan, 1993: 330). 
There are different perspectives of the meaning of the international society. Bull argued 
that international society is associated and connected with the idea of international order, 
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which means that international society can only be established or emerged after the 
accomplishment of international order and stability. On the other hand, some scholars 
based their definition of international society by focusing on the definition of the term 
“society” in general. They argue that a society may evolve and grow naturally, and forms 
its common values and characteristics, or a society is made and constructed by the act, 
the will and the interactions of its members (Buzan, 1993: 333). 
 
At the same time, some scholars argue that international society can only be built upon an 
international system because the international system is the basic and prior idea. As a 
result, the international system can exist without the international society. The same logic 
can be applied to the formation of the international system, which is composed of the 
states and the interactions between them, which include conflicts as well as harmony 
(Buzan, 1993: 331). Waltz argued that the impact of anarchy differs according to the type 
and level of interactions among the states, and the nature of the relations between states 
are determined by the capacity of the interaction between them (Buzan, 1993: 332). 
 
The main aim of these temptations of defining international society is to find out when 
and how states (as parts of the international system) can be parts of the international 
society. Buzan argues that international society may evolve as a result of the performance 
and function of the state under the logic of anarchy without the existence of previous 
cultural ties between states. Although the Waltzian conception of anarchy may not result 
in a homogeneity between states, the interactions between them will facilitate the 
emergence of a sufficient level of factors such communications, trade, and balancing 
 92
which will be the cornerstone of the international society which is based on a primitive 
international system (Buzan, 1993: 344). 
 
2.6 Differences and Overlaps between Neorealism and Neoliberalism  
 
The neorealist-neoliberal debate is a major round of the continuing debate in IR theory 
(Smith, 1995: 22). According to Baldwin, neorealism and neoliberalism differ on several 
points. Firstly, neorealists believe strongly in that the nature and consequences of anarchy 
are major motivations behind the state’s behaviour compared to neoliberals. Secondly, 
neorealists assume that international cooperation is more difficult to achieve than 
neoliberals believe. Thirdly, neorealists believe more in the centrality of relative gains 
whereas neoliberals believe more in absolute gains. Fourthly, neorealists deal more with 
national security issues, while neoliberals deal more with political economic matters and 
how they affect international cooperation. Fifthly, neorealists look at the capabilities of 
states, whereas neoliberals look at intentions and perceptions. Finally, neoliberals believe 
that international institutions are capable of mitigating anarchy, whereas neorealists doubt 
that strongly (Smith, 1995: 23). 
 
There are many points which differentiate the English School scholars of IR such as 
Hedley Bull from neorealists. Bull argues that international order does not require the 
presence of a world hegemonic power to apply and foster order; instead, he argues that all 
states can contribute collectively to guard the international system and maintain order. In 
contrast to Waltz, Bull believes that the balance of power is not inevitable and not 
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spontaneous, but it is a means of maintaining the order and stability in a multi-state 
system or society. More importantly, neorealists believe in the great impact of the 
invisible hand of anarchy on state’s foreign policies and on the international system. On 
the other hand, neoliberals assume that the ability of the state in mitigating anarchy at the 
international system is high and can be over the impact and the role of anarchy (Hobson, 
2000: 91).  
 
Two of the main assumptions of neorealism are that the only alternative to anarchy is 
hierarchy and states are always reluctant to engage in economic openness and 
cooperation because of the fear of absolute gain that the other state may achieve. On the 
other hand, for neoliberalism the developing of co-binding institutions and cooperation 
can mitigate anarchy without the creation of hierarchy. In addition, the fear and argument 
of relative-absolute gains are absent in advanced capitalist economies, where 
interdependency reached a level of complexity to the extent that none of the actors will 
be a loser or the winner forever (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 192). According to 
Scholte, many international and global issues have been raised for which the analytical 
value of structural realism has been negligible, and which it could not predict or explain 
systematically (Scholte, 1993: 8). Moreover, many liberals accused realists of ignoring 
the importance of economic welfare and interdependence as a path for international 
order, peace, harmony and prosperity (Kegley, 1995: 12). 
            
Although Keohane and Waltz share the belief that the state practices high agential power 
in the domestic arena, they disagree regarding the extent to which it has the same power 
 94
internationally. Keohane attributes more freedom to the state in its foreign policy from 
international restraints than Waltz assumes. Another difference between Keohane and 
Waltz is that the former believes in the ability of states in resisting the nature and logic of 
the international system and making them compatible with their interests, especially their 
desire and willingness to cooperate in achieving gains, whereas Waltz assumes that states 
are hostages for the international system and its structure. Moreover, Waltz assumes that 
cooperation will make the state vulnerable to deception and cheating (Hobson, 2000: 
102). One of the major differences between liberalism on one hand and realism and 
Marxism on the other is that liberalism gives little attention to clarifying its assumptions; 
it instead focuses on describing the actors and the reasons behind their behaviours and the 
outcomes of these behaviours (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 138). According to Keohane, 
liberal international theory does not provide us with a fully, perfect, comprehensive and 
complete account and explanation of IR. Therefore, many contemporary liberals accept 
some occasional explanations provided by different kinds of realists and Marxists to 
explain some coercive and exploitive aspects of IR (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 140).  
 
The differences between neorealism and neoliberalism demonstrate the vitality of the 
need for coherent theoretical concepts which can be applicable to the historical context of 
this research, which differs from the periods of the apogee of each of these two major 
theories. The interaction between the reality and aspirations does not unavoidably result 
in an overtaking of one side over the other, in some cases resulting in a unique position 
with some reflection of both sides. This is to say that this debate is not intended to result 
in a synthesis of neorealism and neoliberalism; rather it results in a partially developed 
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synthesis of some aspects of the two. Such an alternative is reflexive of the successful 
aspects of these two major theories and avoidance of their defects in contemporary 
political contexts.  
 
Therefore, finding out the best theoretical concept which is capable of efficiently tackling 
a particular relationship is based on considering the temptations of including as well as 
excluding specific concepts from the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism. As a 
result, a mixture of theoretical concepts is required while dealing with asymmetrical 
relations such as those of the U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s. The justification of a 
combination is, indeed, essential to rationalize the suggested theory for such 
asymmetrical relations. Therefore, the section below will explore liberal hegemony as a 
more focussed and up to date paradigm of liberalism as the first part of the theoretical 
combination that is used in this thesis. After that, the chapter will carry on exploring the 
second part of the theoretical combination, which is small states’ politics. 
 
2.7 Ikenberry’s Liberal Hegemony 
 
Historically, the reordering of IR took place after major wars in a specific region and 
time, such as the one which took place in Europe in 1648. However, afterwards, the 
reordering of IR become wider, which recently covered nearly all the globe and most 
international issues and concerns (Ikenberry, 2001: 8).  
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One of the remarkable facts and events after the end of the Cold War is the continuity of 
international order and alliance between the U.S.A and other advanced democratic and 
industrialised countries. Many observers expected major changes in the international 
arena after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. There was an 
anticipation of a decrease in the U.S. alignments and cooperation with the advanced 
democratic and industrialised countries. These expectations were based on the belief that 
Communism and the Soviet bloc were the threats which bound the Western countries 
together; on the contrary, that did not take place and the alignments and cooperation 
between the U.S.A and these countries continued and expanded (Ikenberry, 1998: 43). 
This was a major challenge to the neorealist approach in analysing and explaining the 
continuity and durability of the post war order which gave extra credit and attention to 
the liberal character of the international order. In addition, that emphasized the 
significance role of the international institutions in fostering cooperation and preventing 
exploitation between these countries after the Cold War. The main logic of this kind of 
orders is that the institutional and democratic characters of this order reduce the 
incentives of states to practice rivalry and balancing against each other or against U.S. 
hegemony in particular (Ikenberry, 1998: 44).  
 
2.7.1 Liberal Hegemony and the U.S.A 
 
There are several reasons why critiques of realism and liberal institutionalism are 
powerful. Firstly, realism clashes with the basic values and elements of the embedded 
liberalism found in the US government. In this regard, realism does not provide the 
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American policymakers with a favourable perspective of themselves and the world. 
Secondly, American scholars perceive war as only the last resort to protect the world 
from evil powers and to spread democracy. Realism, however, perceives war as a useful 
tool to maintain the balance of power, not to mention that realism does not categorise 
powers as good and evil; all are determined by power politics and survival doctrine. 
Thirdly, while realism believes that war is inevitable between states and therefore it is a 
pessimistic theory in essence, human progress is a deep American belief (expressed in 
such concepts as ‘land of the free’ and ‘manifest destiny’) which contrasts with the 
predominantly pessimistic character of realism. Fourthly, during the time of shaping the 
American culture and because of its geographical isolation, the U.S.A had a legacy in 
isolationist foreign policy which resulted in limited U.S. involvement in world politics, 
which was based on the origins of realism such as balance of power and alliance politics. 
All of that made liberal theories more attractive for the American people and 
policymakers. In addition, liberalism not only replaced realism in the U.S.A, but also 
reflected grass-roots American values more (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995: 49).  
 
One of the significant results of the Second World War was the emergence of an open 
world economy and a hegemonic world order led by the U.S.A, which encouraged and 
facilitated economic interdependence and free trade between countries. That made the 
connection between U.S. hegemony and economic globalisation very strong. Moreover, 
the U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Second World War has aimed to establish and 
support international institutions such the United Nations (UN), Bretton Woods, General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
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and more recently the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Ikenberry, 2007: 41). The 
U.S.A not only intensively participated in the creation of these institutions and located 
itself in the centre of their activities, but also it made them useful for their members as 
well as for its ambitions and strategies. Ikenberry believes, as does Niall Ferguson, that 
the leading state “enhances its own security and prosperity by providing the rest of the 
world with generally beneficial public goods: not only in economic freedom but also the 
institutions necessary for the markets to flourish” (Ikenberry, 2007: 43). 
 
The leading state provides stability and security for the international system by upholding 
the rules; in return, the other states agree to operate within the order. International 
institutions and the mechanisms, rules, and norms shape the international system and 
provide all states, including the hegemonic power, with the atmosphere where they all 
can participate willingly without the use of force, so they cooperate not only in economic 
issues but also in political and security issues. Therefore, the leading state restricts its use 
of power and this reassures the weaker states that they will not be dominated or exploited 
by the hegemonic power (Ikenberry, 2007: 43). However, some scholars, such as 
Mearsheimer, are suspicious about the validity and the inevitability of the international 
order, basing their argument on the fact that the international institutions have a limited 
role in maintaining international peace and order. Mearsheimer argues that there is little 
empirical evidence that international institutions can change states’ behaviour 
(Mearsheimer, 1994-1995: 47).    
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The major difference between Ikenberry’s theory of liberal hegemony on the one hand 
and neorealism and neoliberalism on the other is over the role of the hegemonic power 
and the international institutions in shaping international order (Ikenberry, 2001: 11). For 
neorealists, international institutions do not play a primary role in organising international 
relations and shaping order; moreover, they believe that hegemonic order and stability are 
based on the ability of the hegemonic power in practicing inducements and threat. On the 
other hand, Ikenberry argues that there are many cases, such as Britain in the nineteenth 
century and the U.S.A after the Second World War, where the hegemonic power’s 
behaviour in establishing order was not merely based on the concept of power but they 
acted in order to reach a mutually agreed set of norms and rules which required a practice 
of restraint in the use of power (Ikenberry, 2001: 12). Moreover, although after the 
demise of the Soviet Union as an external threat to the West and as a source of cohesion 
among the Western countries, they remained bound together and even deepened their ties 
instead of balancing against the U.S.A (Ikenberry, 2001: 13).  
 
For neoliberals, the roles of the international institutions are to reduce cheating between 
states and to provide them with the relevant information while cooperating with each 
other. Moreover, they believe that the role of the institutions is more salient after the start 
of the decline of the hegemonic power. For Ikenberry, however, the profundity of the 
prevailing order between democratic and industrialised countries make the problem of 
cheating unlikely to take place or at least a secondary problem (Ikenberry, 2001: 17). 
Liberal hegemony also differs from offensive realism; while Mearsheimer argues that 
superpowers the U.S.A are always seeking hegemony by force, whenever necessary, to 
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accomplish their security and interests (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995), liberal hegemony 
argues that the role of the hegemonic international institutions is critical and essential in 
establishing international order and in securing cooperation between the U.S.A and other 
great powers as well as in other U.S. asymmetrical relations (Ikenberry, 2001:17). 
Therefore, it can be argued that liberal hegemony differs from these main theories on the 
level of analysis; at both the structural level and the foreign policy level which the 
theoretical framework of this thesis is addressing.  
 
It is worth mentioning in this regard that hegemonic stability, which derives from 
neorealism, focused on the role of the hegemonic power in any relations and neglects the 
impact of the foreign policy of secondary states. If used in this thesis this would neglect 
some issues studied and would restrict the researcher from tackling the other side of the 
relations, which is Jordan in the case of this thesis. However, liberal hegemony does not 
ignore the role of the hegemonic power, its main argument is that the U.S.A deliberately 
allows its partners to raise their own preferences and desires within their relations with 
the U.S.A. Therefore, liberal hegemony assumes that US relations with other states have 
different characters than those which are implied by neorealism. These relations are 
based on extensive interactions between states in a wide range of issues. These 
interactions make the relations between the hegemonic power and its partners liberal in 
the sense of the existence of mutually agreed roles that allows the weaker side to be able 
to have an impact in shaping these relations. In other words liberal hegemony adopts 
from neorealism the impact of the international system and the role of the hegemonic 
power in shaping these relations but in different features. In addition, it adopts from 
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neoliberalism the impact of mutual harmony and cooperation between states especially 
when these states are a hegemonic power that will remain decisive in the international 
system and a small state that is willing to remain active within the this system.     
   
The theory of hegemonic stability, as argued by Duncan Snidal, is with limited range and 
only applicable to certain conditions, issues and periods of time, although it claims 
comprehensiveness and longevity (Snidal, 1985: 579). In addition, contrary to the 
argument of hegemonic stability, the U.S.A became no longer able to practice an 
overwhelming dominance over European affairs (Snidal, 1985: 580), while the usage of 
liberal hegemony, which contradicts with hegemonic stability regarding the features of 
the relations between the states, to the study of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s in a 
Middle Eastern context, will broaden the inapplicability of hegemonic stability in 
different relations and periods of time that Snidal talked about.  
 
The theory of hegemonic stability is powerful only when there is simultaneous approval 
of two main conditions: the presence of the hegemonic power to maintain international 
order and free trade, and that this order is beneficial for all parties in all affairs (Snidal, 
1985: 582). The absence of these two conditions in U.S.-Jordanian relations made the 
theory of hegemonic stability narrow and inadequate for this thesis of which free trade is 
not one of its major pillars. On the other hand, liberal hegemony is more flexible and 
comprehensive for allowing the researcher to explore the features of these relations and 
to provide more details regarding different topics of these relations.  
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While one of the main assumptions of hegemonic stability is the decline of the 
hegemonic power as a result of providing free trade and public goods for the international 
system and for other countries, many scholars such as Joseph Nye, Samuel Huntington, 
Francis Bator, and Susan Strange disagree with this statement arguing that the U.S.A is 
not declining as a result of these policies (Grunberg, 1990: 444). In addition, Ikenberry 
argues that different U.S. policies, including being liberal hegemonic, are aiming and 
contributing in maintaining the U.S. status and in increasing its power, not the other way 
around (Ikenberry, 2001). In other words, the use of hegemonic stability would result in 
interpreting U.S. – Jordanian relations in the 2000s as if they are one sided and 
dominated by the U.S.A. Whereas liberal hegemony allows the researcher to investigate 
these relations in more detail and to tackle different important issues for the two countries 
that hegemonic stability considers as secondary issues and in some occasions do not 
exist.     
  
According to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, the idea of American Empire is 
associated with the imperial character of the American constitution which will lead to the 
global reach of U.S. internal constitutional project. In another words, for Hardt and Negri, 
American empire is a process of extending the American ideas, beliefs, and culture all 
over the globe (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 182), while for Ikenberry, although the U.S.A is 
concerned with promoting liberty and order, it is expected to allow its allies to differ with 
the U.S.A in their external policies including in major issues occasionally, let alone in 
their internal affairs. Not less importantly, Adam Walson rightly distinguished between 
empire and hegemon as empire is the “administration of different communities form the 
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imperial centre” and hegemony is the ability of the hegemon of practicing influence and 
power some times over other countries regarding their external behaviours and leaving  
them independent in their internal affairs (Beeson and Higgott, 2005: 1174). 
 
While Negri argues that a global empire constitutes the sovereignty of the market (Negri, 
2008: 8), this thesis as mentioned above, does not take as of its main object to explore 
U.S.-Jordanian trade relations and the impact of the market on them. Moreover, the 
concept of American empire, as Mathew Morgan put it, is associated with the concept of 
globalization in both its dimensions; economically and culturally (Morgan, 2008; 146), 
which this thesis is not going to tackle while its focus is on the features of the relations 
between the governments of these two countries.  
 
For some scholars, such as Loch Johnson and Kiki Caruson, the driving forces for U.S. 
foreign policies especially during G.W Bush two terms are unilateralism, selfishness, 
dominant ambitions and arrogance toward other countries (Johnson and Caruson, 2003: 
9). However, other scholars, such as Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, argue that 
many scholars from different theoretical backgrounds criticise U.S. foreign policy based 
on selective and occasional cases (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005: 254). In addition, 
although hegemony might attract resistance or enmity, U.S. hegemony has generally been 
indirect and at a distance, direct U.S. military intervention has been the exception not the 
rule (Beeson and Higgott, 2005: 1176).     
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The favourability of liberal hegemony to the study of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 
2000s is based on the assumption of the absence of exploitation whether form the small 
side to the hegemonic power leading to the decline of the hegemon as hegemonic stability 
argues, or the dominant power to the small power as Hardt and Negri argue who are 
oriented by communists and exploitive beliefs but surprisingly neglect the tradition of 
historical materialism (Boron, 2008: 25). Moreover, the overestimation of Hardt and 
Negri to the role of the UN and its different organisation where they argue about the 
equality between countries makes their work inadequate to the understanding of the 
current international system which has an asymmetrical character in which the U.S.A is a 
central player (Boron, 2008: 28).     
   
2.7.2 Challenges to U.S. Liberal Hegemony 
 
It has been argued that the unprecedented superiority of U.S. power after the end of the 
Cold War and after the beginning of the twenty-first century was simultaneous with an 
increasing tendency in the U.S. foreign policy toward a unilateral approach. The extreme 
and tremendous power of the U.S.A makes it sometimes give less attention to weaker 
states and its small allies (Ikenberry, 2003: 533). On the other hand, some people argue 
that although the opportunities for a U.S. unilateral approach have increased, with some 
usage of it occasionally, in general the U.S.A remained committed to the entire 
multilateral order which it has been at the centre of since its creation after the Second 
World War (Ikenberry, 2003: 536). For example, according to Fareed Zakaria, the U.S.A 
was the most supportive country to major international organisations and institutions and 
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their creation, even when it was at its peak of power and the most powerful country in the 
world, such as its support for the League of Nations and the United Nations. In other 
words; the U.S.A behaved unilaterally only occasionally, and then by pleading self-
defence (Ikenberry, 2003: 538). In addition, there are deep systematic, institutional, 
domestic, and structural sources for multilateralism in the U.S. foreign policy. The main 
issues, however, which the U.S. unilateralism is most clear on, are the issues of arms 
control and the use of force (Ikenberry, 2003: 544). 
                     
The sources of unilateral approach rest in the fact that the unprecedented status of the 
U.S.A made her sometimes less aware of the costs of rejecting other states’ demands at 
the negotiation and bargaining table. Moreover, because the U.S.A became so powerful 
and its impact on different international issues and states is very huge, the attitudes and 
beliefs of some key figures in the U.S. foreign policymaking that were influenced by 
these U.S. power and status and who favoured the unilateral approach were enough to 
reflect a unilateral approach in the U.S. foreign policy. This makes many states perceive 
the attitudes of those U.S. administrational figures as the official and the lasting U.S. 
strategy in dealing with world politics (Ikenberry, 2003: 539). Moreover, the recent 
international structure, led by the U.S.A, made the views of those figures in the U.S. 
administration more effective than in other international circumstances. Although there 
are signs of unilateral dimensions in the U.S. foreign policy, which are mainly adopted by 
the neoconservatives, these tendencies are rejected by many other figures in the U.S. 
administration, as well as by many American people. In addition, many previous 
unilateral policies adopted by previous administrations resulted at the end in the creation 
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of multilateral initiatives. For example, Nixon’s cancellation of the Bretton Wood system 
resulted soon after in the U.S. creation and sponsoring of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), which is a major and active institution in the current international order 
(Ikenberry, 2003: 540).  
 
Liberal hegemony is an essential paradigm in understanding U.S. foreign policy in its 
particular context toward specific countries, however, while this paradigm represents the 
features of the current U.S. political culture in both of its dimensions (U.S. liberal values 
as well as its wide ambitions as a hegemonic power), this paradigm can be qualified to be 
inclusive of other U.S. relations with other kinds of countries and contexts if some 
additions are made. While U.S.-Jordanian relations are undeniably asymmetrical 
relations, and because Jordan is a small and weak state according to many criteria, several 
expectations and behaviours by Jordan as a small country are expected. Therefore, an 
analysis of small states’ politics is required in order to be able to interpret these policies 
throughout the thesis. In addition, there are many concepts of liberal hegemony and of 
small states’ politics complementary to each other, and will be malleable to the study and 
the conceptualization of U.S.-Jordanian relations. Therefore, the section below will 
discuss the main features of small states and their politics in order to be able to 
conceptualise a theoretical framework that can be complementary to liberal hegemony in 
order to investigate the U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s efficiently and 
professionally.  
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2.8 Small States and International Relations                           
 
During the nineteenth century, especially after the emergence of the nation state, the 
study of small states was less attractive because of their limited role in the international 
arena, as they were defenceless to big nations. For example, one of the major enemies 
and threats to small states is the national unification state. However, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century and after the establishment of the League of Nations and the United 
Nations later on, and after the increased role of international law and the right of self-
determination, small states became more secure and more important in the international 
arena than previously. Although after the Second World War major attention remained 
focussed on major players in the international system (favouring on a realist approach), 
the post-war world still favoured the participation of smaller powers more than any 
previous system of international relations, and after the end of the Cold War small states 
gained much activeness and importance in the international arena (Neumann and Gstohl, 
2006: 9).   
 
There are different ways to define small states. These definitions are based on different 
factors and criteria such as geographical size, population, and the state’s participation and 
influence in international affairs. However, many scholars perceive these criteria and 
definitions as unhelpful in the understanding and prediction of the foreign policies of 
small states, because they cannot be exclusive only to small states (Hey, 2003: 2). 
Therefore, some scholars focus on the idea of “perception” and how small states perceive 
themselves, and how that reflects on their foreign policies and abilities. Rothstein, for 
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example, argued that “a small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain 
security primarily by the use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally 
on the aid of others”. Moreover, Keohane used a perception concept to identify small 
states: “[A] Small power is a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone 
or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system” (Hey, 2003: 3). 
 
The size of the state is important not only at war times, but also in peace; big states with 
large economic resources and populations have more influence on international events 
and have more international prestige. On the other hand, small states are more affected by 
external pressures, and also because of their limited human and economic resources they 
face difficulties in surmounting obstacles and obtaining their needs. Meanwhile, human 
and material issues are not the only factors that determine the ability of the state; other 
issues such as policies’ efficiency, geographical location, level of development, cohesion 
of population and the level of internal support to the government are important factors 
and play a considerable role in determining the preferences of a small state and its foreign 
policy (Vital, 2006: 77).  
 
2.8.1 Small States and the Problem of Security  
 
Small states face different kinds of threats to those different kinds that states face, and 
perceive the same threats differently. The most important threats to small states are 
military, economic, and political threats. Buzan argued that the major political threat to a 
small state is when other powerful states question its existence or the legitimacy of its 
government. All of these threats or the possibility of them in the future have a major 
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weight in the calculations of the policymakers of small states (Knudsen, 1996: 26). 
Therefore, small states seek protection and support from major powers, especially when 
the international system and international norms are unable to protect them. However, the 
recent growth of the ability of the international system and international norms to resist 
and prevent wars resulted in an increase of the potentiality of conflicts within the 
boundaries of small states, especially when there is an invitation from powers inside the 
state to external powers for intervention (Knudsen, 1996: 24).  
 
Economic threats take different faces; the increase of economic interdependency and 
market logic which are both based on asymmetric relations may result in unequal 
distribution of gains. The other economic threat a state may face is economic sanctions, 
which are very harmful for small state, especially when it faces it from a dominant state 
within its economic sphere (Knudsen, 1996: 25). Moreover, small states usually face 
general economic weakness, mainly because of their territorial smallness, which results 
in limited resources and markets. Therefore, when a small state is relatively safe 
politically and military, and is facing an urgent economic problem, it tends to sacrifice 
some of its political goals and sovereignty to obtain its vital economic needs (Handel, 
2006: 157).  
 
Most of the existing literature on small states’ foreign policy is based on the realist 
approach of IR, which was the dominant paradigm in small states’ politics during the 
Cold War, mainly because small states used to be very aware of their security and the 
external threats they were facing. However, after the end of the Cold War realism became 
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less relevant in explaining small states’ foreign behaviours, mainly because it focuses on 
the security of these states which have become safer these days. Therefore, Neack, Hey 
and Haney argue that extra attention should be paid to other factors, such as the 
individual leaders of these states, bureaucratic politics, and the state level, which includes 
other domestic factors in order to accomplish an advanced and contemporary 
understanding of the foreign policies of small states (Hey, 2003: 8).  
 
2.8.2 Small States and the Level of Analysis 
 
According to Rosenau, there are major factors that have major roles in determining the 
main level of analysis of small states’ politics. These factors are the size of the state, the 
level of development, and the political system of the state (Hey, 2003: 8). For Rosenau, 
the main levels of analysis are the international system, the state level (including 
bureaucratic, social, cultural, and public opinion), and finally the individual level (Hey, 
2003: 9). Rosenau perceives the individual level as the most important factor for 
undeveloped and undemocratic states, regardless of their size. For developed states, 
however, he believes that the role of bureaucracy is the most important factor in 
determining and explaining the foreign policies of these states. For small states, the 
international system was ranked as the second factor after the individual level. According 
to Rosenau, the foreign policies of small states, especially undeveloped ones, are more 
likely to change according to the changes in both their leaderships and in the international 
system, and this change is more likely to take place than in other states which differ in 
terms of the size and level of development (Hey, 2003: 185).  
 111
 
However, although individuals are the most important factors in shaping the foreign 
policy of an undeveloped, small state, policymakers cannot ignore other domestic and 
systematic pressures, especially when considering that the legitimacy and survivability of 
their regimes are always at risk (Hey, 2003: 192). Therefore, international and regional 
politics are major forces behind the behaviour of small states. Moreover, less developed 
small states seek in their foreign policies to ensure their regimes’ security and legitimacy, 
and they have to engage in international institutions which provide them with credit and 
aids (Hey, 2003: 193).              
                   
2.8.3 Small States and the International System 
 
From a systemic theorist point of view, when defining and studying small states the focus 
must be on the role of the state in the international system. While the system as well as 
the state dominates the international system, it has been argued that the state can be 
categorised according to its presence, role, and influence in the system (Keohane, 2006: 
59). Therefore, a “system determining state” is the state which plays a critical role in the 
international system; as a result, small states can be called as “ineffectual states” because 
of their limited impact on the international system individually or collectively; even when 
they work as a group the impact of each state on the system will be minimal. Therefore, 
the foreign policies of these states are simple adjustments to the international reality 
rather than a rearrangement of it (Keohane, 2006: 59). According to Keohane:  
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A great power is a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a 
large, perhaps decisive, impact on the international system; a secondary power is 
a state whose leaders consider that alone it can exercise some impact, although 
never in itself decisive, on the system; a middle power is a state whose leaders 
consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systematic 
impact in a small group or through an international institution; a small power is a 
state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in small group, 
make a significant impact on the system (Keohane, 2006: 60). 
 
Some people argue that the study and analysis of small and great powers’ foreign policies 
requires different level of analysis in order to be able to predict and explain the 
behaviours of these different states (Elman, 1995: 175). There is also a scholarly 
consensus that because small and big states behave in different domestic and international 
contexts, their different foreign policies will reflect different constraints. For example, 
Snyder assumes that big and strong states are more influenced by their own domestic 
factors than by the international environment in the making of their foreign policies, 
mainly because they are less vulnerable to external threats (Elman, 1995: 176). 
Therefore, in order to explain and predict big states’ foreign policies, the “unit” level of 
analysis should be considered. On the other hand, domestic level explanations are not 
very useful in predicting and analysing small states’ foreign policies, which are 
concerned more about external pressures and threats and their survival. For these reasons, 
small states are more attentive to regional and international structures and the constraints 
they face (Elman, 1995: 176). According to Walt, because of small states’ vulnerability 
and their secondary position in the international system, their foreign strategies seek to 
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bandwagon with greater powers to ensure their security. Whether small states bandwagon 
with or balance against a great power depends on the kind of the threat they are facing, as 
well as the availability and the impact of other great powers in the international system; 
therefore, the international structure and systematic level of analysis are adequate in 
understanding the foreign policies of small states (Elman, 1995: 177).         
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
As has been mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the construction of the 
theoretical framework for this thesis will take place in the next chapter, as the theoretical 
framework needs to be reflective of the methods and characteristics of this research. This 
chapter, however, has demonstrated the major different concepts of IR that the theoretical 
framework of this thesis is evolved from. Exploring these different theoretical concepts 
has been determinative as well as constructive in justifying the selection of the main 
concepts that are framing the core theory of this thesis. 
 
The theoretical debate that has been conducted in this chapter resulted in highlighting the 
inadequacy of the exclusive usage of either neorealism or neoliberalism in the study of 
U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The narrowness and static of neorealism 
undermines its capacity of explaining different dynamics and details of U.S.-Jordanian 
relations during the era of the absence of balancing. Needless to say, Jordan is a small 
state with a limited ability to impact on the structure of the international system. 
Therefore, neorealism and its exaggerated focus on the international structure cannot 
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explain the features of the foreign policy of such a small state, especially in its 
interactions with a superpower like the U.S.A  
 
On the other hand, neoliberalism gave sufficient account to the role of international 
institutions and the importance of economic cooperation between states while 
undermining the impact of security issues in shaping states policies toward each other 
(Smith, 1995: 23). However, Jordan and the U.S.A have substantial common mutual 
security interests that are explored in chapter four. These security interests are reciprocal 
interests with limited impact of international institutions upon them. In addition, although 
economic relations between the two countries are important, especially to Jordan, they 
are one-sided. Trade between the two countries is still at too early stage to claim that 
there is economic interdependence between the two countries (Rosen, 2004: 62-65). As a 
result, neoliberalism is sufficient to the study of U.S. relations with other countries that 
share with the U.S.A the profundity of institutionalism and trade that developed during a 
long period of time, such as those relations with European countries. Therefore, the use 
of neoliberalism would result in rather a simplistic, over-optimistic and unrealistic 
explanation of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s.     
 
The choice and adequacy of liberal hegemony and small states’ politics is a natural 
consequence and a realistic outcome of the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism 
to the study of the relations between countries like the U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s. 
Ikenberry’s work on liberal hegemony illustrated that the U.S.A. interacts with its allies 
based on liberal principles to achieve realist aims, such as hegemony and preventing 
 115
inhibition of its power. Therefore, Ikenberry’s work of liberal hegemony is a sensible 
temptation of describing the current international order especially in terms of the 
presence of an effective hegemony and its role in establishing order and maintaining 
cooperation among advanced and industrialised democratic countries (Ikenberry, 2001). 
Therefore, the use of liberal hegemony is a well-calculated and rational step forward in 
explaining relations between countries that are witnessing increasing connectedness such 
as the U.S.A and Jordan. In other words, liberal hegemony is facilitating the 
understanding of the current move from power politics to interdependency, especially 
between countries that suffer huge power disparity. 
 
However, Ikenberry focussed his attention on the relations between the U.S.A and these 
countries with less attention to other kinds of states, in a world where the U.S has an 
overreaching impact and interests including with small powers, especially in regions that 
are of great importance to the U.S, let alone that these small powers started to play a 
remarkable role. This role was also explained by different realist and liberalist theorists of 
IR. Therefore, while this thesis is addressing the relations between Jordan as a small 
state, which in many regards differ from the U.S allies that Ikenberry has mentioned, and 
the U.S.A during relatively the same period and characteristics of U.S. foreign policy that 
Ikenberry has explained, the chapter has had to necessarily identify the major concepts of 
small states politics in order to figure out the concepts that can be integrated and bound 
together with those of liberal hegemony in the next chapter to compose the theoretical 
framework of this thesis.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology, Methods, and Core Research Questions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the relevant methodology that is used in this thesis. 
The chapter will illustrate and justify the characteristics, methods, core theory, and 
research questions of this thesis and how they are bound with each other, and how they 
suit the research topic. The reciprocal connectedness and mutual effect of the research 
style and approach on one hand, and the core theory and methods on the other will 
establish the logic of this thesis, which will result in raising the main research questions 
of this thesis at the end of this chapter. 
 
The main methodological characteristics of this thesis are: firstly, it is based on 
qualitative and normative research and methods. Secondly, at different stages it is also an 
empirical study which employs quantitative methods. Thirdly, it is a critical study aiming 
to evaluate and assess the findings of this research and the chosen theoretical claims in 
this thesis by using the case studies in the following chapters. Finally, it is aware of and 
considers the realist philosophy of knowledge and science. This combination of 
characteristics is designed in order to avoid the limitations and the imperfections of each 
of these methodological approaches. By characterizing this research with these characters 
the research will be of good quality as much as possible. Therefore, this chapter will first 
justify these characteristics and why they are important and convenient for this thesis and 
for scientific social research.  
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After exploring the methodological characteristics, the chapter then provides detailed 
analysis of the core theory that is developed by a combination process of the two 
concepts of liberal hegemony and small states. The chapter will also illustrate the 
methods used in obtaining the required data for this research. As a result, the chapter will 
conclude by discussing the logic of this thesis by highlighting the interconnectedness 
between the methodological characteristics of this research and the core theory and 
methods used, and how this interconnectedness formulates the research questions of this 
research that shaped the empirical chapters of this thesis, chapters four, five and six.            
 
3.2 Knowledge, Social Science, Qualitative and Empirical Research  
 
According to Aristotle, truth and knowledge seeking are major activities and desires of a 
human’s life. In addition, there are major motivations for seeking knowledge, such as 
curiosity, and practical reasons and needs related to daily life (Goldman, 1999: 1). 
However, there are several assumptions and basic features of the scientific approach to 
knowledge. Firstly, the regularity and order of the natural world means that things can be 
understood, and changes to the order of these things can be studied and observed 
empirically (Nachmias, 1987: 6). The second assumption is that the human’s ability to 
gain knowledge about nature is applicable to and possible for social phenomena and the 
life of humans in general. While the human’s mind is capable of knowing nature and its 
laws, humans are also capable of making their own (and others’) minds amenable to 
scientific investigation, although scientific knowledge is tentative and changeable 
(Nachmias, 1987: 7).  
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The third assumption is that cause-and-effect relationships can be employed to 
understand and explain natural as well as social events and phenomena. This led to the 
assumption that scientific research and approaches are superior to unthinking, dogmatic 
belief in supernatural forces. Thus, scientific thinking must be critical and sceptical 
because knowledge is not self-evident. Finally, understanding the real world needs to be 
based on empirical experiences, which must use perceptions, senses and observations 
(Nachmias, 1987: 8).  
 
Scientific social research must also meet other criteria, which should aim to achieve 
descriptive and explanatory inferences based on empirical information. While facts can 
be gained by different direct methods, inference is a vital characteristic of any research to 
obtain data that beyond observation.  In addition, the research must contribute to the area 
of social science by using explicit, codified and public methods and procedures in order 
to allow others to assess the conducted research (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 8). 
While inference is imperfect, uncertainty is a major characteristic of knowledge and 
social research, and scientific social research must be able to acknowledge and estimate a 
reasonable level of uncertainty of the gained knowledge and results to allow a level of 
interpretability. Finally, it should be aiming at knowledge and scientific enterprise and 
the use of scientific methods and rules, not only focusing on the subject matter while its 
material is endless (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 9). 
 
The basic activity of qualitative research is the process of evaluating and assessing the 
interpretation of the subject matter. In addition, qualitative analysis is based on the 
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process of connecting and reconceptualising the available data which describes the 
studied objects in order to get a fresher analysis about the subject matter (Dey, 1993: 30). 
Such a process of connecting concepts will take place later in this chapter while framing 
the theoretical framework of this thesis, which will shape the discussion of later chapters.  
 
There are major features that characterise qualitative research. These features are: firstly, 
qualitative research is a philosophical and interpretive method aiming to know how a 
social phenomenon can be interpreted and experienced; secondly, it is based on both 
flexible and sensitive methods of data generating; thirdly, qualitative research is based on 
methods which lead to analysis and argument building that lead to advanced 
understanding (May, 1987: 3). Therefore, good qualitative research must meet some 
criteria, such as not only providing description but also explanation and argument. In 
addition, it must provide the reader with the necessary data which they can judge; it 
should be fallible and not beyond judgment. While qualitative research focuses on the 
understanding and explanation of the social world through the interpretation of its 
participants, it must be aware of the possibility of not being neutral; therefore the 
researcher must involve critical self-scrutiny during the research process (May, 1987: 8). 
 
Qualitative research seeks to ground the used theory in reality by trying to conceptualise 
the studied phenomenon in a way that is compatible with the theory. As a result, some 
critics accuse qualitative researching of avoiding challenging or testing the theory, which 
is a major requirement of good research (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 315). 
Although qualitative research is accused of focusing on in-depth knowledge of the 
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subject at the expense of generalizing the findings of the research for other similar cases 
or topics (Burnham et al., 2004: 31), generalisation in the social world and science does 
not eliminate the importance of details; knowing about a specific entity is useful and 
helpful in generalising knowledge in other studies. In addition, more knowledge about 
specific issues can be gained by knowing more about the general, and vice-versa (King, 
Keohane and Verba, 1994: 35). 
 
It is worth emphasising here that this thesis is broadly empirical, but not empiricist.  
Empiricism views knowledge as grounded in facts or events which can only be observed 
and what can be counted as knowledge is the information which talks about and refers to 
atomised objects (Smith, 1996: 19). It has been argued that science in general can be 
perceived as the linkage of empirical facts and the reason behind them. In addition, 
science is believed to be associated with the systematic process of gaining knowledge and 
search for truth about an empirical facts and problems. Therefore, in order to talk about a 
science of IR there should be relations between countries and empirical problems or 
issues within these relations (Krippendorff, 1982: 17).  
 
It is assumed that empiricism underestimates the necessity and the role of theoretical 
assumptions and concepts in explaining social phenomena, both of which have major 
roles in the ability to observe and describe things (Smith, 1996: 20). It is impossible to 
perceive and understand facts without interpretation, which always needs theory. As a 
result, good empirical research must be guided by a theory in order to have and shape the 
right questions and inquiries in the study being conducted. Therefore, the theory and the 
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empirical research must be strongly connected. At the same time, after choosing the 
adequate theory, conducting the empirical research must be based on choosing the right 
observables that are relevant to the chosen theory (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 30). 
For example, Halliday argued that although facts are important in IR, there should be a 
preconception and distinction between which facts are more significant, because facts do 
not speak for themselves and can be interpreted differently (Halliday, 1994: 25).  
 
There is a reciprocal relationship between theory and empirical research in the sense that 
the theory shapes the aim and the argument of the research. In addition, the explanation 
and interpretation of a political concept or phenomenon must be empirically tested in 
order to measure the scientific adequacy of the explanation and interpretation. At the 
same time, the finding of the inquiry may result in a revision of the theory in future 
studies (Mayer, 2002: 124). Using concepts in social sciences is very important and 
useful in describing a phenomenon, however, in empirical researches the use of concepts 
must lead to a high degree of empirical reference even if the concept does not refer 
directly to an observable. Therefore, the precision of the concept is very important and 
the concept must refer to one set of properties related to the phenomenon; moreover, the 
concept should relate in some way to the theoretical concept which the theory is based on 
(Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 21).  
 
In order to adopt a critical approach of studying a phenomenon or doing a critical social 
research it is required first to explore the meaning and the advantages of being critical of 
something (Hammersley, 1995: 21). The basic meaning of being critical of something is 
 122
to be vigilant of its defects by neutral intention. According to Horkheimer, the intention 
of a critical approach should be social totality and concerned with human needs and 
ideals based on the integration between philosophy and empirical researching 
(Hammersley, 1995: 26).  
 
One of the major characteristics of critical inquiries in social sciences is that critical 
inquiries combine explaining and understanding approaches together. This approach 
allows critical theorists to be practical in conducting their research and gaining 
knowledge about it (Bohman, 2003: 91). In addition, a critical social inquiry is the one 
which produces practical knowledge about the topic in the sense that it can be reflective 
of different social perspectives and criticisms. This reality of critical research is 
embodied in the rejection of the demand of a single unified theory to be employed in all 
historical contexts, mainly because the comprehensiveness of a social theory may 
undermine the explanatory power of the theory itself and limiting the understanding of 
the subject matters (Bohman, 2003: 93). In IR therefore, the main aims of critical theories 
are the reinterpretation and restructuring of political ideas by challenging and replacing 
different existed approaches (Brown, 1994: 58). 
 
Realism, as a scientific model of explaining and understanding, avoids the positivist and 
relativist traditions of epistemology. Realism’s main feature is that explanation is 
essential in the advancement of scientific knowledge (Pawsan and Tilley, 1997: 55). 
According to realist philosophers, such as Van Fraassen, the growth and development of 
science is a process of endless self-correction and discovery rather than invention 
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(Goldman, 1999: 244). In addition, Fraassen argued that scientific theory is empirically 
adequate for the field and to the real world (Goldman, 1999: 245).                 
 
Bhaskar argued that philosophical realism is committed to the belief of the existence of 
some disputed kind of being. In addition, philosophical realism argues that people’s 
behaviour is affected by the knowledge they have about their social world, which does 
not exist independently of this knowledge (May, 1987: 12). Therefore, and because the 
people’s knowledge may be partial or incomplete, the duty of the researcher in social 
sciences is to explain social observations (May, 1987: 13).  According to Quine, all kinds 
of knowledge, including scientific knowledge, are a synthetic and human-made ‘fabric’ 
(George, 1994: 143).  
 
On the other hand, Van Fraassen argued that scientists reject the realist’s conjunction of 
consistent theories because they are rather pragmatic. Grander argued that scientists from 
different approaches such as realists and instrumentalists have different views and 
perspectives in the use of theories in social sciences (Enfield, 1991: 479). Nonetheless, a 
sensible theory is the one which can serve the researcher or the practitioner, such as an 
ordering framework in the usage of the available data in predicting and explaining 
empirical phenomenon of the real world. Moreover, an adequate theory is one which can 
be embodied in the field in the sense that it can help the researcher in conceptualizing and 
prescribing the major objects and events related to the topic or at least to hypothesise 
them accordingly (Sayer, 1992: 50). 
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There are different perspectives regarding the development and advancement of a 
science; some scholars argue that the processing of a science results from the 
modification and reinterpretation of old and existing ideas and theories of this science. 
On the other hand, others suggest that the development of a science takes place only after 
dramatic and fundamental changes and developments took place in the subject matter, 
which essentially would result in rejection of previous ideas and beliefs (Enfield, 1991: 
468). Popper affirmed that the development of science is a rational process. In addition, 
Lakatos argued that the replacement of a theory by another one is also part of the rational 
process in the development of any science (Nicholson and Bennett, 1994: 199).  
 
The methodology of IR is not a concern of international issues and affairs themselves, but 
about how these issues are studied and researched, although they are normally overlap 
and interdependent (Nicholson, 1985: 56). The recent debate over theories of IR resulted 
in a methodological debate about the discipline, with issues such as that a major reason 
for methodologies in IR is to develop the relationship between the field itself and the real 
world, but this relationship was a challenge to the field in some occasions (Halliday, 
1994: 23). 
 
The study of IR faced a dispute between two camps; those who favoured the idea that the 
field should be studied based on the classical approach, which uses the same methods for 
the study of history and classical political theory. On the other side were those who 
favoured applying the usage of scientific methods in the study of IR and neglecting the 
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importance of linking the development of this field to the study of history (Little, 1991: 
465). 
 
Waltz argued that the methodological errors in studying IR resulted in undermining the 
understanding of IR and its development as a science. This led, according to Waltz, to the 
need of assessing and evaluating the methodology of studying of IR (Little, 1991: 470). 
In addition, Waltz believed that the use of methods is just a tactical device which could 
easily result from the adequacy and appropriateness of the logic behind the use of these 
methods, the methodology and the subject matters. Therefore, it is important for any 
researcher to be aware of choosing the right methods and methodology which suits the 
researcher’s questions but at the same time not allowing the methodology or the theory to 
dictate these questions and the nature of the topic (Little, 1991: 471).  
 
3.3 The Core Theory 
 
The advancement or modification of a scientific theory is a response to a crisis that the 
theory is facing or because of scepticism of its adequacy among its practitioners. In 
addition, competition and tension between two major theories has been, historically, 
resolved by the evolvement of a third theory that combines and unifies their most relevant 
and compatible assumptions and principles (Enfield, 1991: 469-479). However, in order 
to have a useful theory it must meet several criteria, such as: firstly, it must be testable in 
the sense of its applicability to the real world to the extent that its assumptions can be 
used in supporting or falsifying the expected behaviours of the observables; secondly, the 
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components and assumptions of the theory used should be logically connected and 
compatible with each other without inconsistencies; thirdly, the theory must be 
communicable in the sense that other specialists in the field can understand and examine 
its assumptions and hypothesises; and fourthly, it must be general by being applicable to 
different empirical cases and periods of time (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 20). 
 
The core theory of this thesis, which will be addressed later in this chapter, is embodied 
in a combination of some theoretical concepts and assumptions of both the works of 
Ikenberry regarding the current international liberal order, and the U.S. role in it on one 
hand; and the one of small states’ foreign policies and their role in international relations 
on the other. The major concept of Ikenberry’s work is embodied in what is known as 
strategic restraint, which will be discussed in the next section. As explained in the 
previous chapter, Ikenberry’s work is based on a critical perspective of the two major 
theories of international relations, neorealism and neoliberalism. His analysis is based on 
the realisation of empirical realities regarding the current international order and the U.S. 
role in it, especially since the end of the Cold War.  
 
The use of some theoretical assumptions regarding small states is highly important in this 
thesis for two reasons: firstly, the reality of Jordan as a small state requires the usage of 
some concepts which suit its criteria in order to obtain reliable and accurate data. 
Secondly, the combination of Ikenberry’s work and small states theory are compatible 
and complementary for each other, especially when dealing with relations such as those 
of U.S.-Jordanian relations, mainly because Ikenberry focuses his analysis on the 
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hegemonic behaviour and perspective in general; therefore, some concepts of small 
states’ politics are essential and are required to accomplish a more comprehensive 
perspective of the relations between these two countries. 
 
This combination will strengthen this thesis in different ways. It will result in an 
assessment of the adequacy of the two works, Ikenberry’s and those on small states. The 
interaction between the two in an empirical case will examine and test their basic 
principles in general. This interaction will illustrate the strengths and defects of the two 
theoretical concepts and their explanatory power based on the real world of contemporary 
international politics. More importantly, while this combination will be based on a 
conceptual selection of both works, the combination will result in narrowing down the 
theme of this theoretical framework to establish an original and more focussed argument 
that the thesis is concerned with. 
 
The choice of the theoretical framework was made after careful consideration of the 
research’s aims and questions. In order to understand and explain U.S.-Jordanian 
relations in the twenty-first century the theory used must grasp the multidimensional 
nature of the topic. Therefore, the use of only one part of the theoretical combination will 
be problematic, partial, ineffective, and unfortunate, especially when taking into account 
the possible comprehensiveness of the combination. In addition, while the current 
international order and system and the status of the U.S.A in it seems to be relatively 
static for the foreseeable future, most of the other states in the system seem to be 
secondary if not “small” compared to the U.S.A, therefore, if the theoretical combination 
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proves to be very successful and adequate for the study of the U.S.-Jordanian relations in 
the 2000s, it can be applied to other U.S. relations, especially with those in the Middle 
East regarding many contemporary international issues, concerns, and dilemmas that they 
share with Jordan in their relations with the U.S.A, or at least the use of this combination 
may guide to the necessary sense of direction toward a more adequate and comprehensive 
theoretical framework to contemporary similar topics.                 
 
3.3.1 Liberal Hegemony and U.S. Strategic Restraint  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are different interpretations and theoretical 
claims regarding the international order. From the liberal hegemonic perspective, 
establishing order between states with huge power asymmetries seems to be difficult and 
undesirable for both sides; the hegemonic and the periphery, unless there is assurance that 
such an order is beneficial and vital for both. Therefore, the U.S.A has to engage in 
“strategic restraint” in its relations with its allies in order to guarantee their compliance 
and cooperation. By doing that the U.S.A will assure weaker states that it will not 
abandon or dominate them on one hand, while on the other it is reassured that these states 
would participate within the order cooperatively (Ikenberry, 1998: 45).  
 
The character of the international order is changeable according to the change in the 
state’s capacities to restrain its power at the international arena. The most recent 
development in what has been called “strategic restraint” is embodied in establishing 
intergovernmental institutions in order to institutionalise the relations between states. The 
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real start of this institutionalisation of international affairs took place by the initiatives 
and support of the U.S.A after the Second World War. It aimed not only to facilitate the 
relations between states but also offered the dominant state, the U.S.A, the opportunity to 
practice political management of weaker states to lock them into mutually favourable 
relations (Ikenberry, 2001: 5). Consequently, the role of the international institutions is 
crucial in making the acts and behaviours of all states predictable and knowable to the 
others, and to reduce the possibility of the return to the use of power between these states 
when there are disagreements among them (Ikenberry, 1998: 46). 
  
The major reasons for which make a hegemonic state limits its use of power and restricts 
itself in its relations with weaker states are to ensure and guarantee the continuity and 
durability of international cooperation and order which it created for the long run in a 
predictable manner. Secondly, by depending on a more cooperative order where states 
participate willingly, the hegemonic power will reduce the costs which it would have to 
sacrifice in other kinds of relations in order to enforce order or to reward secondary states 
(Ikenberry, 1999: 131). Finally, what support and make the U.S. hegemony in the centre 
of the international order and what makes this order survivable and desirable are the facts 
that the U.S. hegemony is perceived by many states as being reluctant, penetrated and 
institutionalised (Ikenberry, 1999: 135). 
 
The main outcome of the U.S. strategic restraint is obvious in the absence of any 
balancing power against U.S. unipolarity after the end of the Cold War. Most of the great 
powers which could be the potential challengers to the U.S.A prefer to comply with the 
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U.S. policies mainly because broadly speaking they believe that U.S. intentions are not 
hostile to their interests (Brown, 2005: 237), not to mention that any changes in the U.S. 
hegemonic order would be very costly for many states, including those who have the 
potential ability to change the order, because of the substantial connectedness which 
emerged around different organisations and economic activities which are already 
established and supported by the U.S.A and the current order. In another words, the U.S. 
hegemonic order became so deep and profound for both the leading state and for the 
periphery to the extent that it is very difficult to be changed, which is what makes it 
stable and expansive (Ikenberry, 1999: 139).     
 
The major belief that recent U.S. foreign policy has been based on is that the U.S. 
hegemonic leadership and international cooperation are complementary to each other 
(Keohane, 1984: 179). By adopting and fostering an open world economy the U.S.A 
aimed to achieve many vital aims: firstly, to obtain accessibility to the markets and 
resources in different regions in the world, to help in enhancing the wealth, power and 
security of its nation. The second aim is political as well as economic, that by integrating 
in the world economy the U.S.A will be able to influence the political and economic 
strategies of these states to guarantee their cooperation and ensure the openness and the 
interdependence of the world economy, which are crucial factors for U.S. prosperity and 
its hegemonic position in the world (Ikenberry, 2007: 43). Thirdly, by deliberately 
increasing the interdependence between great powers as well as between small states and 
the U.S.A, the desire of these powers to gravitate against the U.S.A and to become its 
rivals and competitors decrease. In other words, this strategic interdependence aimed to 
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make the potential competitors have less desire and be less able to become fully 
autonomous from the leading power. Finally, the U.S. policies had the aim of creating a 
path for democratic values and principles in undemocratic countries which are part of the 
world economy to expand the order and its hegemony (Ikenberry, 2007: 45).  
 
In response to the main liberal institutional scholars such as Ruggie, Keohane, and 
Martin, who believe in the efficiency and superiority of liberal institutional theory, 
Mearsheimer argues that their claim of the state and international institution’s behaviours 
are consistent with realism in many occasions and aspects. Mearsheimer asserted that the 
main genuine motivation behind the behaviours of these institutions and their members is 
power politics (Mearsheimer, 1995: 84). In addition, he asserted that international 
institutions do not independently change state behaviour. However, he does not deny the 
role of these institutions in facilitating cooperation between states by settling gain 
distribution disputes, but he is unconvinced of the claim that international institutions are 
a source of peace between states (Mearsheimer, 1995: 87).     
 
International orders are established at the international arena after major wars and 
international events. After the end of a global conflict and at the beginning of a new era 
which witnesses the establishment of a new international order, the dominant and 
victorious power will find itself more powerful than before and than other powers. It 
faces at this stage a major and a determinative crucial crossroad, not only for the 
dominant power itself but also for all the international system and the theme of IR. This 
crossroad is about the choices and strategies that the dominant power will adopt and how 
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it will affect the international order, and centre on whether the power isolates itself from 
the international arena or engages more profoundly in global issues with its greater 
capacity and influence. Therefore, while the leading state may choose to engage in 
international politics in a leading manner with all its overwhelming weight in order to 
establish a durable and survivable international order, it must override the fears of its 
weaker partners of being dominated or abandoned under the new order and the 
hegemonic status of the dominant power (Ikenberry, 2001: 4). 
 
Two variables determined the incentives and capacities of the dominant power to employ 
international order and political control. Firstly, the power disparities between the 
dominant state and other states are very effective in this regard. The greater the power 
disparity is the more ability the leading state will have in employing international order. 
This will be embodied by encouraging both sides, the hegemonic power and the weaker 
state, to engage in strategic restraint, by the dominant state’s ability not to use its surplus 
power and grant some of it to international institutions. Secondly, the more democratic 
the states which are involved in institutional order the stronger the interlocking between 
these states will take place (Ikenberry, 2001: 5). When the hegemonic power is a liberal 
state, the secondary state has many channels and accessibility to the hegemonic power’s 
policymaking mechanism in order to represent its interests and to make its voice heard. 
Moreover, the liberal features of the hegemonic state offer a great deal of transparency, 
so the secondary state will not be surprised by any policy that the leading state may adopt 
and it will be aware of the decisions that the leading state is intending to make regarding 
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a specific issue of mutual interest. Therefore, a reciprocal influence takes place between 
the core state and the periphery regarding policymaking (Ikenberry, 1999: 186).  
 
3.3.2 Small States’ Foreign Policies                                   
 
Some scholars summarize the behaviour of small states by expecting them to exhibit 
limited involvement in international affairs, adopt a narrow foreign policy limited to their 
regions only, prefer using diplomatic and economic tools to military ones, choosing 
neutrality, obeying international law and engaging in international agreements and 
organisations, depending on superpowers to ensure their security and vital needs, they 
behave cooperatively, and finally they focus their foreign policies mainly on guaranteeing 
their political survival (Hey, 2003: 5). However, Hey argues that this list of expected 
behaviours is too long to be exclusive only to small states and at the same time some of 
these characteristics are contradicting. For example, it is difficult for a small state to be 
neutral while allying itself with a superpower which provides the small state with security 
and supports it needs. Therefore, it is very important to understand the nature of the 
international system and conditions under which a small state operates. For example, Paul 
Smith argues that it is important to focus on the international system and adopt the 
system level of analysis in order to understand the behaviours of small states, mainly 
because they are weak to the extent that they always behave reactively to the international 
status. In another word, the behaviours of small states are shaped according to the issues 
and conditions outside their borders which are determined by international politics and 
superpowers (Hey, 2003: 6). 
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According to Rothstein, there are three aspects which can be generalised for small power 
politics; outside help is always needed for a small state, a small state’s margin of safety is 
narrow and the time available to correct mistakes is limited, and small states’ leaders are 
always aware of the unalterable weakness of their states. Although these aspects are 
shared by some big states on some occasions, they are more prevalent in small powers 
(Keohane, 2006: 56). Moreover, Michael Handel argues that while small states are 
preoccupied with the vitality of their survival and security, this makes them more affected 
by the policies of other states and that leaves little room for domestic or bureaucratic 
factors in the making of their foreign policies. According to Handel, the international 
system in which small states perform is very important for the understanding of small 
states’ foreign policies, which are expected to be very rational and focussed on seeking 
survival and the maximization of benefits (Handel, 2006: 150). Other scholars such as 
Elman and McGraw argued that small states’ domestic politics are paramount in shaping 
and changing its foreign policies. As a result, it is difficult to generalize whether 
international or domestic politics is the supreme factor in the foreign policies of small 
states, however, it can be argued that only when a small state guarantees that it will not 
jeopardize its international interests, especially with great powers, will it consider its 
domestic factors a priority in its foreign policy (Hey, 2003: 7).  
 
Scholars of small states argue that small states are, or should be, moral actors, and they 
can be the glue which supports the cohesion of the international system, being more 
responsible actors than great powers. Moreover, they believe that great powers and their 
selfishness and the desire they have for domination make them the major destabilizing 
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actors in the international order (Sens, 1996: 86). On the other hand, other scholars 
accuse small states of behaving irresponsibly by bandwagoning with growing and 
threatening powers in order to provide them with the security which small states are 
always concerned about. They argue that one of the reasons for destabilising the 
international system is when small states empower a growing great power to be further 
out of the equilibrium (Sens, 1996: 88). As Rothstein argued “If power corrupts, so does 
the lack of it” (Rothstein, 1968). 
 
Nevertheless, the role of small states in the international system can be developed by the 
strategies they adopt; they can be main players in stabilising the system and activating the 
role of the international organisations and institutions. In addition, they can also be a 
mediator between other states and participate in enhancing the cohesion of the system, 
especially if their own interests are better served in a more cooperative and peaceful 
international environment, particularly if the risks and the sacrifice which may result 
from such policies is limited (Sens, 1996: 90).             
 
Although small states are constantly conscious of and preoccupied with their 
survivability and security, they survived and still exist and some of them are very active. 
They differ in their sensitivity towards their survival, depending on their geographical 
location, but most of them share the inability to relax their vigilance on security issues 
and are always on alert to external factors (Handel, 2006: 152). In addition, small states 
may be unable to protect themselves, but they can manoeuvre within the international 
system to get help from other states, especially when they have the freedom to choose 
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their great and strong allies and know how to use them and the international system and 
tensions between great powers. Therefore, in many cases, the danger for a small state is 
higher when it isolates itself from the international system (Handel, 2006: 190). 
Therefore, it is argued that small states have more freedom to manoeuvre within the 
international system than classical IR theories expect, depending on their policies and on 
the surrounding conditions; as Keohane stated, the compliance of small states is not 
always guaranteed (Ingebritsen, 2006: 289).  
 
There are different views about what determines the survivability of a small state; Vital 
argues that long-term survival depends on small state’s own policies and the quality of 
these policies in terms of making the right decisions based on the wisdom and smartness 
of its policymakers (Vital, 1971). On the other hand, Mathisen believes that the policies 
of a small state cannot make a significant impact to its survival on the long run; external 
factors and mainly powerful states will remain having the upper hand in determining the 
security and the survival of a small state (Knudsen, 1996: 8). The response to Mathisen’s 
beliefs is that although the hegemonic power will retain the upper hand and be committed 
to the support of its allies, it also aims to restrain its usage of power and resources in its 
relations in order to reduce the cost of its foreign strategies, and to make the international 
order which it rules expansive and attractive for small as well as for major powers 
(Ikenberry, 2001: 131).  
 
Different variables should be considered while examining power disparities, most of 
which are external ones. These variables are: the strategic location of the small state from 
 137
the perspective of great powers, the tension between great powers, the history of the 
relations between the small state and the great power, the relations between the small 
state and other rivals or allies for great powers, the role of the multilateral frameworks in 
stabilising power disparity, and the phase of the power cycle in which the superpower 
operates (Knudsen, 1996: 9). Not all of these variables are equally important, they differ 
from one case to another, but taken together, the interaction between them define the 
international and political environment of power disparity which have a substantial 
impact on the security and foreign policies of small states (Knudsen, 1996: 17). 
 
Based on this discussion, the strength or weakness of a small state can be measured by 
examining its ability in withstanding external and internal threats and pressures and in its 
ability to perform its own choice of policies. Some small states overcome their weakness 
by allying themselves with big powers, but that normally be at the expense of their 
autonomy and ability to manoeuvre (Vital, 2006: 79). Therefore, for a small state, testing 
its ability in resisting other states’ demands and measuring its capacity to manoeuvre are 
more accurate in identifying its power and in predicting its policies accordingly (Fox, 
2006: 40).  
 
3.3.3 The Combination of U.S. Liberal Hegemony and Small States  
 
From the discussion above, the foreign policies of small states can only be accurately 
studied and interpreted while attributing them to the major characteristics of world 
politics and the international system with consideration of the prevailing paradigm, such 
as the one of Ikenberry’s liberal hegemony, which has been highlighted in the previous 
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chapter and explored above in this chapter. In addition, while small states are always 
concerned about their security, which makes them affected more by the international 
system as discussed above, they are more willing to cooperate with others and participate 
effectively in maintaining the international order (Hey, 2003: 50; Sense, 1996: 68). 
Therefore, the hegemonic power’s practice of strategic restraint that Ikenberry stressed is 
a major guide for the expectations of the foreign policies of both sides, the hegemonic 
power and the weaker state (Ikenberry, 1998: 45).  
 
This acknowledgment of these major characteristics of the policies of both sides 
rationalises the expectations of small states to be more responsible in achieving their 
security and survivability, whether by their ability in withstanding external pressures 
(Fox, 2006: 40) or as Vital argued by adopting the right and smart policies that are 
compatible with their vital needs (Knudsen, 1996: 8). This will fundamentally require 
small states to be equipped with the necessary ability in manoeuvring in their foreign 
policies at the international arena, especially with the hegemonic power, as far as 
possible, to overcome their vulnerabilities.  
 
The accomplishment of the priorities and survivability that shape the foreign policies of 
small states do not result solely from their own policies, nor from the support and 
protection offered by the hegemonic power; they are rather obtained from the policies of 
small states which are based on the combination of the recognition of both the realities of 
the international order and the role of small states in it on one hand, and the 
implementation of the hegemonic power’s policies and terms in the international system 
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and its consequent implications. Therefore, the activeness of the small state in the 
international system and its support to the hegemonic power to achieve international 
order and its vigilance of the mechanisms that determined the priorities of the hegemonic 
power accordingly are essential for the small state to overcome its security problems and 
achieve survivability. Consequently, from this theoretical framework, it can be assumed 
that while democratic and industrialised countries willingly cooperate with the U.S.A, 
small countries like Jordan have extra vital incentives and interests to be active and 
compatible in their behaviours with the liberal international order and U.S. hegemony in 
the twenty-first century. Meanwhile, for a small state like Jordan, being an active and 
reliable U.S. agent must not prevent it from manoeuvring to utilize from such a liberal 
order to withstand occasional detrimental U.S. exigencies.     
 
3.4 Methods of the Thesis 
 
According to de Vaus, the importance of the research plan is to enable the researcher to 
find the necessary, valid, objective, and accurate data for the research questions by using 
the appropriate and available methods (Burnham et al., 2004: 33). Therefore, the research 
methods are central in the process of finding results in any political inquiry and designing 
them is an essential element of political science in general (Burnham et al., 2004: 1). 
Bryman argued that good research is the one which is well designed and has a framework 
for data collection and analysis according to the priorities of the research (Burnham et al., 
2004: 30). The research design also determines how the research will be conducted, using 
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a combination of methods and strategies is important in order to provide complementary 
data to support the results (Burnham et al., 2004: 31). 
 
 The unjustifiable increase in the use of quantitative methods in political research at the 
expense of epistemological inquiries resulted in many cases in the inadequacy and 
inefficiency of these methods (Mayer, 2002: 125). Therefore, Cox suggested that theory 
and methodology are for someone and for some purposes that suit the research topic; in 
addition, theory and methods should be connected and compatible with each other and 
must be for a specific purpose for each researcher and each topic (Burnham et al., 2004: 
276). For this research, side-by-side with elite interviewing, archival and document 
analysis will take place. Moreover, investigating and analysing academic materials is a 
key method of this thesis. This method is highly significant, reading these materials is 
essential to integrate and connect different parts of the data with each other to obtain the 
required ground for the analysis of the subject matter (Dey, 1993: 82). This would result 
in a combination of different methods, which are believed to deepen the outcomes of any 
research (Burnham et al., 2004: 206).  
 
Most styles of interviewing share the same feature, such as that they engage in an 
interaction and dialogue between the researcher and the interviewee (Mason, 2002: 62). 
According to Kahn and Cannell, interviews are “a conversation with a purpose” 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 108). As a result, the researcher’s ontological perspective 
gives an account of the people’s view, knowledge, interpretations, and experience which 
are major part of the social reality that the research is exploring (Mason, 2002: 63). In 
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addition, there is a pragmatic reason for choosing qualitative interviewing; the required 
data may be unavailable by other means. Moreover, interviews will help the researcher to 
explore the research questions from different angles, especially when the researcher is 
using other methods. Interviewing is also a method which provides the researcher with 
large amounts of data in a very short time (Mason, 2002: 66).  
 
Elite interviews are those which focus on individuals who are considered to be 
influential, well-informed and expert in the research topic and area. The advantages of 
this kind of interview are that the interviewee’s position in the realms related to the 
research enable them to offer the researcher an overall view of the topic as well as vital 
details and information, whether related to the past, present or even future plans related to 
the issues; they will be in the heart of the topic (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 113). For 
political research, elite interviewing is a key technique mainly because it is an effective 
way for the researcher to obtain vital information about decision making from experts 
about the topic. Because of the fact that qualitative interviewing is based on the 
assumption that knowledge is constructed more than excavated, the interview’s questions 
should focus on the interviewee’s knowledge and experience rather than asking 
hypothetical questions and scenarios (Mason, 2002: 68). In addition, the high knowledge 
and intellectual ability of the interviewee in the topic makes the researcher neutral and 
limited in their ability to capriciously manipulate the information and the matter under 
discussion during the interview (Burnham et al., 2004: 205).  
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Interviews in general have their own problems which the researcher who is using them 
should be aware of when designing research strategies. Because of the importance of the 
interaction and cooperation between the researcher and the interviewee, the latter may be 
unwilling to cooperate with researchers or to share some valid information they have, as 
well as unwilling to support the researcher’s desire to explore the topic (Marsharll and 
Rossman, 1999: 110). In addition, the most important elite people tend to be very busy, 
which may cause difficulties for the researcher in terms of access and sufficient time 
during the interview. More significantly, on some occasions, the researcher may have to 
adapt the interview and its structure and questions to meet the desires and predilections of 
the interviewee person, especially when considering the fact that they may have the 
ability to take charge of the interview and avoid responding to specific advanced and 
sensitive questions and inquiries (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 114).  
 
Although elite interviewees may offer the researcher the needed vital information, they 
may cause some scientific risks, especially if the researcher lets them shape the 
researcher’s definitions and concepts of the observables and the research process with 
their invalid information (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 321). This may happen if 
the researcher is not aware of the facts, or if the respondents give limited or inaccurate 
information in their answers to the questions, or they provide the researcher with 
misinformation when tackling ideological, personal or sensitive issues (Manheim, Rich 
and Willnat, 2002: 322). However, these problems can be overcome if the researcher has 
strong conceptualization of the research problem and questions, as well as advanced 
knowledge of the topic in general (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 115). No less 
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importantly, while the researcher may not have full control over the interview, the 
researcher must not take all the information provided by elite people as factual data 
because understanding political behaviour requires a distinction between what is fact and 
what is claimed to be a fact and true by politicians and elites. Consequently, the 
researcher should interview more than one source of information, especially when 
collecting data regarding very crucial events or concepts related to the topic, and compare 
the provided information and analyze them carefully and compare them also with the data 
obtained by other means and methods (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 323).  
 
While the researcher should be knowledgeable enough about the topic in order not to be 
manipulated and misled by invalid or unbalanced answers and information, the intentions 
of the first two expanded chapters of this thesis were to provide the researcher and the 
thesis with extensive basic knowledge about the topic in both of its dimensions, 
empirically in chapter one and theoretically in chapter two. The reasons for that are to 
enable the researcher to formulate the right questions and to establish the adequate 
argument of this thesis with limited influence of the interviewees’ motivations or 
intentions, and to be equipped with solid comprehension of the topic in order to be aware 
of any invalid information that is provided by any participant or source. In addition, the 
researcher’s career experience in the Jordanian Parliament (1998-2005) allows him to be 
aware of Jordanian politics and the profiles of its elites, which helped him in selecting 
adequate interviewees for this research and its characteristics, let alone that the researcher 
examined more than two hundred books and other publications of different academic 
journals and specialized institutions and centres in different countries, including the 
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U.S.A, in particular the Library of Congress, specialized centres in strategic and Middle 
Eastern studies, and many others. This wide and diverse range of materials published by 
different scholars and experts in the topic from different angles and backgrounds aimed 
to ensure balanced, up-to-date, and advanced information and data that are 
complementary with what is obtained from interviewing.  
 
During the field research in the summer of 2008, the researcher interviewed seventeen 
Jordanian experts in U.S.-Jordanian relations. As a result, the interpretations of U.S.-
Jordanian relations in the 2000s provided in this thesis are mainly from a Jordanian 
perception of these relations. These interviewees were from different establishments and 
political backgrounds to obtain balanced views about the subjects matter. Most of them 
are high-ranking politicians, academics, analysts, and current and retired officials from 
the Jordanian Armed Forces and other institutions. Although the number of interviews is 
not too big, the interviews were long and deep discussions about details that are of high 
importance to the understanding of the features of these relations which could not be 
obtained from other sources or a larger cohort of interviewees. The selection of the 
interviewees was based on their relevance and expertise on the topics covered in this 
thesis, and their involvement in these topics within the timescale of this thesis.       
 
3.5 The Core Theory and Methodology  
 
The interlocking between the methodological characteristics of this thesis and the core 
theory and methods can be described as follows. Firstly, this research is a qualitative one 
aimed at achieving a complex and profound understanding and knowledge of U.S.-
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Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The theory and methods used in this research are 
designed to provide the necessary data for argument building and analysis to enrich the 
understanding and the knowledge of the subject matter. It is vital to mention in this 
regard that interviewing in general is one of the most used methods in qualitative studies 
(Mason, 2002: 62). In addition, while the connection of different concepts is a major 
aspect of qualitative research, as discussed earlier in this chapter (Dey, 1993) the 
combination of the works of Ikenberry and small states’ politics together aimed to 
provide a conceptualisation framework which can challenge other frameworks and to 
strengthen the understanding of the subject matters and to be applicable to similar cases.  
 
Secondly, this research is an empirical one concerned with the relations between two 
countries, the U.S.A and Jordan, in a specific period of time. At the same time, the 
research is driven by a theoretical framework which itself was based on observed facts; 
Ikenberry’s assumptions were built upon observation of historical evidences and cases. In 
addition, the theory used, as discussed in the combination section, has its say in 
determining and choosing the observables in this thesis. While scientific inquiry is a 
systematic process of gaining knowledge (Krippendorff, 1982: 17), elite interviewing is 
an efficient tool in gathering knowledge and constituting facts regarding particular topic 
and issue (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 113). Moreover, while the interpretation of a 
political phenomenon must be empirically tested (Mayer, 2002: 124), the research 
questions that are asked in the elite interviews tackled the nature of the subject matters. 
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Thirdly, the nature of the core theory, as discussed above, is that it is critical of the major 
leading theories of IR. This research is based on a critical methodology not only because 
the core theory itself is critical to others, but also because this theory was chosen in order 
to be assessed and evaluated based on empirical case and research. The combination of 
the theoretical assumptions aimed to achieve two major elements of any critical study, it 
aims first to understand deeply the nature of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s and 
then to explain its nature and characteristics. To achieve that, the core theory of this 
research is designed in order to guarantee that the research will include and tackle the 
entire primary objectives and observables that fabricate U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 
2000s which are embodied in the following three chapters of this thesis. Remarkably, 
while in IR a critical study and theory aim to the reinterpretation and restructuring of 
ideas (Brown, 1994: 58), elite interviewing is a practical means to achieve that by being 
able to tackle the topic from different angles (Mason, 2002: 66), and by being able to 
access the most influential and knowledgeable people on the topic (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999: 113). 
 
The final feature of this study is that it is inclusive research in the sense that the subject 
matter and the theory used will be assessed based on observation and interpretation of the 
reality of the issues related to the topic. In addition, the rationale of using this theoretical 
framework is to accomplish a powerful explanation of the reality of the topic. The desire 
for explanation is also designed to enhance the progress towards a more complete 
knowledge of the subject matter, and at the same time it is considered that the knowledge 
produced in this thesis could be incomplete at one point depending on the developments 
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and the future of the subject matter. For these reasons, the choice of topics and timescale 
covered in this thesis are fixed. While U.S.-Jordanian relations are shaped by the people’s 
knowledge, mainly politicians and those who dealt with the matter in general, 
interviewing people who are experts in the topic and revising secondary resources 
published by specialist in the theme are the best methods to offer the researcher with the 
required data to accomplish a solid research (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 113). As a 
result, this thesis aims to arrive at more comprehensive knowledge of this topic, which 
may result in a proof of the people’s knowledge or may result in an indication of more 
accurate knowledge which may differ from that available from these people.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has addressed the interaction and interlocking between the relevant 
methodological characteristics of this research on one hand and the invented theoretical 
framework on the other. This interaction and interlocking have established the logic of 
this thesis, which is embodied in the nature and rationale of the research questions. These 
research questions do not claim that they offer an absolute understanding of the relations 
between the U.S.A and Jordan, empirically or theoretically, rather they suggest that they 
offer a better understanding of the current relations between the two countries. 
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These questions are: 
  
- Despite the radical differences in power relations between the U.S.A and 
Jordan, there is a certain level of interdependence and cooperation 
between the two countries: how far does a theory of liberal hegemony 
and small states’ politics better explain these relations than neorealism 
or neoliberalism? 
 
- How far is Jordan a reliable U.S. partner or agent in security issues in 
Middle Eastern contexts after 9/11?  
 
- To what extent are Jordan’s domestic policies of political reform driven 
by U.S. exigencies of democratization in the region? 
 
- How far did Jordan manage to maintain simultaneous alignment and 
manoeuvrability within its relations with the U.S.A, and U.S. 
neoconservatives, with Israel separately?      
 
These questions are formulated to explore U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s in a way 
that can offer deep understanding, interpretation and original knowledge of the current 
nature of the relations between the two countries. The first question is designed to 
provide basic but advanced theoretical grounds for the nature of the relations between the 
two countries in order to allow the thesis to establish its argument that is derived from its 
theoretical framework. The other three questions are initially derived from the first 
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question, but address precise issues, each of which is concerned with one of the empirical 
chapters respectively. The empirical questions, questions two, three, and four, are also 
designed to answer the theoretical question, question one, in order to justify the usage of 
this theoretical framework by exploring the relations between the two countries 
empirically in the chapters that follow. 
 
All in all, these questions aim to tackle the research topics in a qualitative manner in the 
sense of their trends towards achieving argument building and sophisticated 
understanding of the relations between the two countries in the 2000s. In addition, these 
questions study specific objects and observables that are of high importance to the 
relations between the U.S.A and Jordan, the subsequent chapters therefore are going to 
address these observables regarding fundamental issues such as the security cooperation 
between the two countries in the 2000s in chapter four, the U.S. democracy promotion in 
the Middle East after 9/11 in chapter five, and the tri-dimensional relations between the 
U.S.A, Israel and Jordan in chapter six.            
 
These questions are also derived from the central assumptions of the theoretical 
framework of this thesis, which is a critical concept to other dominant paradigms in the 
theme. As a result, these questions address the current relations between the U.S.A and 
Jordan from a critical and unique point of view aiming to provide a unique interpretation 
of the subject matter. Meanwhile, these questions and the topics that are covered in the 
following chapters are exploring the current realities of the relations between the two 
countries regarding specific interpretations, issues and period of time. Therefore, these 
 150
types of questions are tackling the most significant topics of U.S.-Jordanian relations in 
the 2000s in the following chapters in order to provide sophisticated, deep, and coherent 
but sensible knowledge that is required for this thesis.  In other words, there is reciprocal 
influence between the topics of subsequent chapters and the rationale behind them on the 
one hand and the interlocking between the characteristics and core theory of this thesis on 
the other.   
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Chapter Four: Security Cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates the security cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan since 
2000. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the nature and intensity of security 
cooperation between the two countries over a specific period of time that has witnessed 
unprecedented events regarding the security of both the U.S.A and the Middle East. 
While the Middle East and the U.S.A witnessed major military events during this period 
of time, the security cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan is a vital component in 
exploring the features of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 and their consequences, especially the War on Terror and the war in 
Iraq in 2003 have not only resulted in more security interactions between Jordan and the 
U.S.A, but also made their relations in this regard more sophisticated and advanced.  
 
The main argument of this chapter is that despite the huge power disparity between 
Jordan and the U.S.A, the two countries are practicing a high level of alignment, 
interdependence, and mutual influence in very sensitive issues regarding their securities, 
with a considerable level of thoughtfulness. The originality of this chapter is embodied in 
assessing the role that a small state like Jordan can play as a vital player in regional and 
international politics, as well as its ability in accomplishing simultaneous independency 
and considerable attention from a superpower like the U.S.A during a very crucial time. 
As a result, the level of domination by the U.S.A over Jordan will be assessed regarding 
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security affairs and cooperation, even though Jordan as a small state depends heavily on 
U.S. support and protection.  
 
This chapter, therefore, will explore the importance of the cooperation between the two 
countries in security issues and the value of each country’s policies in this increasing 
mutual interaction. To achieve that, the chapter will start with the recent nature of the 
Middle Eastern security situation and the impact of U.S. security policies and strategies 
that were highlighted in chapter one, which will address the major issues and aspects of 
U.S.-Jordanian security relations. This will allow the researcher to provide satisfactory 
analysis of these relations in more detail regarding major events and concerns that are 
adequate for this thesis, such as 9/11; the war in Iraq in 2003; and the Islamist threat to 
the region, Jordan and U.S. interests accordingly. The chapter then focuses on more 
mutual security relations between the two countries, such as Jordanian internal security, 
the development of Jordanian forces, and intelligence cooperation between Jordan and 
the U.S.A. These specific mutual issues would not be investigated appropriately before 
exploring the major events and issues mentioned above that have shaped the security 
policies of each country. These major events and issues have had huge influence on 
fashioning the current security cooperation between these two countries.           
 
The sources used for the purpose of this chapter are diverse; besides academic materials, 
the researcher used publications of U.S. specialist centres in the Middle East as well as 
those of Defence Department. In addition, the researcher interviewed two senior officers 
in the Jordanian Intelligence and Military Intelligence. This diversity of resources aimed 
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to avoid the limitation of information regarding the security cooperation between the 
U.S.A and Jordan, especially in the issue of intelligence cooperation.  
 
4.2 Security Cooperation in the Middle East 
 
It is important to highlight the meaning and characteristics of security cooperation in 
general and its implications on Middle Eastern security mainly because these realities 
have great impact on security relations between the two countries. According to Antonia 
and Abram Chayes, the core idea of cooperative security is the assurance and the 
confidence of the participant state that other participant states are abiding within the 
cooperative security system. Therefore, cooperative security is based on the agreements 
between sovereign states in the limitation of the military arms race and the use of force 
mainly because the assurance of cooperation is a complex idea due to the sensitivity of 
the state’s sovereignty regarding military issues (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 65). The 
compliance of the state within these agreements requires that the security regime be 
legitimate by being fair and indiscriminate in implementing its procedures among all 
participant states. Moreover, transparency and accessibility to information among states 
increase the state’s assurance and the efficiency of these agreements. All of these 
characteristics and procedures must guarantee the state’s security in order to be accepted 
(Chayes, and Chayes, 1994: 66). 
 
The end of the Cold War resulted in a major change in the meaning and requirements of 
international security and cooperation. The purpose of security cooperation at the 
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international level after the end of the Cold War was to deepen the cooperation between 
countries to face new threats and security challenges different from those of the Cold War 
era. In addition, cooperative security aims at reaching a mechanism between states to 
prevent wars by preventing the assembling and accumulation of the necessary means for 
an organised and deliberate aggression and conflict (Chayes, and Chayes, 1994: 5). 
 
Middle Eastern countries face many kinds of security threats and challenges. This region 
has experienced many conventional wars; some of these countries possess nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction. Significantly, Islamic terrorism is believed to have 
Middle Eastern origins. In this region there are border disputes, water scarcities, and high 
possibility of internal violence and instability due to poor governance. The Arab-Israeli 
conflict, the weakness of regional organizations, and the limited, or in some cases the 
absence of regional cooperation and trade increased the insecurity and instability of this 
region (Laipson and Hokayem, 2006: 153). 
   
After the end of the Cold War, the Middle East witnessed major events which affected 
the region in many ways, especially its security arrangements. The legacy of the Gulf 
War (1990-1991), the defeat of Iraq, and the peace process which started accordingly 
were simultaneous with the beginning of a new era in international affairs such as the 
intensification of the internationalisation of security arrangements and arms control 
initiatives. These realities increased the desire of Middle Eastern countries to enhance 
their security cooperation whether among them or with external powers (Kemp, 1994: 
392). No less importantly, the Gulf War illustrated the vulnerability of most poor and 
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small Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan and smaller Gulf countries in the face of 
regional or international powers. External protection and modern technological weapons 
and military support systems became affordable only to rich, oil-producing countries or 
major U.S. allies like Israel, which receives substantial U.S. economic and military aid. 
Another characteristic of Middle Eastern security is the possibility of the use of WMD; 
the concentration of the population and economic infrastructure in main cities in Middle 
Eastern countries makes the use of this kind of weapon even more catastrophic than usual 
(Kemp, 1994: 394).   
 
According to Steinbruner, the aim of cooperative security is to control and prevent the 
circumstances that cause wars and confrontation between countries by implementing 
rules and transparency among states to stop of offensive behaviours (Steinbruner, 1992: 
20).  However, he asserted that although cooperative security in the Middle East is an 
advantage for all countries in the region, it is still an unachievable idea, mainly because 
of the rejection attitude toward the principles of cooperative security in the region 
(Steinbruner, 1992: 22), not to mention the absence of the criteria for security 
cooperation, discussed above with reference to Antonia and Abram Chayes. 
 
The instability of the Middle East prevented many foreign investors from investing in the 
region. More importantly, the lack of stability and harmony and the inefficiency of the 
peace process are preventing the establishment of a unified trading block which would 
enhance the idea of building a security block that would be concerned with the stability 
of the region as well as with international security (Kemp, 1994: 399). There is also an 
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absence of any security community in the Middle East which is sufficiently capable of 
providing these countries with the needs for their national and regional security 
preferences and to make the responsibility of the security of these countries associated 
with their sovereignty. Therefore, it is believed that many Middle Eastern policymakers 
experience that their policies and preferences must be adapted to be compatible with U.S. 
priorities in the region, so these countries can accomplish their national security 
accordingly (Laipson and Hokayem, 2006: 154). 
 
Because of the fact that most of the required components of regional security cooperation 
mentioned above are weak among Middle Eastern countries, and because the challenges 
and concerns for the security and survivability of a small state like Jordan, which is 
located in such a region, are paramount, many countries in the Middle East such as 
Jordan build strong alliances with the U.S.A, especially while the requirements for 
security cooperation between these countries and the U.S.A are more adequate than those 
among Middle Eastern countries.  
 
4.3 The U.S.A and Middle Eastern Stability  
 
The presence of a great power in a region is essential for establishing regional stability 
and order (Miller, 2004: 240). In addition, the type of engagement which a great power 
conducts in a region shapes the balance of power in it, by policies of arms supply, 
alignment, economic assistance, or by sanctions and embargo, the international system 
and great powers have major influence in regional politics (Miller, 2004: 240). Moreover, 
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resolving international conflicts and civil wars are important factors in enhancing 
international and regional security as well as U.S. security especially when considering 
that international conflicts and failed states mainly those in the Middle East became 
breeding grounds for terrorists and their organisations which became a threat to the 
U.S.A and its allies (Walt, 2001: 62).  
 
According to Yossi Alphar, U.S. security strategies and concerns in the Middle East after 
9/11 shifted from the Arab-Israeli conflict and focussed on issues related directly to U.S. 
security. President Bush perceived stagnation and lack of freedom and democracy to be 
combined with terrorism, WMD, and rogue states and organisations as the major threats 
to the stability of the Middle East, as well as to the international order and to the U.S.A. 
In other words, President G.W. Bush differed from President Clinton, who believed that 
sustainable peace between the Arabs and the Israelis would result in a more stable Middle 
East (Laipson and Hokayem, 2006: 162).  
 
Remarkably, the achievements of U.S. policies in the Middle East such as containing 
Communism, supporting Israel, and access to the oil trade were successful with modest 
costs in terms of human and economic costs compared to the costs of U.S. policies in 
other regions. Apart from the tragedy of the events of 9/11 and the U.S. policies that 
followed in the region, only 500 Americans died as a result of U.S. policies in the region 
in the fifty years prior to 9/11, whereas, for example, in South East Asia 50,000 
Americans lost their lives as a result of U.S. policies during the same period (Quandt, 
2003: 461). Therefore, and because of the vitality and significance of U.S. goals in the 
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Middle East, different U.S. administrations had the determination and public support to 
respond boldly to the threats to U.S. interests in the region such as the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 and the events of 9/11. This makes the U.S. War on Terror and 
countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction major elements of U.S. policies 
towards the region (Quandt, 2003: 461).     
 
Although wars of anticipation are hard to justify, it was argued by the Bush 
Administration that after 9/11 the War on Terror was different from any other kind of war 
(Flint and Falah, 2004: 1389). In addition, the prevailing attitude among the Bush 
administration prior to 9/11, that the U.S.A did not need the support of other countries, 
became unconvincing. International terrorism and its nature made the support of U.S. 
allies and friends indispensable, mainly because counterterrorism requires sharing 
intelligence information between countries as well as accessing other countries’ 
territories (Walt, 2001: 63). It is worth mentioning in this regard that prior to 9/11, inter-
state alliances were between states against states, whereas the alliance to fight terrorism is 
mainly against non-state terrorist organisations and those who sponsor them, which 
requires different kinds of interactions and cooperation between allies (Lieven, 2002: 
249).  
 
The U.S.A engages in different asymmetrical military alliances, despite the fact that it is 
the most powerful country in the world. It is worth mentioning that the U.S.A builds two 
kinds of security alliances, those which are based on formal agreements with other states 
such as NATO, and informal alliances which are not based on formal agreements such as 
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those between the U.S.A and small countries in the Middle East (Tertrais, 2004: 136). 
The U.S.A benefited from these alliances in the sense that the other part of the alliance 
shares the costs and responsibility with the U.S.A, let alone that the other partner’s 
foreign policy will be influenced by different U.S. strategies (Tertrais, 2004: 136). At the 
same time, different allies of the U.S.A benefit considerably from their relationship with 
the U.S.A; they guarantee U.S. protection from external threats and aggressions, and by 
cooperation with the U.S. forces they modernise their militaries and develop their skills. 
More importantly, U.S. allies gain access to U.S. military and political elites which make 
these countries have an impact on U.S. policymaking in issues related to their security 
and vital mutual interests (Tertrais, 2004: 141).  
 
One of the significant facts of current world politics, according to Professor Kamel Abu 
Jabber, is that the U.S.A is almost an immediate neighbour to most countries in the world 
even though it is not geographically close to them. Because of its presence, power, 
wealth, outreach and worldwide interests, the U.S.A has a huge influence in the politics 
and interests of many countries and regions in the world. This fact is more profound for 
small countries like Jordan, taking into consideration the importance of the Middle East 
for the U.S.A. Therefore, the U.S.A is not only next door to the Middle East, it is rather 
inside the Middle East. For example, Abu Jabber claimed that the U.S.A is planning to 
establish 923 military bases all over the world, which is equivalent to 4-5 bases in each 
country; current U.S. policies in Iraq indicated a bigger number than that in Iraq 
(Interview: Abu Jabber, 2008). 
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4.4 The Role of Jordan in the Stability of the Middle East     
 
Jordan is central to the geopolitics of the Middle East. It borders Syria, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Israel and the West Bank. This location places Jordan between the two most hot 
arenas and conflicts in the Middle East; the Israeli-Palestinian and the Iraqi theatres 
(Terrill, 2008:1). However, this location gives Jordan a strategic advantage, as the 
location of Jordan makes it a buffer state between both Israel and other Arab countries 
neighbouring Jordan, especially when hardliners in each side are in power (Interview: 
Hamami, 2008). Furthermore, the Jordanian forces are playing a vital role in maintaining 
stability in the region; it controls and monitors the Jordanian borders to prevent 
smuggling drugs, weapons, and terrorists to surrounding countries which are major U.S. 
allies such as Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008).  
 
The Jordanian army is very supportive of U.S. allies in the region; many officers from 
different Arab countries have their military education in Jordan which adopts the western 
school of military thought. Jordan also sent many of its military missions to other Arab 
countries for training. In April 2002 Jordan sent Special Forces to Yemen to help U.S. 
forces in training Yemeni forces in fighting terrorism. In addition, Jordanian forces 
trained almost 100 officers from the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan in 
counterterrorism and special operations (Terrill, 2008: 56). The ultimate goal of the U.S. 
and Jordanian governments in creating sustainable support of the Jordanian forces is not 
only to retain the loyalty of these forces to the current regime, which is very vital for any 
small state in the developing world, but also to enable these forces to do their important 
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tasks regarding regional stability. This loyalty has become taken for granted for the 
current regime over time. The strategic location of Jordan, which has the longest border 
with Israel and is a buffer state between Israel and other countries, and its role in fighting 
terrorism, made the role of Jordanian forces essential and strategic in stabling the region 
(Interview: Al-Raggad, 2008).  
 
Although U.S.-Jordanian relations are historically strong, since his accession to the 
Jordanian throne in 1999 King Abdullah II aimed to build a strategic relationship with the 
U.S.A and to make U.S.-Jordanian relations the cornerstone of Jordanian foreign policy 
(Lasensky, 2006: 11). A small country likes Jordan, about the size of Indiana, with 
limited resources and of population around six million has to depend heavily on external 
support and protection (Terrile, 2008: 2). One of the main factors in the survivability of 
Jordan is its leader’s realisation of its limited power and its perpetual need for the support 
of a superpower (Interview: Hamai, 2008).  
 
King Abdullah II had most of his education and training in the U.S and has an excellent 
military background; this makes King Abdullah II aware of U.S. interests in the region 
and gives him a full understanding of the mentality and desires of U.S. policymakers. 
Moreover, Al-Ka’abneh stated that by adopting many policies of arms supply and mutual 
alliances between the U.S.A and Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries, the U.S. 
involvement and presence in the Middle East are positive for Jordan as well as for 
stabilizing the region and preventing wars and conflicts (Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008). 
According to Benjamin Bell, Jordan is an extremely reliable ally for the U.S.A in the 
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global War on Terror. He emphasised that Jordan cooperates with the U.S.A on a daily 
basis in issues related to stability of the region and helping the U.S.A for better 
understanding of many details in the region (Interview: Bell, 2008).  
 
4.5  9/11 and U.S.-Jordanian Security Cooperation 
 
Increasingly, after 9/11, the U.S. approach towards Middle Eastern security remained 
military (Bilgin, 2005: 150). The events of 9/11 and the threat imposed by international 
terrorism on the U.S.A and its allies resulted in extraordinary involvement and different 
strategies by the U.S.A in the Middle East. The U.S.A anticipated that regime change in 
Iraq and Afghanistan would protect U.S. interests and allies and eliminate eminent and 
imminent threats in the region (Miller, 2004: 258). 
 
It has been argued that the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror and on Al-Qaeda 
provided the U.S.A with the justification to expand its presence and to further its interests 
in the Middle East. These events and their consequences on the U.S. strategies in the 
Middle East are similar to those of Pearl Harbour and the Soviet influence which allowed 
the U.S.A to legitimatise its strategies in the Far East (containing Japanese imperialism 
and communist expansion respectively) (Thayer, 2003: 36). Some people argue that the 
U.S. government has not identified terrorism in order to keep this term a flexible and 
political one so that its policies are not bound and contradicted. In addition, by keeping 
the term “terrorism” flexible, the U.S.A will have more advantages by being able to ask 
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its allies for more cooperation in many related issues in the name of fighting terrorism 
(Interview: Braizat, 2008).  
 
Although many realists believe that non-state actors in the international arena, such as Al-
Qaeda, are not capable of combating a hegemonic power such as the U.S.A, it is 
recognised that by the events of 9/11, Al-Qaeda aimed at a strategic goal, to undermine 
the U.S. presence and hegemony in the region. Al Qaeda’s leaders hoped that the terrorist 
attacks would provoke the U.S.A to overreact in the Middle East which would cause huge 
anti-U.S. sentiments in the region, leading to the overthrow of many pro-U.S. regimes 
such as those in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan in order to replace them with 
fundamentalist Islamic alternatives (Layne, 2004: 107). 
 
Military alliance took different faces and was motivated by different reasons. For the U.S,  
terrorism after 9/11 and the issue of weapons proliferation have resulted in strengthening 
already existing alliances between the U.S.A and other countries, as well as the creation 
of new ones (Tertrais, 2004: 135). The unprecedented power of the U.S.A and its defence 
policies after 9/11 made many countries in the world bandwagon with the U.S.A. 
However, great powers such as Russia and China decided to distance themselves from the 
U.S.A, mainly because of their national interests and pride (Tertrais, 2004: 147). Other 
countries which are traditional allies with the U.S.A started their own alliances and 
defence policies amongst themselves, such as Israel and Turkey. Although these 
countries share a common threat, Islamic fundamentalists, their cooperation with each 
other was a reaction to the increased cooperation between the U.S.A and other countries 
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in the Middle East. The term ‘ally’ for the U.S.A was interpreted in different dimensions 
after 9/11. Many western democratic countries which have been allied with the U.S.A for 
many decades have opposed the U.S. war in Iraq and other U.S. defence policies. At the 
same time, other countries which did not share the values of the U.S.A became major 
allies, mainly because of their tactical importance for the U.S. strategies in its War on 
Terror (Tertrais, 2004: 148).  
 
In 2002 after the events of 9/11 the NSS asserted that the U.S.A will work with its allies 
in different regions in the world to encourage them to destroy different terrorist 
organisations, especially those of global reach, by disturbing their financial network and 
system (NSS, 2002: 6). The U.S.-Jordanian relations have always been excellent on all 
fronts and the major and dominant principle of these relations is alignment, by which 
Jordan has been considered one of the best allies of the U.S.A in the world. This 
alignment has faced ups and downs on a few occasions, but since 9/11 the relations 
between the two countries have been strengthening (Interview: Al-Massry, 2008). King 
Abdullah II was the first head of an Arabic state to visit the U.S.A after the events of 
9/11. During this visit, on the 28th September 2001, King Abdullah II assured President 
Bush of the full Jordanian support of the U.S.A in the war against terrorism, and Jordan 
offered everything in its capacity in this war. President Bush himself stated that “the 
cooperation of our friends, the Jordanians, is strong and powerful” (Prados, 2003: 4).  
 
The cooperation between the two countries developed directly after the events. Although 
the Jordanian forces did not participate in military operations in the war in Afghanistan, 
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Jordan sent two important humanitarian missions to Afghanistan in December 2001, 
which were very helpful for the U.S.A to achieve the required stability in Afghanistan. 
These missions were operating in Afghanistan in 2002 as a military field hospital in 
Mazar Al- Shareif and the second was helping the U.S. forces in logistic issues such as 
anti-personnel landmines clearing unit and guarding food and medical supply routes. This 
Jordanian participation in Afghanistan was seen by some figures in the Jordanian 
opposition as if the Jordanian forces were joining the U.S. forces in a war against a 
Muslim country (Bookmiller, 2003: 179). However, according to the U.S. Defence 
Department fact sheet in June 6, 2006, the Jordanian hospital treated 68,811 patients in 
Afghanistan, in addition to which the Jordanian Army mines-clearing unit helped to clear 
almost 70,000 square meters of territory, including an air base, of anti-tank and anti-
personnel mines (Prados, 2003: 4).  
 
The Jordanian participation in the war in Afghanistan was modest on the ground mainly 
because of the geographical distance between the two countries, however, the Jordanian 
support to the U.S.A was perceived as unique compared to other countries. It shows the 
courage and vigilance of Jordan in seizing the moment and offering avoidable support to 
the U.S.A. In another words, Jordan found from the events of 9/11, and the war in 
Afghanistan in particular, a great chance to involve itself in U.S. major strategies in a 
way that showed a considerable level of pragmatism and initiative. Moreover, after 9/11 
the Jordanian cooperation with the U.S.A developed significantly on other issues related 
to this war and the War on Terror and Al-Qaeda, such as the indispensible intelligence 
cooperation and other activities, which will be explained later in this chapter.    
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4.6 The War on Iraq in 2003  
 
The U.S.-Jordanian relationship has been one of the key strategic relations for the U.S.A 
in the Arab countries. These relations developed significantly after 2003 as a result of the 
U.S. difficulties in Iraq (Terrill, 2008: ix). Before the political decision by the U.S. 
government to launch a military campaign to invade Iraq, the military planning 
considered and prepared for the methodical aid support from U.S. allies in the region 
(Baker and Robinson, 2002: 1). After the events of 9/11 the U.S. government started to 
increase its aid to its allies, especially those who could help them in the war in Iraq. For 
example, between 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Jordan received $350 
million in military aid and six U.S. F16 fighters, and was promised more in the future. It 
is important to point out that these were major boons to a small country and army like the 
Jordanian (Garcia, 2003). Additionally, in early 2003 Jordan received three U.S. Patriot 
missile batteries from the U.S.A to enhance its defence capabilities (Prados, 2004: 14). In 
the summer of 2002, Jordanian bases were used by the U.S. air forces for deployment and 
preparation for the battle (Jordan’s borders are the closest to Baghdad among the U.S. 
allies who neighbour Iraq, at only 340 miles) (Baker and Robinson, 2002: 2). 
 
Although King Abdullah II rejected any direct Jordanian engagement in the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq, Jordan allowed more than 3,000 U.S. troops to be stationed in the Jordanian 
desert close to the Iraqi borders to operate the U.S. Patriot missiles system. In case of any 
Iraqi missile strike against Israel, these troops were also prepared to conduct rescue 
missions inside Iraq when required, let alone that Jordan permitted U.S. coalition forces 
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to use Jordanian airspace (Garcia, 2003). Jordan agreed to allow U.S. Patriot missiles 
batteries to be based in the Jordanian desert near the Iraqi borders mainly because Jordan 
was anxious about two points; firstly, Israel would attack Iraq via Jordanian airspace if 
Iraq would have launched a Scud strike at Israel, and the use of the Jordanian airspace by 
Israeli fighters would greatly damage the regime’s creditability in Jordan and in the 
region. Secondly, while the issue of the influx of Palestinian refugees to Jordan has 
always been a major concern to Jordan, Jordan feared that Israel would exploit the war as 
a chance to transfer a large number of Palestinians to Jordan. If these two scenarios, 
public anger and transferring Palestinians to Jordan, were to occur, the Jordanian 
government would have faced many internal challenges (Bookmiller, 2003: 182). 
 
On March 2003, just after the war began, the Jordanian government expelled five Iraqi 
diplomats of Saddam’s regime accusing them of terrorist plots against U.S. interests in 
Jordan; these plots were also aiming to destabilise Jordan. On the other hand, after the 
war Jordan welcomed the appointment of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in July 2003 
as a major step towards achieving stability in Iraq. In addition, Jordan supported the U.S. 
desire of conducting an election in Iraq in 2005, although the Jordanian government and 
leadership advised the U.S.A to postpone the election mainly lest that the situation in Iraq 
at that time and the role of the Shiite will provide Iran with the opportunity for extra 
interference in Iraq (Prados, 2004: 7). 
  
One of the major roles and participation of Jordan in the war in Iraq was the training of 
the new Iraqi police forces. These forces were vital for the security and stability of Iraq, 
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especially after dismissing the Iraqi police and security forces of Saddam’s era. 
According to Marwan Muasher, the Jordanian foreign minister during the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq, in the years 2003 and 2004 Jordan trained approximately 35,000 members of the 
Iraqi police in order to build and enhance security and stability in Iraq after the regime 
change (Muasher, 2004). These police forces were very helpful for the U.S.A in 
stabilising Iraq. In addition, while Jordan refused to send troops to Iraq (apart from 
medical missions), after the war Jordan sent and transferred some of its own military 
equipment and machinery to the new Iraqi army, which was critically weak and in need 
of many of these equipments to regain the efficiency of these forces to accomplish 
security and order in Iraq (Terrill, 2008: 27).  
 
After removing Saddam Hussein from power, Jordan repeatedly announced that it will 
not send any Jordanian forces to Iraq and its role and participation in supporting the Iraqi 
police were exclusively to train these forces in Jordan, however, there were indications 
that the Jordanian Special Forces in particular were joining the U.S. forces in conducting 
some counterterrorism operations inside Iraq (Lasensky, 2006: 9). Lasensky asserted that 
although Jordan publicly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a former anonymous senior 
U.S. diplomat stated that King Abdullah II was, privately, supportive of the U.S. invasion 
and assertive of the importance of achieving U.S. strategies and its existence as the only 
dominant power in the region (Lasensky, 2006: 1). In addition, the U.S.A and Jordan 
share the same objectives regarding Iraq as a unified peaceful country with its 
neighbours, more importantly, they fight for freeing Iraq from Islamist fundamentalists 
and terrorist groups. A stable united Iraq, free from extremists, maintaining a free market 
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and Sunni rights are in the interests of the U.S.A and Jordan. However, instability in Iraq 
in the years following the U.S. invasion became a major source of anxiety for Jordan 
(Lasensky, 2006: 3).   
 
Jordan’s major security concerns, apart from terrorism, were, an early U.S. withdrawal 
from Iraq, which would leave Jordan caught between an unstable Iraq in the east and 
worsening violence in the west between the Israelis and the Palestinians; the division of 
Iraq is a major concern for Jordan mainly because that would complicate its security 
requirements and allow other regional powers to be closer to Jordan, which would in turn 
force it to make greater efforts to secure its borders with different countries or political 
entities instead of one unified Iraq (Lasensky, 2006: 4). Finally, Jordan is concerned with 
the role of Iran in Iraq and in the region in general, especially considering the Iranian 
revolutionary agenda in the region and its ties and support to groups such as Hamas and 
Hezbollah that reject the peace process and the role of the U.S.A and other moderate 
players in the region like Jordan (Lasensky, 2006: 4). 
 
According to one of the Republican candidates for the U.S. presidency in 2008, Rudolph 
Giuliani, the strategy of future administrations in the U.S.A should focus on 
strengthening the role of the U.S.A in the international system to widen its defence and 
influence which terrorists are trying to harm. Giuliani argued that the main threat to the 
U.S.A is that if it fails in its war in Iraq that would give the terrorists and other anti-
American movements a great chance to target U.S. interests in the region and U.S. allies 
and that would strengthen these organisations (Giuliani, 2007: 3). While Iraq is a very 
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rich, big, and strategic place for terrorists to operate from, U.S. failure in Iraq would not 
only harm the U.S. prestige and interests in the Middle East, but also in other regions in 
the world, mainly because countries with different agendas from the U.S.A, whether 
competitors with the U.S.A or those which are classified as rogue states, would exploit 
the moment and U.S. weakness (Giuliani, 2007: 4).  
 
The Iraq Study Group stated in its report in December 2006 that the U.S. policy towards 
Iraq should be shifted towards less military combats and more inclusion of regional 
powers to support long-term security and political reconciliation in Iraq. Additionally, it 
acknowledged the role of Jordan as a neighbouring country to Iraq in achieving the 
stability of Iraq and Jordan (Iraq Study Group, 2006: 24-26). As a result, after the U.S. 
withdrawal from Iraq, Jordan will need to work and cooperate with regional actors to face 
its first enemy, terrorism, and some of these actors are unallied with the U.S.A such as 
Syria, Iraqi Sunnis and other regional organisations and powers. The U.S.A should not 
disapprove of Jordan’s links with these actors given the importance of the Jordanian 
security and stability for U.S. interests in the region (Terrill, 2008: 47).      
           
According to Ambassador Paul Bremer, Jordan was a very helpful ally during the 
invasion of Iraq by offering indispensable logistic support to the U.S.A in the war in Iraq 
such as allowing U.S. Special Operation Forces to operate from Jordanian territories 
(Terrill, 2008: 24). However, the Jordanian interests were well-calculated and considered 
in the Jordanian support to the U.S.A. A retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General 
Bernard Trainor stated that Jordan and the U.S.A engaged in a lengthy negotiation on the 
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number of U.S. troops to be stationed in the Jordanian desert close to the Iraqi border and 
other military bases. The U.S.A requested 14,000 troops which were perceived as a big 
number by Jordan, and ultimately only 5,000 soldiers were agreed between the two sides 
to be stationed in Jordan during the war in Iraq, and this number was reasonable for 
Jordan (Terrill, 2008: 24). Not to mention that although the purpose of a large segment of 
these troops to operate Patriot anti-missile batteries to protect Israel form possible Iraqi 
strikes, the prevention of such strikes was in the best interests of Jordanian internal 
stability, as discussed above.  
 
In 2003 the U.S.A understood the Jordanian situation, and Jordan made its voice clear to 
the U.S.A, given the fact that Iraq is a strategic backyard for Jordan, the U.S.A was 
considerate of this fact and did not ask Jordan for heavy demands (Interview: Abu Jabber, 
2008). In general Jordan was very supportive of the U.S.A in their war in Iraq, and they 
offered a lot of vital help. Meanwhile, Jordan offered only the help that would be 
harmless to the stability and survivability of Jordan and its regime. The number of U.S. 
troops that Jordan agreed to station in Jordan during the war was far less than the number 
that the U.S.A asked for initially. This illustrates the extent to which the U.S.A was 
considerate of Jordan’s desires and preferences, despite the power disparities between the 
two countries and U.S. crucial need for help in such issues; let alone that many U.S. allies 
and neighbours of Iraq were reluctant to help, especially those who are stronger than 
Jordan and more difficult for the U.S.A to pressure, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In 
other words, the U.S.A was considerably considerate to Jordan despite the fact that 
Jordan was the only country that the U.S.A could pressure while the others, apart from 
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Kuwait, refused to help.  In addition, Jordan received a lot of U.S. aid, especially in 
military issues. The Jordanian support in the war was also in the interests of Jordan; apart 
from being a closer ally to the U.S.A, Jordan preferred a more liveable, peaceful, stable 
and moderate Iraq than the one of Saddam’s era.  
 
4.7 The Islamists  
 
Although associating terrorism with Islam has been debated and questioned by critical 
approaches and scholars in studying this phenomenon, fighting terrorism have multiple 
U.S. uses while it is a crucial concern for its different strategies and foreign policy in the 
region as well as defining its allies and foes (Dalacoura, 2009: 130). 
 
It is believed that the majority of Jordanian people are moderate Muslims, however, 
many U.S. policies in the region, especially the U.S. interference in the Islamists’ affairs 
and the undermining of their political status, would result in the radicalization of many 
moderate people (Interview: Abu-Nowar, 2008). Moreover, although Jordanian people 
are against the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and they consider it to be not only crime against 
American people but also against humanity, they oppose the occupation of Iraq and the 
huge U.S. military presence in the region and its commitment to protect Israel. These 
issues resulted in the government’s securitisation of many public affairs which concern 
Jordanian people (Interview: Arabyat, 2008). The Islamic party in Jordan, the Islamic 
Action Front (IAF) and the Jordanian people are moderate and are not intrinsically 
against cooperation with the U.S.A at different levels and issues, but they prefer to have 
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more balanced relations based on mutual respect and recognition (Interview: Arabyat, 
2008). Likewise, Joseph Nye argues that international cooperation and the will of the 
U.S. allies are essential in this war to accomplish its required outcomes. In addition, Nye 
asserted that “The United States will win the War on Terror only if moderate Muslims 
win, and the United States’ ability to attract moderates is critical to victory”  (Nye, 2003: 
75).  
 
The wider Middle East hosts the home, sympathisers, and infrastructure of many terrorist 
organisations which became a major challenge to U.S. interests in the region and its 
overall security. Therefore, the U.S. different policies including the war in Iraq were 
aiming to tackle all these challenges to enhance its security and interests in the region 
(Inbar, 2004: 1). According to Richard K. Bitts, the continuous huge U.S. presence and 
influence in Middle Eastern affairs are causing continuous resistance from terrorist 
organisations and Islamic fundamentalists to U.S. policies in the region (Layne, 2004: 
108). However, terrorist organisations and their activity lack the capability to force the 
U.S.A to shift its foreign policy towards specific issues mainly because the U.S. military 
power and efficient diplomacy in building coalitions minimise the destruction caused by 
these activities to a bearable level (Layne, 2004: 108).  
 
Jordan’s foreign policy in supporting U.S. strategies, especially the War on Terror, made 
it a main target for terrorists. On the other hand, these policies made Jordan perceived by 
the west and the U.S.A in particular as a main partner in fighting different Jihadist groups 
such as Al-Zarqawi’s (Sharp, 2008: 16). In August 1999 the Jordanian government closed 
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the office of the Hamas organisation on the grounds that this organisation was conducting 
illegal political activities in Jordan contrary to the accord between Hamas and the 
Jordanian government not to practice such activities. In addition, in October 2001, 
directly after the events of 9/11, the Jordanian government made amendments to many 
laws that related to counterterrorism such as banning all sorts of banking operations to 
organisations that were believed to have links with terrorist organisations or those who 
were sympathetic to these organisations (Prados, 2003: 6). 
 
Interestingly, although Jordan became the first Middle Eastern country that ratified the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2002 and was very supportive of it since its 
inception, the Jordanian government and parliament ratified an agreement with the U.S. 
government preventing Jordan from surrendering to the ICC any American nationals as 
well as non-American nationals working for U.S. establishments who are accused of 
violating international law. According to this agreement; Jordan has to surrender them to 
the U.S. government instead (IRIN, 2006). The U.S. government justified its position 
toward the ICC by claiming that the court will be motivated by political reasons against 
the U.S. government, especially in its War on Terror. The Jordanian government; 
however, justified its action by claiming that U.S. law requires states that receive U.S. 
military and economic aids to ratify U.S. exemption from the ICC. Therefore, in July 
2003 President Bush gave Jordan six months time to ratify the agreement before agreeing 
on a planned $333 million aid to Jordan in 2004 (IRIN, 2006). 
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The NSS in 2006 asserted that the greatest threat to the U.S. security are the proliferation 
of WMD, and being obtained by rogue sates such as Iran, mainly because Iran is believed 
to be a major sponsor to terrorists and threatening Israel and other U.S. allies in this vital 
region (NSS, 2006: 19). According to Bradley A. Thayer, the current greatest threat to 
U.S. interests and strategies in the Middle East is derived from Iran for three reasons. 
Firstly, he argued that Iran has connections and ties with Al-Qaeda as the Iranians 
themselves acknowledged, and the ex-U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld 
claimed in 2003 (Thayer, 2003: 25). Secondly, it is clear that Iran is supporting resistance 
organisations to the U.S.A and its allies in the Middle East such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, 
Hamas in Palestine, and Hezb–Islami in Afghanistan, which operates against the U.S. 
backed government of Hamid Karazi (Thayer, 2003: 26). Thirdly, and more dangerously, 
Iran is assertive in developing nuclear weapons, which will increase its regional status 
and deterrence (Thayer, 2003: 27). 
 
After the war in Iraq and the toppling of Saddam’s regime in Iraq, there was a power 
vacuum in Iraq, and as a result, major change in the balance of power occurred in the 
region in favour of Iran, which started to interfere in Iraqi internal affairs and in other 
countries in the Gulf region, and elsewhere like Lebanon and Palestine. These Iranian 
policies were designed to meet Iranian interests regardless of the stability of the region or 
the interests of other countries in the Middle East (Interview: Hassan, 2008). During and 
directly after the war the Arab countries were absent from the Iraqi theatre, including 
Jordan, for fear of public criticism. This absence was an advantage for the Iranians and 
their role in Iraq. Therefore, Jordan was one of the first countries to counter the Iranian 
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role in Iraq by supporting Iraqi forces to fill the power vacuum which was used by Iran 
(Interview: Hassan, 2008).  
 
The Iranian support to different Islamic groups and organisations such as Hezbollah and 
Hamas, its anti-Arab-Israeli peace agenda, its interference in Iraq, and more importantly 
its nuclear programme and the threat it imposes on Israel accordingly made containing 
Iran one of the paramount U.S. priorities in the Middle East (Nasr and Takeyh, 2008: 85). 
It is not surprising therefore that these Iranian policies and its alignments with different 
organisations and non-state actors in the region are perceived as a counter-hegemonic 
project against the U.S.A and its allies (Dalacoura, 2009: 132). For Jordan and King 
Abdullah II, the Iranian intervention in the Iraqi election that took place after the war was 
a major concern. The fear was that the Shiites would dominate Iraq, so that Iraq would 
become another Islamic Republican state similar to Iran (Terrill, 2008: 48). In addition, 
the Iranian negative and provocative behaviour towards the peace process and the 
Palestinian issue have a negative impact on these issues as well as on Jordan. Therefore, 
it has been argued recently that the contests and rivalries in the Middle East are not 
overwhelmingly derived from, or based on the Palestinian issue. The gravity in the region 
has shifted from Palestine to the Gulf to the extent it is believed that the Palestinian-
Israeli peace depends upon the peace and stability in the Gulf, where Iran is an active 
player, not the other way around (Nasr and Takeyh, 2008: 87). 
 
There are strong reasons for the unwillingness of the U.S. government to attack Iran at 
the present time which would make the U.S. government prefer an Israeli strike on Iran 
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rather than a U.S. strike. A U.S. strike might cause Iran to halt the flow of oil from the 
Gulf, not to mention exacerbating the difficulties the U.S.A faces in Iraq. An Israeli 
attack on Iranian nuclear establishments would free the U.S.A from such a responsibility 
and reduce the Iranian pretexts for any action in the Gulf. However, an Israeli attack 
would require Israeli fighters to penetrate Jordanian and Iraqi airspace (Thayer, 2003: 
31). Meanwhile, an Israeli or U.S. strike on Iran is unlikely, mainly due to Iran preparing 
for such an attack by establishing very sophisticated protection by its nuclear programme, 
and they are capable of responding to Israel in different ways. Jordan is unable to prevent 
or to help such an action (Interview: Abu-Jabber, 2008). Moreover, a military action 
against Iran requires an international coalition which is difficult to obtain by the U.S.A 
under the current international circumstances, especially after the Iraq war (Interview: Al-
Raggad, 2008).  
 
Jordan is cooperative with the U.S.A and has been a stabilizing factor in the region since 
the 1950s. The Islamic party in Jordan, the IAF, perceives the security of Jordan as a 
priority and terrorism as a main threat (Interview: Arabyat, 2008). According to the 
party’s leaders, while Jordan played a major role in supporting different U.S. policies, 
including containing Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, it can also play a major role as a 
mediator between these powers and the U.S.A for better stability of the region and an 
advanced role for Jordan and its security (Interview: Arabyat, 2008). Significantly, 
channels of communication were opened between Jordanian intelligence and Hamas in 
the summer of 2008 in Jordan, in order to establish dialogue between the two sides to 
solve disputes in order to start cooperation between them and to meet the challenges that 
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Jordan and the region are facing (Interview: Mansour, 2008). It is worth mentioning that 
the officials of Hamas who used to stay in Jordan are now in Syria and have strong ties 
with Syria and Iran (Interview: Mansour, 2008). In another words, the role of Jordan in 
containing the Islamists can be highly significant not only by military or confrontational 
means, but also by conciliation and appeasement. Jordan as a small country can play this 
role as the U.S.A is assured that Jordan, as a small and trustworthy ally, will remain 
bound by its alignment with the U.S.A and considers U.S. interests. The same role by 
another bigger state in the region would give it extra independence from the U.S. desires 
and interests. Adding to that, the democratic status of Jordan and the presence of the 
Islamic party are advantages for Jordan to play such a role compared to other regional 
countries.        
 
4.8 The Development of the Jordanian Forces 
 
In general, U.S. military aid to Jordan is highly important for Jordan due to their 
contribution to the efficiency of the Jordanian forces in fighting terrorism and enhancing 
the stability of the country and, consequently, for Jordan’s future development 
(Interview: Abu Nowar, 2008). The historical U.S.-Jordanian military relations and sales 
have experienced different levels of achievements and difficulties. The U.S. supply of 
arms to Jordan was enhanced in the 1960s mainly because of the Cold War and the fact 
that Jordan could have asked for arms from the Soviet Union at that time. During this, 
Jordan was in hostility with regional powers supported by the Soviet Union such as 
radical Arab nationalists and Palestinian organisations (Terrill, 2008: 53). However, the 
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delivery of U.S. arms to Jordan slowed down as a result of U.S.-Jordanian differences 
over regional issues such as the peace process in Camp David in the late 1970s and more 
noticeably over the Second Gulf War in the early 1990s. However, the U.S.A has never 
sacrificed Jordan, and the later managed to differ with the U.S.A in very critical issues 
and to regain its prominent ties with the U.S.A subsequently. For example, after the peace 
treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994, witnessed and esteemed by the U.S.A, Jordan 
regained U.S. arms supplements, support, and cooperation, which have increased 
dramatically after 9/11 (Terrill, 2008: 54). 
 
In May 2005 President G.W. Bush signed legislation to fund and offer U.S. guidance for 
establishing a training centre in Jordan initiated by King Abdullah II to train Special 
Operations Forces (SOF), King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre 
(KASOTC). For Jordan, the aim of this centre is to develop the Jordanian SOF and, more 
importantly, to attract international customers in order to make Jordan the regional 
leading country in Special Forces training and skills development and to allow the 
Jordanian Special Forces to associate with the U.S.A and other countries forces regarding 
fighting terrorism. This kind of cooperation will enhance the coordination between the 
two countries in their mutual strategies and affairs. The centre is designed to be the 
meeting house for Special Operation and paramilitary forces from friendly countries to 
Jordan and the U.S.A in particular in the region in order to develop the international 
coordination in fighting terrorism (Kessner, 2006). 
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According to Colonel Maher Halaseh at the KASOTC, the King’s vision of the centre is 
to develop the Jordanian Special Forces and to enhance its ties with the U.S. Special 
Forces. This vision started before the King’s accession to the Jordanian throne while he 
was the commander of the Jordanian Special Forces in 1998. However, the emergence of 
new threats such as terrorism in the region and in the world and the unpredictability of 
the Middle Eastern security stoked the King’s desire to commit to the project in 2004 
(Kessner, 2006). Maj. Gen. Frank Keary, the head of U.S. Special Operations Central 
Command, asserts that empowering the skills and the training of military personnel are 
very important in fighting terrorism. He believes that establishing and funding the centre 
are of great importance and in the best interests of the U.S.A and its allies in 
counterterrorism (Kessner, 2006). According to Frank Keary, the centre will be owned 
and operated by the Jordanian government and army. At the main time, the U.S. 
government and army will provide the centre with the required support for training 
without interfering in the sovereignty of Jordan and its forces (Kenssner, 2006). 
 
King Abdullah II envisions the international security to be based on greater international 
cooperation and on the sharing of information and techniques regarding the War on 
Terror. He is also planning a greater cooperation in the future between coalition partners 
to establish other centres dealing with intelligence and multinational rapid reaction 
forces, which will be a privilege for Jordan at the international arena in the future. 
However, these initiatives will depend on the willingness of other countries, especially 
the U.S.A, to share such visions (Kessner, 2006). These initiatives and ideas are similar 
to those of the NMS in 2004, especially in their effect in more rapid crisis response and 
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the prevention of surprise attacks (NMS, 2004: 12). This means Jordan is trying to be an 
international or at least a regional hub for security cooperation in fighting terrorism, 
which is an admirable idea by the U.S.A during an era while terrorism is a main player.   
 
Many Jordanian officials participated in many meetings and activities of NATO, in 
addition to which, Jordanian forces have participated in many peacekeeping missions 
within NATO’s involvement. When NATO started to politicise its role in world politics 
and to expand its missions and activities beyond its geographical territory, the Jordanian 
forces were active and present on many occasions (Interview: Dodeen, 2008). Any 
country which has the privilege of being a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), like Jordan, 
can benefit from the U.S.A in different ways. It has the chance to cooperate with major 
NATO members such as the U.S.A in researching to develop defence projects and 
counterterrorism technology. In addition, companies from MNNA have the chance to bid 
in contracts with the U.S. government for foreign repair of U.S. defence equipments 
(Scoville, 2004: 2). Moreover, an MNNA is eligible to receive U.S.-owned reserve 
stockpiles on its territory, and to obtain U.S. assistance to purchase depleted uranium 
ammunition. The ally is entitled to engage in agreements with the U.S.A for cooperative 
training and it has the right to receive military loans directly from the U.S. Secretary of 
Defence with no need to get approval form other executive or legislative bodies in the 
U.S.A (Scoville, 2004: 3). 
 
Some commentators argued that military alliances became very costly for the U.S.A as 
well as for its allies. Permanent deployment of U.S. forces in these countries created 
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unnecessary friction between these troops and the people of these countries. This in many 
cases damaged the reputations of the U.S.A and the governments hosting them among the 
populations of these countries and made these forces vulnerable to terrorist attacks 
(Tertrais, 2004: 141). Although Jordan has never allowed the U.S.A to establish 
permanent military bases on Jordanian soil, which would be a major risk for the regime’s 
reputation, Jordanian and U.S. forces have together participated in many joint military 
exercises in Jordan such as Exercise Eager Tiger, which focussed on counterterrorism. 
There were other kinds of collaboration between the two forces such as the cooperation 
between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Jordanian army in Exercise Infinite Moonlight 
and Early Victory. Moreover, Jordan participated in a multilateral exercises supported by 
the U.S.A such as Bright Star exercise in Egypt in 2005 (Terrill, 2005: 55).  
 
The Jordanian forces have always been engaged with the U.S. forces in training at 
different levels. By doing this, the Jordanian army has been introduced to high levels of 
professionalism and technology in war affairs, not to mention the strengthening of the ties 
between the Jordanian army and that of the U.S.A and its allies in the region (Interview: 
Habashneh, 2008). In addition; the costs of this training are fully covered by the U.S.A, 
and this economic support is very important for the Jordanian army; to get trained at a 
very professional level for free is great advantage for a country like Jordan, which suffers 
economic scarcity. Needless to say, many Jordanian officers at different ranks and from 
different branches of the Jordanian forces have their military education and training in the 
U.S.A (Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008).  
 
 183
The U.S.A is continuously supporting Jordan in modernising and developing its military 
capabilities (Prados, 2003: 6). For example, the Fiscal Year (FY) of 2008 budget request 
included extra military assistance to the Jordanian Army of $200 million. The aim of this 
assistance is to upgrade the Jordanian air force, radar system, purchasing air-to-air 
missiles and U.S. Blackhawk helicopters. It is worth mentioning that the tasks and 
capabilities of these equipments are to enhance border monitoring and counterterrorism 
(Sharp, 2007: 17-18). 
 
In general the U.S.A has been very generous to Jordan, and it sends a lot of its military 
expertise to train Jordanian forces in using new military equipment as a result of 
Jordanian cooperation with the U.S.A in the region. The U.S.A wants Jordan to be a very 
successful and helpful country for both Israel and Iraq, where the main U.S. interests and 
concerns lie (Interview: Bell, 2008). According to Dr. Mohammed Al-Momani, 50% of 
U.S. aid to Jordan goes to the military field. While the Jordanian government is very 
aware of its strategic importance for the U.S.A, this makes them aware of cost-benefit 
calculation of its policies toward the U.S.A. Jordan, therefore, makes sure that it is going 
to benefit or get paid by the U.S.A for any action it takes that serves the U.S in one way 
or in another. This indicates that Jordan makes its foreign policies upon a well-calculated 
strategy with the U.S.A (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008). 
 
Jordan is a stable country in a troubled region; Jordan and Israel are the best allies of the 
U.S.A in this region, especially in fighting terrorism. There is great deal of predictability 
and sustainability in Jordanian different policies which make Jordan a reliable ally for the 
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U.S.A (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008). Conclusively, Jordan will always remain in need 
of the U.S. military support and aids. This makes Jordan constantly prioritise the U.S. 
demands and preferences. The capacity and transparency of Jordan allows the U.S.A to 
be very generous with them. On its part Jordan knows what it is required to do and how 
to use this in their needs from the U.S.A based on reciprocated interests and trust. 
 
4.9 Jordanian Internal Stability 
 
Jordan has always denied terrorism and supported all means to fight this phenomenon 
mainly because Jordan suffered a lot from terrorism and it is harming the  stability of the 
region as well as different Arab causes (Interview: Al-Massry, 2008). After 9/11, 
especially during the Iraq war, Jordan witnessed different terrorist plots. The main actor 
and planner for the attacks and plots was the Jordanian Abu Musab Al- Zarqawi, the Al-
Qaeda leader in Iraq after the invasion (Levitt and Sawyer, 2004: 1). Al Zarqawi oversaw 
the bombing of the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad in August 2003, the unsuccessful huge 
intended attack which was designed to use chemical materials to attack the U.S. embassy 
in Jordan as well as major Jordanian official headquarters such as the Prime Ministry and 
the General Intelligence Department. The Jordanian authorities expected that the attack 
would result in approximately 160,000 casualties. This operation, according to the 
Jordanian authorities, was funded and facilitated by a network in Syria and Iraq led by 
Al-Zarqawi. These plots, Levitt and Sawyer argued, made Jordan a strategic country in 
fighting terrorism through its raids, arrests and the freezing of terrorist funds and logistic 
operations in the region (Levitt and Sawyer, 2004: 3).  
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On 9th November 2005 three suicide attacks took place in three different hotels in the 
Jordanian capital Amman. These attacks resulted in the death of 60 civilians and the 
injury of 100 others. These attacks were also masterminded by Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda 
as revenge for the support Jordan holds for the U.S.A in its War on Terror and in Iraq 
(Middle East Report N 47, 2005). In the words of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice on 9th November 2005 after the attacks: “The United States has had no closer ally 
than Jordan in the War on Terror, and Jordan will find no better friend than the United 
States at this difficult hour”. Al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks and 
they justified the attacks by claiming that the Jordanian regime by its support to the 
U.S.A in the War on Terror and in the war in Iraq made Jordan a backyard for the enemy 
of Islam, the U.S.A (Arkin, 2005). 
 
This shows that the main threat to Jordan and to the region is international terrorism, 
which is embodied in some Islamic organisations such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. These 
organisations are supported by Iran and they serve Iranian interests in the Middle East. 
They aim to attack the U.S. forces, interests and allies. As a result, the tasks of the 
Jordanian security establishments are to protect Jordan from terrorism and to prevent 
smuggling weapons, especially form terrorist organisations from Iraq and Syria to Jordan. 
Although Jordanian forces are very efficient, there is still a terrorist threat to Jordan 
mainly due to the region’s instability, which makes these organisations able to operate 
(Interview: Al-Mawazreh, 2008). What makes the situation more difficult for Jordan is 
that it is located in the middle of hot and conflicted points in the Middle East; in addition, 
not all Jordanian neighbours are very cooperative in this regard, especially Syria. Iran and 
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Syria are the sources of instability in the region and they allowed Jordan to be targeted on 
many occasions. However, these facts make Jordan closer to the U.S.A not only because 
these countries aim to harm Jordan, but they also aim to destabilise the region (Interview: 
Al-Mawazreh, 2008).  
 
There are few voices in the U.S.A which undervalue the importance of the political status 
quo of Jordan. They raise the option of solving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute at the 
expense of Jordan, by creating a formal Palestinian entity in Jordan. This approach is a 
devastating threat to the internal stability of Jordan and its regime, and for future 
cooperation between Jordan and the U.S (Interview: Abu-Nowar, 2008). Likewise, 
according to Dr. Abdul Lateef Arabyat, while Jordan has been cooperative with the 
U.S.A and has been a stabilizing factor since the 1950s in the region, it is in the interests 
of the U.S.A to oppose any temptation of questioning its existence. The Israeli desire of 
creating a Palestinian state in Jordan is perceived by the Islamic party, as well as from all 
political powers in Jordan, to be a national security threat (Interview: Arabyat, 2008).  
 
These Jordanian fears are clear for the U.S.A, mainly because Jordan is very aware of 
them and is keen to raise them with the U.S.A when necessary. Therefore, although 
Jordan is very cooperative with the U.S.A in regional issues, it is very sensitive regarding 
its internal affairs. It offers limited cooperation with the U.S.A on some occasions related 
to internal politics such as the distribution of power and political participation. By doing 
that, Jordan aims to keep all its options open in key security issues regarding the domestic 
front. These issues do not undermine the Jordanian alignment and cooperation with the 
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U.S.A in vital issues such as the War on Terror (Interview: Bell, 2008). While these 
regional affairs are of mutual interest, they are more important for the U.S.A than 
Jordanian internal issues. This allows Jordan to be free from U.S. demands regarding 
Jordanian internal affairs and preferences, although U.S. assurance of non-Israeli 
intervention in Jordanian affairs would be of great benefit to Jordan. These issues will be 
discussed in more depth in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
Some Islamist figures such as Hamzah Mansour, the head of the IAF in the Parliament, 
asserted that U.S. cooperation with Jordan is limited to security issues and it does not 
sufficiently support Jordan economically. He accuses the Bush administrations of 
exploiting other countries such as Jordan to achieve its major strategies without paying 
enough attention to these countries’ needs and preferences. These policies may result in 
the U.S.A losing  the War on Terror, and will increase the threats on the American soil 
because this war required the cooperation of not only the government of these countries 
but the public as well (Interview: Mansour, 2008). On the other hand, Jordanian 
government and security establishments found it advantageous that the U.S. government 
prioritised security on other issues, and by that they enjoy extra freedom of action in 
internal affairs as well as extra power and support from the U.S.A. This is a main source 
of stability and continuity of the status quo in Jordan; a considerable sector of Jordanians 
depend on their livelihood on working in public sector in general, including the military, 
and these establishments would receive less support from the U.S.A if it had different 
priorities (Interview: Braizat, 2008).         
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Although the presence of U.S. forces abroad can be perceived as an indication of U.S. 
commitments to its allies (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1391), and  although President Bush 
was determined to build an international coalition to fight terrorism, because of the nature 
of terrorism and the spread of Al- Qaeda’s cells in many countries and regions, it is not 
possible nor necessary for the U.S.A to do the fighting alone in all of these countries, 
especially while the security establishments of these countries can do the job more 
effectively, due to their information and capacity to work in their territories (Posen, 2002: 
43). Barry R. Posen argued that the U.S.A can not solve all the problems of the countries 
which it is trying to persuade to support the War on Terror, neither can it afford to make 
all of its allies prosperous and to solve all regional conflicts, mainly because the U.S.A 
needs the support of all of the parties involved in these conflicts (Posen, 2002: 51). 
However, these U.S. concerns are not applicable to Jordan. Many U.S. officials are 
satisfied with the ability and efficiency of the Jordanian policies and forces to achieve 
their obligations (Bell, 2008). The section below explains the U.S. satisfaction regarding 
the Jordanian establishments, especially the intelligence.  
 
4.10 Intelligence Cooperation between the Two Countries 
  
After 9/11, intelligence became a more vital element in enhancing U.S. security at home 
and abroad from international terrorism. The vitality of intelligence in the War on Terror 
indicated the importance of allies’ cooperation in this element (Posen, 2002: 46). The 
failure of U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) to anticipate the threat coming from Al-
Qaeda pre-9/11 and the overestimation of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction made the 
U.S. government and its different intelligence agencies recognise the need for changing 
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the U.S. intelligence strategy, especially in sharing information within the U.S. agencies 
and also with international partners and allies (Reveron, 2008: 2). Interestingly, 
intelligence cooperation between the U.S.A and other countries is not only a vital tool for 
the War on Terror, but also one of the greatest opportunities and tools for other countries 
willing to cooperate with the U.S.A, to cooperate in a covert way to avoid public 
criticism, especially in an era of highly anti-American public sentiment about foreign 
policies, especially in the Middle East, for which reason the governments of these 
countries are reluctant and not willing to use their armed forces publicly alongside the 
U.S.A (Reveron, 2008).  
 
The former U.S. Director of the CIA, R. James Woolsey, stated that Jordan is a natural 
target for terrorism and Al-Qaeda (Silverstein, 2005). The Jordanian intelligence has 
always been a central pillar for Jordan’s safety, which compelled the Jordanian regime 
build a strong relationship between its intelligence and the CIA. Since the leadership of 
Allan Dulles of the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, Jordanian intelligence was perceived as 
a main partner in the Middle East by the U.S.A. Since that time, the CIA believed that the 
Jordanian intelligence should be supported and equipped with high level of 
professionalism. This professionalism made the Jordanian intelligence one of the closest 
intelligences in the Middle East to the U.S.A (Terrill, 2008: 58). 
 
U.S.-Jordanian intelligence cooperation is highly beneficial for both countries. For 
example, the U.S. finances the Jordanian intelligence secretly to subsidise its budget. 
These subsidies are believed to be annual and are not included in the U.S aid packages to 
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Jordan (O’Sullivan, 2005). After 9/11, the U.S.A increased funds and technical support to 
the Jordanian intelligence, for example, the CIA established a permanent signal’s 
intelligence (SIGINT) monitoring station in Jordan for counterterrorism purposes. This 
station facilitated the tasks of not only the Jordanian intelligence, but also the CIA in the 
region (Arkin, 2005). Noticeably, the U.S. and Iraqi forces missed many opportunities to 
hunt down Al-Zarqawy in 2005 and 2006 mainly because of limited knowledge about the 
man available for them until the Jordanian intelligence got involved after Al-Zarqawy 
targeted Jordan on different occasions, such as the hotel bombings in November 2005 
(Silverstein, 2005). 
 
According to an anonymous CIA officer, the CIA and the Jordanian intelligence 
conducted very sophisticated joint operations regarding the war in Iraq and fighting 
terrorists in the region. Michael Scheuer, a former key figure in the CIA who retired in 
2004 after twenty-two years of service in the agency with expertise in Al-Qaeda stated 
that Jordanian intelligence and the CIA share the same agendas and strategies. He 
believes that although the Israeli Mossad is considered to be the closest U.S. ally in the 
Middle East, the Jordanian intelligence is more efficient in fighting terrorism and has a 
wider reach within the region than any other agency. Moreover, the former CIA Middle 
East division Chef Frank Anderson highlighted the capability of the Jordanian 
intelligence staff in fighting terrorism, mainly because they know the language, culture 
and attitude of the terrorists while interrogating them (O’Sullivan, 2005).  
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Jordanian intelligence was used to do the dirty work on behalf of the CIA, including 
kidnapping high value terrorists, torture and interrogation (Arkin, 2005). Larry Johnson, a 
former State Department counterterrorism officer stated that Jordan is an ideal partner for 
the rendition program because the Jordanian intelligence has the most professional and 
sophisticated interrogators that the U.S.A can rely on (Silverstein, 2005). As a result, the 
Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) was accused by Amnesty International 
in July 2006 of detaining and torturing while interrogating CIA prisoners accused of 
terrorism mainly because the American law banned torture (Sharp, 2008: 17). According 
to Joanne Mariner, Director of the Terrorism and Counterterrorism Program for Human 
Rights Watch (HRW), there were many renditions in Jordan after 9/11 where some non-
Jordanian terrorist suspects were sent to Jordan by the CIA from different countries, 
including Afghanistan, to spend time in the Jordanian intelligence for interrogation and 
torture before being sent back to the CIA (Fisher, 2008).   
  
There is continuous cooperation between the Jordanian intelligence and its counterparts 
in the region, especially those of U.S. allies, to exchange information and experiences 
regarding security challenges to the Middle East (Interview: Al-Raggad, 2008). 
Interestingly, Jordanian intelligence and military intelligence are claimed to be the most 
reliable and honest with the U.S.A. One of the main reasons for the exceptional ties 
between the Jordanian intelligence and the U.S.A is that the Gulf countries are very 
worried about the Iranian ambitions in the region, which resulted in the commencement 
of some private channels between these countries and Iran, where they deal with Iran in 
spite of their relations with the U.S.A; the Syrian regime and the current Iraqi 
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government are allies of Iran. These multidimensional relations with Iran make Jordan 
very reliable and neutral among the U.S. allies in the region regarding Iranian activities 
and ambitions. Needless to say, the location of Jordan and its vital interests of stability 
and survivability force these establishments to generate a great deal of vigilance, 
efficiency and credibility regarding security affairs (Interview: Al-Mawazreh, 2008).  
 
According to the U.S. National Strategy of Information Sharing (NSC) released in 
October 2007, information sharing with other countries is a vital key to the achievement 
of U.S. security. This strategy recommended that the U.S. government and agencies must 
deal with information from other countries with high confidentiality and sensitivity and 
should be based on agreements and understandings with these countries to assure them of 
the secrecy in sharing information in order to help them avoid criticism (NSC, 2007: 25).  
No less important, according to the National Counterintelligence Executive in the U.S. 
(NCIX), the U.S.A War on Terror requires effective counterintelligence activity to halt 
terrorists from gaining vital information about the U.S. military activities and intentions, 
or to mislead the U.S.A by invalid information about terrorists’ activities (NCIX, 2005: 
4). These concerns indicate the extent to which the U.S.A is aware of its ally’s 
sensitivities to guarantee sustainable cooperation with the U.S.A.  
 
Although the U.S.A supports Jordanian intelligence financially and with training, the 
U.S.A does not have power over Jordan nor does it impose its security agenda on Jordan; 
mainly because Jordanian security concerns and objectives are much closer to those of 
the U.S.A in the region, not to mention the role and importance of Jordan for these U.S. 
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concerns. Therefore, Jordan practices a high level of autonomy in its strategic security 
relations with the U.S.A (Interview: Al-Raggad, 2008). Meanwhile, based on the U.S. 
concerns regarding intelligence cooperation and information sharing, and based on the 
record of the Jordanian intelligence as indicated above, it is not surprising that the level 
of mutual trust and dependency between the two countries in intelligence cooperation is 
paramount and sophisticated. Given the importance of intelligence cooperation between 
the two countries and the role of the GID in Jordanian policy making, especially 
regarding sensitive and fundamental issues, the researcher managed to access some 
sources that are a great help, however, the limitations of these sources prevented the 
researcher from using some evidence that it was not possible to confirm.        
 
4.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has investigated the mutual security collaboration between Jordan and the 
U.S.A during an exceptional era of military and security affairs. The role of a small state 
like Jordan in providing vital support to a superpower like the U.S.A in very strategic 
affairs proved to be indisputable. This has resulted mainly from the Jordanian 
acknowledgment of U.S. strategies in the Middle East and how to respond to them 
actively and skilfully. On the other hand, Jordan performs in a calculating manner; it 
receives almost every necessary support it needs from the U.S.A to accomplish its 
survivability, which is a major concern for any small state. This shows, as a matter of 
fact, the U.S. awareness of its allies and partners.  
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Although Jordan as a Middle Eastern country is expected to offer more help to the U.S.A 
in the War on Terror than any other U.S. ally located in another region, many of the U.S. 
policies that Jordan has supported are in the best interests of Jordan in the first place, not 
to mention that Jordan was able to avoid some U.S. demands that otherwise would be 
harmful to Jordan preferences. There is no doubt that the Jordanian cooperation with the 
U.S.A and its War on Terror in general is enhancing Jordanian security and stability 
(Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008). This however does not mean that Jordan is equivalent to 
the U.S.A in terms of mutual influence and importance; it suggests that if a small state 
has the sufficient awareness of the circumstances surrounding her and adopts brave and 
adequate policies, it will have the chance of winning vital U.S. support and consideration 
of its preferences and priorities. In many cases discussed in this chapter, Jordan has had 
the chance to make its voice heard and preferences superior. Unquestionably that 
required Jordan to be an energetic, vigilant and trustworthy ally from the U.S. perspective 
regarding strategic and vital affairs. 
 
The location and credibility of Jordan, side by side with its armed forces’ professionalism 
and wise policies, made the security cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan a major 
pillar of U.S.-Jordanian strategic relations in general since 2000. These strategic and 
sustainable relations however, are based on other interconnected pillars and dimensions 
which are associated with the security cooperation between the two countries, especially 
in the 2000s. U.S. democracy promotion in the region and its impact on Jordan’s 
democratisation process as well as the Israeli concerns and its significance to the U.S.A 
are highly attached and intersected with the security cooperation between Jordan and the 
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U.S.A. More importantly, U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East and the 
significance of Israel are major components of U.S. policies in the region during the 
Bush’s and neoconservatives’ era in the region that influenced U.S.-Jordanian relations in 
different ways, which makes these two topics the themes of the two subsequent chapters 
of this thesis. 
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Chapter Five: U.S. Democracy Promotion in the Middle East and Jordan 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is concerned with U.S. democracy promotion as a major element of U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East and its impact on the democratisation process in Jordan 
and on its relations with the U.S. accordingly. Since democratisation became a major 
U.S. demand in the region after 9/11, it is vital for the sake of this thesis to investigate the 
interaction between the U.S. and Jordan regarding this issue. By doing this, the chapter 
aims to assess both the U.S. seriousness in enhancing the democratic status of Middle 
Eastern countries, including allies such as Jordan, and the ability of the Jordanian regime 
in responding to U.S. exigencies for political reform and democratisation.  
 
The main argument of this chapter, though, is that democratisation in the Middle East has 
fluctuated as a major element of U.S. foreign policy in the region; this resulted from the 
inconsistency between U.S. strategies in the War on Terror and its democracy promotion 
in the region after 9/11, let alone its possible consequences. By applying the theoretical 
framework of this thesis on democratisation in Jordan and its relations with the U.S.A, it 
is expected that the Jordanian regime will be able to choose the path in which it 
democratises itself away from U.S. pressures. The chapter therefore argues that the U.S.A 
turns a blind eye to the slow pace of Jordanian reform while the regime is very skilful in 
allocating priorities and concerns within relations with the U.S.A, even in issues that are 
considered of high value for the U.S.A. More importantly, such a slow Jordanian reform 
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is essential for the U.S.A to maintain Jordanian cooperation with the U.S. strategic War 
on Terror, as discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, the originality of this chapter 
is in clarifying the dynamics of both U.S. democracy promotion in the region after 9/11 
and the slow reform process in Jordan in the current context of counterterrorism. 
 
In order to profoundly explore U.S.-Jordanian democratisation interactions, the 
researcher had to provide a rationalization for both the incentives and obstacles of both 
U.S. democratisation in the region and the slow political reform process in Jordan. The 
researcher believes that although sometimes the complexities of the two issues are wide, 
a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter requires coverage of the 
multidimensionality of the topic. Therefore, the chapter will start by analysing U.S. 
policies and efforts in promoting democracy in the Middle East in general, in order to 
examine the seriousness and capacity of the U.S.A as a democracy promoter in the 
region. Subsequently, an evaluation of these policies will be provided. This evaluation 
will consider the obstacles of democracy promotion and the impact of the U.S. War on 
Terror on the democratisation process in the region. These topics will enable the 
researcher to accomplish a profound knowledge about the topic in order to explore in 
depth the Jordanian political reform and U.S relations accordingly in the second half of 
this chapter. Therefore, the chapter will be finished with an investigation of the dynamics 
of the Jordanian slow reform and the impact of the Islamists and regional politics on the 
democratisation process in Jordan and how these features are affected by and shape U.S.-
Jordanian relations in the issue of political reform.         
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5.2 U.S. Foreign Policy and Democratisation 
 
It is believed that the U.S.A has benefited a lot from promoting democracy all over the 
world. Major previous enemies of the U.S.A were autocratic countries such as Japan and 
Germany during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Therefore, the 
consolidation of democracy in Germany and Japan after World War II increased the 
security of the U.S.A as well as other strategic interests. However, some U.S. strategists 
and policymakers during the Cold War supported the U.S. ties with some enemies of 
communism regardless of their democratic status, as any regime change in these 
countries would be replaced by pro-communist alternatives. Interestingly, many current 
enemies of the U.S.A are autocratic and endorse antidemocratic ideas, such as Al-Qaeda 
(Fukuyama and McFaul, 2007- 2008: 26). 
   
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of the Marxist ideology were 
simultaneous with, or smoothed the way for, a wave of democratisation process in the 
world and with a turn by many authoritarian regimes to a discourse of pluralist 
democratic language to legitimise their presence and behaviours (Parry and Moran, 1994: 
10). Many people believe that the twentieth century was termed the “democratic century” 
mainly because of the U.S. influence during that century to the extent that many people 
conceived the terms the “American century” and “democratic century” to be 
synonymous. Historically, the U.S. political and military powers were used to promote 
democratic systems in different countries, especially erstwhile enemies. In addition, the 
U.S. productivity and economic capacities and its favour of free market economies, 
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which are associated with democratic values and politics, made the U.S.A an influential 
actor and beneficiary in favour of this kind of governance. Lastly, the U.S.A takes a great 
role in knowledge and information structures and technology, which allowed the U.S.A 
to practice an extraordinary influence over other countries in this regard. These factors 
made the U.S.A a great pioneer of democratization during the last century and in the 
years to come (Parry and Moran, 1994: 265). As a result, John Ikenberry asserts that the 
more democratic the states that are allied with the U.S.A, the more these alignments last 
with higher durability (Ikenberry, 2001: 5).   
 
In President G.W. Bush’s speech at West Point in June 2002 he asserted the importance 
of creating a new world order based on liberal values and human freedom. In this speech, 
the President was clear in emphasising the great role the U.S.A should play to achieve 
these goals; the President also asserted that achieving these goals requires the U.S.A to 
practice its military hegemony as a major element of creating the intended new order. 
Furthermore, the U.S. National Security Strategy, published a few months after this 
speech, suggested that the use of U.S. military power does not require a global consensus, 
although it must practice a global reach (Rhodes, 2005: 228). Therefore, democracy, 
freedom, security cooperation, and hegemonic peace were all linked to the U.S. 
hegemonic project. In other words, there are obvious interlocking combinations between 
morality, principles, and extra-territoriality in the U.S. foreign policy after 9/11, and the 
concept of a moral and just mission is the main tool used in justifying U.S. policies and 
extra-territorial activities and policies in a world of sovereign states (Flint and Falah, 
2004: 1385).  
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Promoting democracy and enhancing human rights have been always supported by 
different U.S. administrations, institutions, political communities and the American 
public. However, the differences among the two dominant parties in the U.S.A, the 
Republicans and the Democrats, are divided in the extent to which this issue should be 
adopted in U.S. foreign policy and affected different U.S. institutions regarding the 
implementation of these ideas. Even within the same party there are widely different 
views about promoting democracy. Although the Republicans are more supportive of the 
idea than the Democrats, Realist Republicans prefer limited involvement in promoting 
democracy, whereas the neoconservatives are still strongly attached to the idea; whereas 
the American public became more doubtful about it, especially after the war in Iraq in 
2003 and its consequences (Carothers, 2007: 1). 
 
Many people argue that promoting democracy as an element of U.S. foreign policy is a 
rhetorical strategy rather than a genuine policy. However, the Bush administrations have 
always argued that democratisation is a real goal in U.S. foreign policy, exemplifying the 
cases of Iraq and Afghanistan despite the fact there were different views and reasons 
among Bush’s team to go to war in each case. For example, the first Bush 
administration’s Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld 
supported the wars for security justification and the U.S. status in the world, while other 
key figures such as the Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz perceived the war in Iraq as 
a step forward to building a new democratic and pro-Western Iraq, which would lead to a 
wave of democratisation in the Arab world (Carothers, 2007: 6). 
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Thomas Carothers argues that Bush’s policies of promoting democracy were driven by a 
semi-realist framework similar to most previous administrations, but publicly presented 
as exuberant in order to connect promoting democracy with other U.S. policies and 
strategies. In addition, Carothers denied the assumptions made by the Bush 
administration that his democratisation policy represented the first genuine U.S. attempt 
to promote democracy abroad. Also, he denied that these policies presented a full press 
on U.S. democracy promotion and that future administration can start from where Bush’s 
era ended. Carothers argued that other previous administrations tackled the issues, 
especially those of Presidents Ronald Regan and Bill Clinton (Carothers, 2007: 16).                  
 
There are different trends that differentiate Bush’s democracy promotion from previous 
administrations, the most salient one being that it focussed on the Middle East. This 
region has never been a main target of such a U.S. policy; not less importantly, there is a 
limited record of democratic achievements in the region. Previous U.S. policies targeted 
hostile regimes to the U.S.A and countries which are already in a democratic flux, and 
their cultures are more compatible with democracy, whereas these criteria are not fully 
present in most Middle Eastern countries (Carothers, 2007: 17).                 
 
5.3 U.S. Democratisation and the Middle East 
 
The desire for democracy in the Arab countries mainly results from domestic frustration 
and the inefficiency of the governments of these countries in following up other countries 
in terms of standard of living, human rights, facing and responding efficiently to major 
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challenges in these countries and crises in the region, such as the Arab-Israeli disputes 
and the situation in Iraq (Rubin, 2007: 1). In principle, achieving stable and full 
democracy in the Middle East combined with free market economies are in the best 
interests of the U.S.A in the long term. The most important challenges, however, are in 
accepting the process of democratisation by the regimes and peoples of the region and the 
U.S. realisation that promoting democracy requires time and effort, which sometimes 
would result in undesirable outcomes (Hawthorne, 2002: 81).  
 
Supporting political reforms and promoting democracy are useful policies for the U.S.A 
and should remain part of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This norm is based 
on the notion that these policies will be very efficient in eliminating dictatorships and the 
mentality that accompanies them, which are harming the U.S.A in achieving its interests 
and are unhelpful in solving the region’s problems and dilemmas. At the same time, the 
U.S. needs to have good ties with some key regimes in the region in order to achieve its 
vital present strategies in the region. Therefore, Barry Rubin argues that the U.S.A should 
adopt a policy which conditions U.S. aid to these regimes and countries with the 
implementation of reasonable U.S. demands related directly to U.S. interests in the 
region. Moreover, while the U.S.A is supporting most countries in the Middle East in 
different ways, it has the right to ask for something in return. In other words, the U.S.A 
must ask for attainable demands from these regimes and ignore basic and fundamental 
political changes in these countries lest these changes jeopardise U.S. interests and the 
stability of the region (Rubin, 2007: 15). 
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In the long run, promoting democracy in one of the most autocratic regions in the world 
should enhance the legitimacy of the regimes in this region which will reduce the chance 
of the emergence of anti-systematic organisations such as Al-Qaeda. Because of the fact 
that democratic countries are generally more stable than dictatorships, promoting 
democracy in the Middle East would increase internal stability within these countries and 
would reduce the likelihood of conflicts between them. This would reflect positively on 
U.S. interests in the region and reduce the necessity of a costly military presence in the 
region which proved to be harmful to the U.S. reputation and the reputation of the 
regimes of the Arab countries where these troops were based (Fukuyama and McFaul, 
2007- 2008: 26).  
 
Tamara Cofman Wittes argues that U.S. interests in the Middle East require the U.S.A to 
protect the status quo in the Arab countries and to rely on key Arab regimes such as in 
Jordan. However, she argues that there are many challenges in these countries such as the 
combination of demographic growth, economic stagnation, bad governance, lack of 
sustainable development and lack of democracy. These realities are presenting huge 
challenges for the legitimacy and survivability of these regimes (Wittes, 2005: 21). More 
importantly from a U.S. perspective, these challenges are risking the status quo and the 
sustainability of U.S.-Arab relations in the future and U.S. interests in this region. 
Therefore, enhancing the relationship between the regimes of the Arab counties and their 
citizenry is essential in order to guarantee the support of the people to the regimes in 
these countries, to accomplish a sustainable cooperation between the U.S.A and these 
countries (Wittes, 2005: 23). 
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In practice, U.S. policies toward its autocratic partners and allies in the Middle East were 
toothless and fruitless regarding promoting democracy to the extent that they can be 
categorised as semi-realist policies, in the sense that the U.S.A prioritised security and 
economic interests over democratisation. The U.S.A practiced the same policies with 
other countries such as Russia for security reasons and with China for economic reasons, 
at the time when both of these countries took backward steps on liberalisation (Carothers, 
2007: 7). Therefore, there is a combination of two reasons, economic and security, for the 
reluctant U.S. policies in promoting democracy robustly in the Middle East; economic 
reasons such as the importance of the oil industry and price stability in the Gulf countries, 
and security reasons such as the War on Terror and the Islamists such as Hamas and Iran 
in countries like Egypt and Jordan (Carothers, 2007: 13). 
 
5.4 Obstacles to Democratisation in the Middle East 
 
Anti-Americanism in the region lessens the credibility of U.S. democratisation initiatives 
and efforts among the people and governments of these countries (Hawthorne, 2002: 89). 
Richard Crockatt argues that anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is a profound 
conviction, U.S. policies in the Middle East are perceived as if they are against the Arab 
interests and aiming at exploiting the Arabs and causing them humiliation, and to achieve 
deprivation for these countries from genuine development (Crockatt, 2003: 43).  
 
Dalacoura argues that the problem with U.S. democracy and human rights promotion in 
the region is that the Arab public perceives it as a kind of hypocrisy, in the sense that the 
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U.S.A has a hidden agenda behind these initiatives, such as U.S. domination of the region 
and protecting its interests and allies such as Israel. In fact, according to Dalacoura, the 
U.S.A is serious about democracy and human rights in the Middle East, but the problem 
is that the neoconservatives believe that the type of democracy they want to accomplish 
in the Middle East is the only solution for all the problems in this region, mainly because 
they combine realist assumptions with the role of democracy in enhancing U.S. security 
and interests in the region (Dalacoura, 2005: 974).  
 
According to Steven Cook, a main reason behind limited democratisation in the Arab 
countries is the flawed nature of the institutions which deal with citizens’ liberties and 
political rights in these countries. The institutions which enforce and represent the laws 
and regulations in these countries are aiming only to consolidate the role of the autocratic 
regimes and their executive branches. Therefore, institutional change and reform are 
critical keys in Arab political reforms which can be achieved by using positive pressures 
by the U.S.A (Cook, 2005: 94).  
 
The military and security establishments have the upper hand in shaping the domestic and 
foreign policies of most Middle Eastern countries (Laipson and Hokayem, 2006: 159). 
Moreover, Middle Eastern countries are facing major difficulties in political transition, 
mainly because of state capacity and determination to manipulate democratic forces and 
oppose reforms. Therefore, democratic and political transition is very difficult when the 
regime has control over the security forces and establishments which provide the state 
with coercive apparatus to oppose real political transition. The security establishments of 
 206
any undemocratic state are always in desperate need of international support to maintain 
its capacity to hold on to power. Even after the end of the Cold War, different western 
powers, especially the U.S.A had security concerns in the Middle East which resulted in 
the continuation of international backing for specific undemocratic regimes and their 
different security establishments (Bellin, 2004: 142).  
 
No less importantly, Hinnebusch argued that one reason for the limited success of 
democratisation in the Middle East is that when these states were founded the structural 
conditions for democracy were neglected. For example, the limited power of the 
bourgeoisie and working classes in Middle Eastern societies deprived these societies of 
indispensable actors for the demand and consolidation of democracy. This resulted in the 
state ownership of the economy and made the people dependent on the state in their 
livelihood, and allowed the state to be unbound in structuring the social and economic 
systems and powers of these countries which aimed mostly to strengthen the status of the 
regimes in these countries (Hinnebusch, 2005: 33).  
 
Brumberg argued that to promote democracy in the Arab world and to modernise the 
Islamists the U.S. policies and the Arab governments should not target ideological 
transformation of these groups, as this would create spontaneous resistance and 
sensitivity not only among the Islamists themselves but also among the public. The 
policies must aim at institutional and procedural reforms which encourage the Islamists to 
interact with other powers, whether the current regimes or other non-Islamist parties, for 
power sharing and real political competition. This would force the Islamists to 
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compromise and shelve their ideological priorities in favour of a system of compromise 
and coalition governments (Brumberg, 2005: 99). 
 
Although a free election and full democratic reforms would be a great chance for the 
Islamists to gain power and could result in more anti-American governments in the 
Middle East, it is worth mentioning that these governments would be restrained by 
domestic pressures, which pressures and demands are highly influenced by the support 
and cooperation of the U.S.A, whether regarding economic issues or the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. A government hostile to U.S. interests in the region would face huge difficulties 
in achieving its goals and retaining public support. As a result, any U.S. democratic 
reforms must guarantee the continuous cooperation between these countries and the 
U.S.A in different internal and regional issues (Wittes, 2005: 25). 
 
In most Arab countries, the liberals or reformists are trapped between the likelihood of 
the triumph of either the Islamists or the Nationalists in a genuinely neutral and free 
election. Liberals fear an Islamist takeover because they want a free society, which 
compels them to side with the regime against the Islamists; however, when the regime is 
deeply hated, liberals side themselves with the Islamists against the regime. In most 
cases, however, liberals do not support either side and choose their own independent 
approach, although that limits their power and influence. By allying themselves with one 
side they would influence either the regime for more openness or the Islamists for more 
moderation (Rubin, 2007: 13). Rapid regime change whether from below or from above 
is expected to create chaos and violence, not democracy and stability, in many cases of 
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Middle Eastern countries where power sharing and political tolerance are still weak and 
inexperienced (Brumberg, 2005: 105).    
 
According to Roger Harrison, a former U.S. ambassador to Jordan, the U.S. idealistic 
vision of spreading democratic values is facing realistic obstacles. He believes that the 
U.S.A does not have the capability to change other countries’ ideologies and social 
systems and many previous attempts to do so led to violence. This is not to say that the 
U.S.A should not interfere when there are abuses of human rights and international 
conflicts; he believes that the U.S.A should be careful when restructuring the political 
landscape for other countries and it should do so when it is possible to further people’s 
aspirations (Harrison, 2002: 79). In addition, Harrison argues that some changes in the 
behaviour of some Middle Eastern countries towards their citizens have occurred not 
because of continuous U.S. exigencies but because of other external factors such as the 
impact of globalisation and its complexity. These factors forced the regimes to give an 
account to the public opinion and their increasing and changeable demands and desires as 
a result of their interaction with the outside world. In other words, the U.S. policy of 
democratising other countries can be supported and consolidated by U.S. support of 
different globalisation policies and forces with their multiple dimensions which are in 
favour of everyone (Harrison, 2002: 80). 
 
It is believed that the U.S. democratic promotion policy is not oriented toward the Middle 
East as a single unified region; the U.S.A is selective in targeting these countries based 
on U.S. interests not on the applicability of reform in these countries. Some people 
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believe that the U.S.A should focus on countries which have abhorrent authoritarian 
regimes and high violation of human rights. Others argue that the U.S.A must focus on 
countries which already have political openness and roots of democratic evolution so it 
can flourish and became a success story in the region which will justify U.S. demands for 
change in other countries (Hawthorne, 2002: 89).  
 
5.5 Terrorism and Democratisation 
 
President G.W. Bush started his presidency without a mission of spreading democracy 
and freedom in the world. During his first presidential candidacy he demonstrated a 
modest foreign policy agenda that include political reform in the developing countries. It 
was only after the events of 9/11 that the U.S. administration shifted its intention 
regarding the importance of promoting democracy and freedom in its foreign policy as it 
believed that there is a link between the level of democracy and international threats such 
as terrorism (Fukuyama and McFaul, 2007- 2008: 24). However, while many people 
questioned the intersection between U.S. traditional interests in the Middle East and 
democracy promotion, to justify the War on Terror the U.S. government asserted that 
terrorists reject basic human values and hate the U.S.A for its culture, beliefs and 
fundamental principles (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1391).  
 
According to the NSS in 2006, transnational terrorism is derived from countries where 
people have no voice in political life. These people are easily manipulated and exploited 
by terrorists. Therefore, the U.S.A has to support new democracies which empower 
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peaceful and moderate Muslims, such as Jordan. Democracy will advance freedom and 
human dignity, which are believed to be the best long-term solutions to terrorism (NSS, 
2006: 11). The strategy assures that rising democracies are the enemies of terrorism while 
one of the main aims of terrorists is to overthrow these young democracies (NSS, 2006: 
12).  
 
Promoting democracy in the Middle East became a major element of the U.S. foreign 
policy mainly because of the consensus among U.S. policymakers that promoting 
democracy in the region is vital for the U.S. security by eliminating extremism. Gerecht, 
a Middle East analyst supportive of Bush’s policies of promoting democracy in the 
region, argued that although allowing democracy to flourish in the Middle East is likely 
to result in more anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism in the region, it is a normal thing to 
happen, and according to Gerecht this is “actually good. It is the fever that will break the 
disease. You have to let it go” (Kaye et al., 2008: 13).  
 
Many people argued that the U.S. War on Terror should not only have a military 
dimension, but that other constructive engagement must take place in many U.S. policies 
in different countries (Harrison, 2002: 79). In addition, Joseph Nye argued that 
international cooperation and the will of U.S. allies, not only the governments but also 
the people, are essential to accomplish its required outcomes. Moreover, as stated in the 
previous chapter, Nye asserts that “the United States will win the War on Terror only if 
moderate Muslims win, and the United States ability to attract moderates is critical to 
victory” (Nye, 2003: 75). On the other hand; some key figures in the Bush 
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administrations, especially in the Pentagon, were sceptical of the efficiency of the U.S. 
soft power and the multidimensional nature of the War on Terror (Nye, 2003: 75). F. 
George Gause III argued that there is limited evidence of the relationship between 
democracy and the reduction of terrorism in the Middle East, arguing that a democratic 
election is not guarantor of producing a government willing to cooperate with the U.S.A 
to achieve its different goals, especially in eliminating terrorism (Gause III, 2005: 62). 
Pape also asserted that democracy and political reform are not major motives for 
terrorists’ behaviour; on the contrary, terrorists are driven by their rejection of foreign 
influence, culture, and domination rather than the desire for democracy, which is 
perceived by terrorists as part of foreign influence and culture (Gause III, 2005: 63).  
 
It has been argued that democratic countries usually build reliable alignments together 
and support each others’ policies. However, the war in Iraq highlights a different norm 
regarding the relationship between regime type and its foreign policy. Most of the 
countries that opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq are democratic, including Turkey, which 
is believed to be one of the most democratic countries in the Middle East (Gartzke and 
Gleditsch, 2004: 775). The complement to domestic demands regarding unpopular 
alliances disappoints strategic allies. According to James Morrow, alliance duration and 
durability in asymmetric alliances are stronger than those of symmetrical ones, especially 
when there is huge disparity in military capability between partners. In addition, Scott D. 
Bennett argued that there is limited evidence to prove that democracy enhances and 
empowers alignment between countries (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004: 778). 
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There are some risks by either promoting democracy in the Middle East or stymieing this 
process. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the outcomes of repression and of 
resisting the results of the Algerian election in the early 1990s were disastrous. Political 
reform requires awareness of internal sensitivity and the extent to which an external agent 
like the U.S.A can influence the process (Kaye et al., 2008: 173). Edward Mansfield and 
Jack Snyder assert that quick democratic transition in the Middle East would be a 
destabilising factor, basing their argument on the belief that immature and incomplete 
democracies would create institutional imbalance and political exclusion of key actors. 
This would result in less efficiency and legitimacy of the system from a public 
perspective, and cause anxiety among controlling elites, with more resort to violence by 
both sides. Therefore, in the words of Mansfield and Snyder, “democratising the Arab 
states is a major gamble in the War on Terror” (Kaye et al., 2008: 25).                            
 
Some sceptics of democracy promotion argue that while Al-Qaeda and other 
transnational organisations are the main terrorist threats and enemies to the U.S.A, 
promoting democracy in Middle Eastern countries has a limited effect on these groups 
mainly because the key members of these organisations are already exiled from their 
countries of origin, and these organisations have worldwide cells, not to mention that 
they perceive democracy as a deviant and corrupted western system and a conspiracy 
against the Muslim countries. Therefore, Douglas Borer and Michael Freeman argue that 
promoting democracy in the region is insufficient to counter the grievances that feed Al-
Qaeda and other organisations’ grievances and ambitions. These organisations aim to free 
the Muslim world from U.S. influence and occupation and to free them from the current 
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regimes, which are perceived by these organisations as U.S. agents and traitors, and to 
replace them with a Caliphate and Islamic law (Kaye et al., 2008: 21).  
 
On the other hand, Paul Pillar argues that democratisation has a positive impact on local 
radical groups, in addition to the impact of democratisation in de-legitimising these 
groups and increasing public support of counterterrorism policies, democratisation is also 
a moderating factor for other widespread organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) in Jordan and Egypt. In other words, there are different impacts of democratisation 
in reducing or eliminating terrorism and in moderating radical Islamist groups, depending 
on the level of repression of the state, the kind of activities and motivations of the these 
groups, and the level of political inclusion offered by the regime to these groups (Kaye et 
al., 2008: 23). The remainder of this chapter will explore the Jordanian democratisation 
process and its interactions with U.S. democracy promotion and other policies, 
counterterrorism in particular.  
 
5.6 Democratisation in Jordan 
 
According to the Freedom House ranking regarding the democratic status of Middle 
Eastern countries, Jordan is among those few countries which has achieved some 
progress in political reform and democratisation compared with most other Arab 
countries (Bellin, 2004: 139). Jordan’s bicameral parliament is composed of an elected 
110-member lower house and an appointed 55-member upper house. Although the 
parliament has the theoretical right to challenge the king’s policies, in practice the 
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parliament has limited power, and a majority of two-thirds is required to do so. The king 
has the constitutional right to dissolve the parliament, postpone elections for up to two 
years, and can also issue royal decrees which are not accountable to the parliament 
(Sharp, 2008: 3). Moreover, major decisions in Jordan are made by institutions that are 
not accountable to the parliament, such as the Royal Court and the intelligence services. 
The King in Jordan has the constitutional rights of appointing and dismissing the cabinet, 
dissolves the parliament and can veto legislation, and his government can decree 
provisional laws while the parliament is dissolved (Choucair, 2006: 3). 
 
The most recent parliamentary election in Jordan was in November 2007. It resulted in a 
continuation of the highly managed political and democratisation process to guarantee the 
regime’s dominance of political life in Jordan. The parliament was dominated by loyal 
tribal candidates, wealthy business elite, and former loyal officials in the army or in the 
public sector. The Islamists captured only six seats out of 110 in this election, which was 
a defeat compared with the previous elections such as the one in 2003 when they secured 
17 seats (Kaye et al., 2008: 63). The IAF, the political wing of the MB in Jordan, accused 
the government of rigging and fraud in the election in favour of the regime’s supporters, 
arguing that these results will cause a decline in transparency and accountability (Kaye et 
al., 2008: 64). 
 
Some observers of the Jordanian democratic progress argue that many Jordanian voters 
support candidates who have ties with ruling elites and governmental officials in order to 
help them to obtain patronage and facilities in public services they seek from the 
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governments. In addition, they indicate that in many cases the government and its 
officials allocate privileges for deputies and their acquaintances to avoid deputies’ 
criticism and any opposition to governmental policies (Okar, 2006: 460). Therefore, the 
priority for many Jordanian voters is gaining access to the state services rather than the 
policy making of it. More importantly, apart from the limited presence of the IAF, 
political parties in Jordan have a limited role in the behaviour of the Jordanian 
constituencies and, consequently, the behaviour of the deputies (Okar, 2006: 467).       
 
Not surprisingly, many Jordanian politicians defend Jordan’s democratic status. For 
example, Marwan Dodeen, a long-serving member of the Jordanian Upper House, argued 
that Jordan is developing its own concept of political reform that suits its political, 
demographical and historical structure. In this regard Dodeen argues that western concept 
of representation according to the population does not suit Jordan and is not fair. For 
example, two-thirds of the territory of Jordan is in the southern part of the country which 
is the most scarcely populated part of the country, inhabited by only 10% of the Jordanian 
population; therefore, it is not fair to represent this part of Jordan with only 10% of seats 
in the parliament. This argument is against the Islamists’ desires, because their power and 
presence is allocated in the urban populated cities, whereas the rural areas with less 
population in Jordan host most of the supporters of the regime (Interview: Dodeen, 
2008).  
 
Taher Al-Massry, a former Jordanian Prime Minister and current deputy Speaker of the 
Upper House, argues that although the foreign policy of Jordan is made by the King and 
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his government, because of the closeness of Jordan to Palestine and Iraq, Jordanian 
foreign policymakers significantly consider Jordanian public opinion (Interview: Al-
Massry, 2008). Other politicians such as the former prominent foreign minister Kamel 
Abu-Jabber perceive the policies of Jordan as being dictated by its geography, human and 
natural. Abu-Jabber argues that Jordan is an open society compared to other countries and 
has achieved remarkable steps forward in the right direction in terms of modernity and 
democracy, asserting that the U.S.A realises that Jordan has to operate within a sphere of 
public opinion (Interview: Abu-Jabber, 2008). Rami Khouri, a prominent journalist in 
Jordan, argues that taking into consideration the stability and level of security in Jordan, 
most Jordanians are satisfied with the level of freedom and dignity they enjoy living in 
compared to other Arab countries (Sharp, 2008: 7). In other words, the level of 
democracy that Jordan enjoys is satisfactory at least from the Jordanian elites’ 
perspective.   
 
After the Arab Summit in Tunisia in May 2004, in which the Arab leaders committed to 
reform, King Abdullah II launched a Royal Committee of the National Agenda to draw a 
plan for political reform in Jordan to fulfil the commitment to reform. According to the 
head of the committee, Marwan Muasher, this agenda faced many criticisms especially 
from the ruling elite in the country, who are termed the “old guard”. This group of 
policymakers and politicians perceive any reform and change to the status quo as a threat 
to their status, arguing that widening decision-making and public participation in high 
politics in Jordan would jeopardise the national interests and security of the country. In 
addition, they argue that opening up the system will bring the Islamists more strongly 
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into the political system of Jordan. On the other hand, the reformists’ counterargument is 
that not opening up the system with the current defects of governance and economic and 
social challenges in Jordan will be the reasons for the increase of the Islamists power and 
assertiveness and support among the public, mainly because the Islamists are gaining 
power in issues and areas where the government are failing to meet the public demands 
(Muasher, 2008: 252). 
  
Taher Al-Massry, another key member of the committee and activists for reform; argues 
that although political reform has been a public demand in Jordan, there are backward 
steps in political freedom in Jordan, arguing that there is only the appearance of reform 
with absence of real substance. Al-Massry asserts that the royal mission had produced 
very valuable and applicable recommendations for reform. These recommendations 
tackled the central issues of political reform in Jordan such as the electoral law, the 
media, women’s empowerment, civil society and political participation. Surprisingly, the 
Jordanian government was unwilling to take these recommendations into account, and 
none of them were implemented despite of the fact that all these recommendations were 
considerate of the regime’s concerns and priorities regarding security affairs and political 
reform in general. They were not designed to limit the monarchical authority or the 
security establishments’ role, or even to reduce the presence and power of regime 
supporters, they were designed only to enhance political freedom and to allow extra 
presence and representation of different political powers and parties in Jordan (Interview: 
Al-Massry, 2008). Mustafa Hamarneh, also a member of the mentioned committee, 
argued that despite of the fact that King Abdullah II is always calling for political reform 
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and democracy in Jordan, in practice the monarch is more efficiency driven in his 
policies than being a democrat (Interview: Hamarneh, 2008). 
 
There are several demands by the Jordanian opposition for political reform, such as 
democratically elected government, wider authority to the parliament that is to be elected 
by better electoral law, new democratic press and publication laws, less interference in 
NGOs’ affairs and activities by the government, and a smaller role for security 
establishments (Choucair, 2006: 10-12). Quintan Wiktorowicz argued that in many Arab 
countries, including those which have good level of democracy such as Jordan, civil 
society is not completely independent from the state. Therefore, the Jordanian regime 
skilfully allowed some organisations of civil society to foster and grow in order to attain 
greater state social domination and manipulation of these organisations and public life in 
general (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 43-61).  
 
All of these realities indicate that political reform in Jordan is a top-down process. By 
western standards, Jordanian political reform is a slow and hesitant process. It is believed 
that while the regime achieves a step forward in reform in issues relation to education, 
women’s rights, or economic liberalisation, it takes a step backward in other vital issues 
such as freedom of speech and press and institutional reform (Sharp, 2008: 7). Therefore, 
and because of the fact that democratisation in Jordan is not a paramount priority to the 
regime, possible progress is subordinate to different factors such as regional stability, the 
opposition capacity to make significant change, and a remarkable change to the regime’s 
support base (Choucair, 2006: 10-12).   
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5.7 U.S.-Jordanian Relations and Democratisation 
  
It has long been argued that although the U.S.A is reluctant to pressure Jordan to 
democratise, the long-term interests and durability of the relations between the two 
countries are better served by more political openness and reform in Jordan. This belief is 
more profound when taking into consideration the vitality of Jordan as a U.S. ally in the 
region and the Jordanian contribution to the stability of the Middle East, where many of 
the U.S. vital interests are located (Choucair, 2006: 17). In addition, the U.S. government 
prefers to deal with partners who are willing to raise the challenges for both sides in order 
to face these challenges at earlier stages, rather than hiding them until they become 
insurmountable threats to the interests of both sides in the sense that facing dilemmas 
rapidly and suddenly are very costly for all (Interview: Bell, 2008). 
 
Benjamin Bell, the Deputy of the Political Section Chief in the U.S. embassy in Jordan, 
argues that partners who raise challenges are stronger and more reliable allies that the 
U.S.A prefers to deal with in the Middle East (Interview: Bell, 2008). Therefore, the 
U.S.A is watchful of the growing presence of the Islamists in Jordan and the extent to 
which the Jordanian government is capable of maintaining the public support and 
reserving the role of moderate Islamists at the expense of the radicals. Bell clarifies that 
Jordan is a major U.S. ally in regional affairs but it keeps all its options open regarding its 
domestic front and reform and is less cooperative in its internal affairs. Bell believes that 
political reform in Jordan is a vital component for healthier and more durable relations 
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between the two countries in the future, even if that will cause some challenges for this 
relationship in the short run (Interview: Bell, 2008). 
 
The IAF in Jordan accuses the U.S. government of not being serious regarding political 
reform in Jordan. They argue that the U.S.A stopped pressuring the regimes and 
governments in the region to reform their political status and democracies when it 
realised that such reforms will result in the domination of the Islamists in these countries. 
In addition, the General Secretary of the IAF Hamza Mansour asserts that the main 
cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan is in security affairs (Interview: Mansour, 
2008). 
 
Mansour argues that the great deal of anti-U.S. policies among the Jordanian people 
made the U.S. government support the current political status quo in Jordan, including the 
electoral law, which is designed to limit the presence of the IAF. The U.S. desire to have 
a strong front in Jordan which can govern the country efficiently, a front that is 
compatible with the U.S. preferences, contradicts with how the Jordanian people perceive 
the U.S. policies in the region and IAF principles. Therefore, for the IAF the survivability 
and stability of Jordan and its regime does not derive from supporting U.S. strategies and 
projects, they rather derive strength from the solidarity of the Jordanian people, the 
Jordanian support of the Palestinian cause, and a genuine desire for political reform 
which allows the silent majority in the country to participate in public life and have their 
say (Interview: Mansour, 2008). It is worth mentioning in this regard that the regime 
fears and avoids such simultaneous reform and closeness to the Palestinian issue lest that 
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would result in jeopardising Jordan’s internal stability and its strategic relations with 
Israel and the U.S.A accordingly.    
 
On the other hand, the Jordanian regime is a beneficiary from the containment of the 
Islamists, and the U.S.A recognises that Jordan is one of the few countries, if not the only 
one, in the Arab world which contained political Islam without violence. Consequently, 
Jordan can be an exemplar of toleration with the Islamists and the coexistence between 
political Islam and other powers and the regime. Therefore, the Jordanian experience in 
accomplishing peaceful and cooperative coexistence of political Islam and the regime is a 
good example for both the U.S.A and other Arab countries at the present time (Interview: 
Dodeen, 2008). 
 
5.7.1 U.S. aid and Jordanian Democratisation 
 
Although King Abdullah II made the commitment to democracy unwavering after his 
succession to the Jordanian throne, it is argued that economic reform and regime stability 
are paramount to political reform for the Jordanian monarch. King Abdullah II gave 
extraordinary attention to the Jordanian economy by enhancing foreign investments, aid, 
Jordanian exports, and the privatisation of some elements and services of the public 
sector, although many of these policies were unpopular with the public (Choucair, 2006: 
8). 
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It is believed that due to the economic stagnation in some Middle Eastern countries such 
as Jordan, and due to these countries’ reliance on the IMF’s policies and reform 
packages, which in many cases were unpopular with the public, the governments of these 
countries use their economic difficulties as a licence to slow down political reform 
(Ehteshami, 1999: 212). Meanwhile, while Jordan is prioritising economic reform on 
political reform and seriously aiming and working to modernise its economy and market, 
political and economic reform can only be achieved simultaneously (Bell, 2008). 
 
In general, Jordan is one of the main recipient countries of U.S. aid, ranked third in the 
Middle East after Egypt and Israel. U.S. aid packages aim to improve the reputation of 
the U.S.A in Jordan and to get more positive publicity about the U.S.A. The idea of these 
aids is that they are from the American people to the Jordanian people; in this regard the 
Jordanian regime has no objection to supporting the U.S. reputation in the country. 
However, the Jordanian government is skilful in practicing cost-benefit policies with the 
U.S.A by getting different aids and support in return for being cooperative with different 
U.S. initiatives and policies. At the same time, the Jordanian government is very sensitive 
towards foreign interference in its internal affairs such as its human rights record, 
cooperation with Jordanian high level opposition, and electoral law (Interview: Al-
Momani, 2008).  
 
The Jordanian government is also wary about some elements and consequences of U.S. 
projects and aids, especially those which have a political character. Some of these 
projects targeted the Jordanian parliament in terms of training the staff and providing 
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them with modern technology, and to develop their performance. In general, these 
programs do not interfere with issues related to the sovereignty of Jordan or the real tasks 
of the parliament such as legislating laws and monitoring the government. As a result, the 
Jordanian government welcomes these programmes. On the other hand, the government 
is seeking to prevent these projects from reaching significant achievements that would 
result in undesirable political outcomes for the regime, such as to disrupt the current 
power distribution and the political status in the country. In other words, the Jordanian 
regime would not allow a bottom-up change to take place in the country or to face an 
uncontrollable reform process (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008). 
               
While Jordan is depending heavily on U.S. support and aids, this makes the U.S.A able to 
decisively demand more reforms. As a major recipient country of U.S. aid packages, and 
being involved with the U.S.A in different trade agreements and relations, Jordan has no 
other option but to democratise demonstrably if the U.S.A compels or insists upon 
political reform in Jordan. After the 2003 war in Iraq the U.S.A doubled its aid to Jordan, 
with $450 million ($250 million in economic aid and $200 million in military assistance) 
being given to Jordan and more than $1 billion supplement to offset the impact of the war 
on the Jordanian economy; none of these crucial assistances to Jordan were conditioned 
by the U.S.A on tangible progress in political reform in Jordan (Choucair, 2006: 17). 
 
Jordan entered the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) Threshold Programme in 
September 2006. This programme offers Jordan, as a member, $25 million annually as 
assistance to meet reform measures. None of the main used measures in this program is 
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related to the genuine needs of any developing democracy like the one in Jordan. Issues 
like electoral law, strengthening political parties, and protecting human rights were 
mentioned as important but secondary issues; more weight was given to issues like 
municipal governance and customs administration, which are not very sensitive issues for 
the Jordanian regime. Many U.S. projects to develop democracy in Jordan aim at training 
parliamentary staff and advocating the rights of women and emerging community 
leaders, although laudable goals, do not solve the fundamental defects and problems of 
Jordanian democracy (Choucair, 2006: 19).  
 
Noticeably, political reform in Jordan was not mentioned while negotiating the Free 
Trade Agreement between Jordan and the U.S.A which went into effect in December 
2001. It could be argued, however, that political reform in Jordan does not necessarily 
mean or would result in less ability of the Jordanian regime to cooperate with the U.S.A 
in security and military affairs, mainly because these issues will remain in the high 
national interests of Jordan (Choucair, 2006: 20).  
  
5.7.2 The Islamists and Jordanian Democratisation  
 
The IAF gained almost one-third of seats in the 1989 election, but thereafter its success in 
the Jordanian parliamentary elections was limited in 1993 and 2003, and it boycotted the 
election in 1997. Not only the electoral law, which was amended in 1993 prior to the 
election that year, caused this limitation of the IAF presence in the parliament, but it was 
also the policy of the IAF of not nominating big numbers of its members to these 
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elections; the IAF recognizes that the Jordanian regime will oppose any possibility of an 
IAF majority in the parliament. Likewise, the IAF recognises that a parliamentary 
majority is detrimental under the current domestic and regional circumstances and 
environment. Dominating the Jordanian parliament will force the IAF to face very hard 
choices and crossroads regarding internal and regional issues on the one hand and their 
political survivability, reputation and ideological beliefs and commitments on the other 
(Brown, 2006: 12).  
 
Abdul Lateef Arabyat, a key current leader in the IAF and the former Secretary General 
of the IAF and the Speaker of the Jordanian parliament (1990-1993), asserted that the 
IAF is not planning to dominate the parliament under the current domestic and regional 
circumstances and that is clear from the number of its nominations in each election. 
Arbyat also argues that although the IAF is an opposition party, it is committed to the 
Jordanian constitution and Jordanian national security and preferences, asserting that the 
IAF is an evolutionary power believing in gradual and peaceful change exemplifying 
their tolerant, pro-democracy and patriotic policies in the parliament of 1989, in which 
they were strongly present and active. However, he argued that many traditional powers 
in Jordan, especially those who are corrupt beneficiaries of the current political status 
quo, fear the growing power and presence of moderate Islamists and the IAF. These 
powers perceive real political reform and fairer electoral law as a chance for more 
representation of the Islamists, which will be harmful and damaging to their presence and 
privileges (Interview: Arabyat, 2008).  
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According to Jillian Schuredler, the inclusion of the Islamist opposition in the Jordanian 
political sphere did not originally aim to moderate these groups, mainly because they are 
already moderate, and Jordan has very limited experience of violence with these groups 
compared with other Arab countries. Some people argue that limited violence in Jordan is 
attributed to the cooperation offered by the MB to the Jordanian government. Moreover, 
there is reciprocal recognition among the Jordanian regime and the MB; the MB opposed 
the government’s policies but not the legitimacy of the regime. The political inclusion of 
the Islamists in Jordan, especially the IAF, made the IAF tolerant with other political 
oppositions that differ with the IAF ideologically. This inclusion pushed the IAF to 
interact with other powers in the Jordanian political spectrum in order to play political 
game with these powers in order to organise a broader opposition towards specific issues 
and governmental policies (Kaye et al., 2008: 72). 
 
The inclusion of the IAF prevents the radicalisation of this political power; however, the 
IAF fears that repressive policies against them by the government and security 
establishments would result in an undesirable resistance and radicalisation among some 
members of the organisation, similar to what took place in Egypt during Nasser’s era in 
the 1950s and later in the early 1990s (Kaye et al., 2008: 73). Wiktorowicz argues that 
weakening the MB or its political wing the IAF is very dangerous for Jordan lest some 
members of these organisations move to more radical and Salafi attitudes, especially 
when considering the wealth and mobility of the MB in the Jordanian society (Kaye et 
al., 2008: 77).  
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Although the liberalisation process in Jordan is arguably limited to the extent that some 
scholars identify the system in Jordan as a liberal autocracy, political inclusion of the 
Islamists with its impact of moderation and the fears from the regional situation that 
Jordan would follow the Iraqi fate made many Jordanians accept the regime’s slow 
policies toward reform. This is because many people in Jordan admit that in preserving 
the stability and security of Jordan, including the current regime is a priority in order to 
protect all actors, including the opposition (Kaye et al., 2008: 80). 
 
In some open countries like Jordan, liberals fear that political reform would be a great 
chance for the Islamists to win under the current circumstances on the expense of other 
political powers and minorities. Therefore, many liberal powers and minority groups in 
Jordan would prefer the U.S.A to stop any pressure on the Jordanian regime to progress 
in political reform and to synchronize it to a rhythm that would give them chance to 
flourish and catch up with the Islamists. These powers claim that the regime allowed only 
the Islamists to flourish during the Cold War because that served the regime’s strategies 
at that time in containing the nationalists and the communists (Kaye et al., 2008: 172).                                  
 
The mixed coalition of hawks and doves in the IAF has resulted in multiple dimensions 
of the IAF relations with the regime in Jordan, and it prevented the regime from resorting 
to an aggressive containment of the organisation. Additionally, it created powerful voices 
among both sides to avoid confrontation. However, the regime continues to view the IAF 
as a challenge, mainly because of its ability in mobilising the public and in transforming 
foreign issues, that both sides have different views and strategies regarding them such as 
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Palestine, Iraq, and Jordan’s relationship with the U.S.A to domestic challenges and 
public disagreement with the regime (Brown, 2006: 21). 
 
Susser argues that the Jordanian regime and its well-established services, especially the 
security establishments, enabled the regime to undermine the presence and power of the 
Islamists compared to the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Palestinian services could not 
prevent the growing power of Hamas mainly because of the inefficiency of its 
governance and different establishments (Susser, 2008: 6). The hawks among the 
Jordanian Islamists who are very critical of Jordan’s policies and ties with the U.S.A 
drew a mistaken lesson from the victory of Hamas in Palestine in the 2006 election. For 
most Jordanians the government policies are reasonably acceptable and different 
establishments have a great impact on people’s life, so Susser argues that Jordan is not 
Palestine in this regard (Susser, 2008: 6). 
 
It is worth mentioning here that since the summer of 2008 the relationship between the 
Jordanian government and the Islamists, especially the IAF, has developed remarkably. 
This change was contrary to the expectations that the relationship between the two sides 
would reach a confrontation after both the election of a hardliner, Hammam Said, as the 
General Guide of the MB in May 2008, and after the poor performance of the IAF in the 
parliamentary elections in November 2007, which was followed by widespread 
accusations of government rigging of the election. These developments helped to 
establish ties between the Jordanian government and Hamas in Gaza and Syria (Hamid, 
2008). These changes in Jordanian discourse highlight the ability of Jordan to shift its 
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preferences even with actors considered to be very hostile to the U.S.A while these 
changes are helpful for the Jordanian regime’s self-interest.  
 
5.8 Regional Impacts on Jordanian Democratisation 
 
The Jordanian state managed to survive despite regional instability, shortage of resources, 
and huge number of Palestinian refugees. Under these circumstances the regime also 
managed to weaken institutionalised opposition to its rule. Moreover, although elections 
are regular and  political parties are legal in Jordan, the democratic change and political 
reform are still a hesitant top-down process as a result of the regime’s survival strategies 
in maintaining stable domestic front in facing external pressures and economic challenges 
and need for foreign aids (Choucair, 2006: 3). 
 
While public criticism in Jordan of governmental policies of privatisation, and regional 
tension and pressures rose due to the collapse of the peace process between the Israelis 
and Palestinians in 2000, the events of 9/11 and its aftermath, and the preparation for the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Jordanian government became very conscious of security issues 
and possible challenges to the stability of the country. Moreover, the regime decided to 
support the U.S.A in its War on Terror, including the war in Iraq, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. This resulted in restrictions on political activities; the most obvious 
example was the King’s decision to postpone parliamentary elections supposed to take 
place in late 2001 for another two years, to avoid public and domestic criticism regarding 
internal and external policies. Between 2001 and 2003, during the dissolution of the 
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parliament, the Jordanian government issued more than 200 provisional laws and 
amendments and decisions, most of them regarding economic issues and restrictions to 
liberties. Therefore, since 2000, Jordan found itself facing demands for political reforms 
that were simultaneous with instability in region due to two conflict zones in Palestine 
and Iraq (Choucair, 2006: 9).   
 
However, although Jordan’s democracy has many defects, it is progressing better than 
other countries in the region in the issue of reform. It is perceived by the U.S.A as the 
home of a growing democracy which recently, after the war in Iraq, became the best 
model for political reform. While the Jordanian democratic status is an advantageous for 
Jordan in its relation with the U.S.A as of its preference of dealing with reliable and 
predictable allies, Jordan is keen to maintain its relative democratic advantages in the 
region. Jordanian foreign policy aims to highlight and develop the image of Jordan as a 
moderate, progressive, and reformist partner in the region compared to others. In other 
words, Jordan will always aim to be in a better position regarding political reform 
compared with other Arab countries. This is to say that for strategic calculations, 
Jordanian political reform will also be motivated by the achievements of these countries 
in reform as well (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008). 
 
There are multidimensional calculations for slowing down political reform in Jordan and 
there is interaction between internal and external factors; Jordan’s neighbours, whether 
U.S. allies or not, would not be satisfied if Jordan adopted genuine political reform. For 
example, Saudi Arabia, which provides Jordan with vital political and economic support, 
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has a poor record in political reform, and the Saudi regime would be embarrassed 
internally and more importantly internationally if a smaller and poorer neighbour like 
Jordan was more advanced in this regard in contrast to Saudi Arabia’s poor record in 
human rights and political reform. Needless to say, as the Saudi and Jordanian societies 
share some common elements such as tribalism and the presence of Islamists, the Saudi 
regime prefers not to allow these powers to imitate their counterparts in Jordan or to be 
provoked by them in case of a genuine political participation in Jordan (Interview: 
Braizat, 2008). 
 
While political reform will allow more representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origins 
in the parliament and in Jordanian politics in general, Israel will be watchful of such a 
development. Needless to say that the Jordanian monarch is unwilling to be blamed for 
any major changes in the political distribution of power in Jordan or fully political 
accommodation of Palestinians at the expense of east Jordanians, who are the major pillar 
of the survivability of the regime and the functionality of its different security services. 
This is to say that a real reform in Jordan is contingent upon a real peace between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis (Interview: Braizat, 2008). The victory of Hamas in 2006 in 
the Palestinian legislative election also intensified U.S. and regional fears of the 
Islamists, which allowed Jordan to use this fear expertly to slow down reforms and to 
mitigate U.S. demands. After the victory of Hamas, the head of Jordanian intelligence at 
that time was able to convince a U.S. Congressional delegation of the vitality of 
controlling public life and preventing Islamists from winning elections in Jordan 
(Interview: Hamarneh, 2008).  
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The IAF’s criticism of the Jordanian government, its anti-Americanism, and opposition to 
Israel and the peace process increased after the war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. 
This was simultaneous with Hamas victory in the Palestinian parliament, which 
exacerbated the Jordanian government’s fears of the increasing ties between the IAF in 
Jordan and Hamas and Hezbollah. It is worth mentioning in this regard that these fears 
were based on a strategic calculation by the regime: given the fact that Syria and Iran 
compose an axis in the region with strong relations with both Hezbollah in Lebanon and 
Hamas in Palestine, the Jordanian regime perceives these ties and realities as challenges 
if they get out of control by uncontrollable reform in the country. Needless to say, the 
IAF enjoys huge public support among Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who compose 
approximately half of the population of Jordan (Kaye et al., 2008: 77). 
 
These realities and developments in the region caused tensions between the Jordanian 
government and the opposition, especially the IAF, after the deteriorating situation in the 
Palestinian territory. For example, in September 2006 the Jordanian government issued a 
new counterterrorism law which gives the intelligence and other security establishments 
extra power and authority at the expense of public liberties. The Jordanian regime’s main 
concerns and fears were based on the deteriorating situations close to Jordanian borders 
in both Iraqi and Palestinian territories, which could spill over inside Jordan, resulting in 
new security and stability challenges to the kingdom (Choucair, 2006: 12).  
 
The MEPI became more serious and worrying for the Arab governments when in 
February 2004 a draft of the initiative leaked indicated that the U.S.A was planning to ask 
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for the support of the Group of Eight (G8) countries in this initiative. The U.S.A aimed to 
make it a more international and a serious initiative with heavy demands on the Arab 
countries for reform. The important thing about the leaked draft was that it was very 
harsh on the Arab governments regarding their democratic status. Therefore, according to 
the Jordanian foreign minister Dr. Marwan Muasher (2002-2004), in March 2004 in a 
meeting of the Arab foreign ministers as a preparation meeting for the Arab Summit in 
Tunisia later that year, Jordan tried to include the issue of political reform at the agenda 
of the approaching Arab Summit in May 2004, arguing that the Arab countries must start 
their own initiative of reform to create their home-grown democracies before it was 
imposed by external factors such as the U.S.A and the G8 (Muasher, 2008: 236). 
 
Interestingly, the Jordanian argument was supported mostly by the small Arab states such 
as Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Big Arab countries like Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia 
opposed the idea. Besides being very sensitive towards the harshness of the draft, which 
provoked their significance as major sovereign states, these big countries would face 
bigger challenges and problems in conducting reform compared with smaller countries 
which have better credit in democracy and more manoeuvrability in doing so; small 
countries have to spend less and they have smaller bureaucracies and populations which 
are easier to deal with (Muasher, 2008: 237).  
 
Jordan played a major role before the Arab Summit and the G8 meeting in May and June 
2004 respectively in convincing other Arab countries to accept the idea of reform. The 
Jordanian efforts resulted in the Tunisia Declaration of Principles regarding political 
 234
reform and included the issue of reform in the agenda of the Arab Summit as well. 
Meanwhile, King Abdullah II and his foreign minister Marwan Muasher convinced the 
U.S. administration of the vital need of not producing the initiative in the approaching G8 
Summit in Georgia in June 2004. They argued that in order for the Arab governments and 
public to accept political reform, they need to perceive it as a home-grown project and 
launching the initiative at the G8 would damage the already bad reputation of the U.S.A 
in the Arab world (Muasher, 2008: 241). 
 
While the U.S. administration needed an Arab seriousness approval regarding 
commitment to political reform, the Jordanian foreign minister submitted a draft 
resolution to the Arab League which included all the vital components regarding political 
reform in the region which was accepted in the Arab Summit. As a result of these 
Jordanian efforts, the U.S. administration and other G8 countries not only shifted their 
position towards the intended initiative, but also emphasised the impracticality of 
achieving reform from outside the region, which was a major concern for the Arab 
countries. The Jordanian efforts and ties with the U.S.A, which were embodied in several 
visits and interactions between the Jordanian policymakers and their U.S. and Arab 
counterparts during the first half of 2004, resulted in mitigating the positions of both the 
U.S. and the Arab governments, especially those who were very sensitive to and critical 
of the idea of reform. Therefore, Jordan worked very hard on two simultaneous fronts; to 
create an Arab endorsement of reform which would have been undesirable if the U.S.A 
would have insisted to include it in the G8 Summit agenda that year, and to convince the 
U.S.A to appreciate the Arab commitments and not push the initiative forward (Muasher, 
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2008: 244). Thus, on this occasion, Jordan demonstrated the vital role that an active and 
vigilant small state can play in the region and its ability to use the political space the 
U.S.A allows these countries.       
 
5.9 Jordanian Democratisation and the War on Terror  
 
The U.S.A perceives some dictatorships as sources and reasons for terrorism. By political 
reform and democratisation the U.S.A believed it will beat terrorism. U.S. major allies in 
the region with low records of human rights and political reform such as Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia could not protect U.S. interests and security. However, it is argued that the U.S.A 
used and abused democratisation for its own interests and priorities. For the Jordanian 
government and security establishments, it is an advantage that the U.S.A is prioritising 
security over democracy. On the other hand, these U.S. priorities are harmful for political 
reform in Jordan because there is less emphasis on individual rights and more power for 
different security establishments which is good for the stability and security of the 
country but harmful in the long-run for democracy in Jordan (Interview: Braizat, 2008).           
 
The strategic significance of Jordan to the U.S.A does not derive from how democratic 
Jordan is, rather it is from the Jordanian role in stabilizing the region and cooperating 
with the U.S.A in supporting its different policies and strategies in the region, especially 
in the War on Terror. These strategies and policies are preventing the U.S.A from 
jeopardising these ties and interests for the sake of political reform in Jordan. On the 
other hand, these realities result in a decrease in the Jordanian public opinion’s weight in 
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the making of Jordanian foreign policy, mainly because different U.S. policies in the 
region after 9/11 made the Jordanian people very critical of these policies (Interview: Al-
Massry, 2008).  Mustafa Hamarneh asserts that one of the main obstacles for 
democratisation in Jordan is the securitisation of public and political life in Jordan by the 
government. He argues that all key components of political reform in Jordan have been 
securitised, such as the media and publication law, electoral law, economic reform and 
foreign investment, the relationship with Hamas and political parties’ law. All of these 
affairs and issues became security profiles and are perceived from a security and stability 
point of view. Hamarneh also argues that these policies of securitisation are a source of 
instability for Jordan in the long run, exemplifying that these policies have never 
succeeded in the recent past regionally or internationally (Interview: Hamarneh, 2008).  
 
After the bombing of the Jordanian hotels in November 2005 and the victory of Hamas in 
January 2006, the Jordanian government tightened liberties. According to Human Rights 
Report in 2007, the Jordanian government restricted NGOs’ activities and abused many 
laws related to assembly and association. These policies were justified by the government 
by claiming that external factors and instability are forcing the government for such 
policies to insure stability and security in the country (Kaye et al., 2008: 64).  
 
There is great support from the IAF of Hamas, including of its military actions in Israel-
Palestine. In addition, the IAF opposed the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan 
and all kinds of normalisations between the two countries (Brown 2006: 8). Although the 
Jordanian support of the U.S. war in Iraq was a taboo, the IAF was very critical of the 
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U.S. invasion and it perceived the insurgency in Iraq against the U.S. forces as a 
legitimate resistance to a foreign occupation. Many hawks among the IAF praised the 
actions of Al-Zarqawi in targeting U.S. forces (Brown, 2006: 10). The precise nature of 
Jordanian cooperation and support of the U.S. war in Iraq was relatively hidden, which 
made this cooperation a taboo; it appeared as if there was no tangible or overt Jordanian 
involvement in the war, which enabled the IAF to criticise the war and enthusiastically 
support the insurgency in Iraq while not referring to the Jordanian regime. Therefore, the 
victory of Hamas in Palestine and the endorsement of the IAF of insurgency in both 
Palestine and Iraq made the Jordanian regime perceive the IAF as a major challenge to 
Jordanian stability and its strategic relations with the U.S.A under these conditions 
(Brown, 2006: 16). 
 
While the IAF rejects violence and terrorism, and it has a long record of that since its 
creation in the 1940s, its support of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Iraqi insurgency made the 
Jordanian regime uneasy about the IAF’s peaceful commitments in the future, mainly 
because some trends within it flirt with jihadist ideologies. The IAF was also very 
unenthusiastic and critical of “Jordan First”, a slogan that the palace launched in 2002. 
This slogan and campaign indicated that Jordan’s domestic interests and more 
importantly foreign policies must not be bound with regional problems and affairs 
(Brown, 2006: 18). No less importantly, some Salafi groups in Jordan support violence 
and have external ties and agendas that may influence the IAF. After the peace agreement 
between Jordan and Israel, and increasingly after the war in Iraq in 2003, the MB and its 
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political wing the IAF became more critical of the Jordanian policies and its cooperation 
with the U.S.A in the War on Terror (Kaye et al., 2008: 66). 
 
It can be argued though that Jordan and the U.S.A are dealing with each other on the 
principles of a political game. Jordan offers the U.S.A a great deal of cooperation and 
support in its regional strategy, in return the U.S.A neglects Jordanian democratic defects 
and slow reform (Interview: Braizat, 2008). The U.S.A consequently became careful of 
what it wishes for in Jordan regarding political reform, allowing Jordan to democratise 
itself gradually on its own timetable and in the ways that fit Jordanian security and 
preferences (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008). 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the motivations behind both U.S. policies to promote 
democracy in the Middle East after 9/11 and its reluctance to do so energetically. It is 
obvious from the discussion in this chapter that the U.S.A is very careful of not 
jeopardising its vital interests, especially the War on Terror, by simply increasing 
political participation in Jordan, bearing in mind the importance of Jordan in supporting 
U.S. counterterrorism policies (as discussed in the previous chapter).  
 
The U.S.A was not willing to pressure Jordan to democratise in a way that does not suit 
the regime’s priorities, however, the U.S. modest policy of reform toward Jordan would 
not have taken place without the regime’s vigilance of what Jordan needs and its 
 239
eagerness and ability to convince and mitigate U.S. exigencies of reform. As Julia 
Choucair argues, the Jordanian regime managed to make the survivability and stability of 
Jordan and its current regime in the interests of both domestic and foreign fronts alike, 
especially while the regime is motivated by the belief that although the existence of 
Jordan is not at stake, its political shape and features are unclear in the future (Choucair, 
2006: 4). 
 
The chapter argues that the regime in Jordan realised the challenges in the region and the 
possibly hugely damaging impact of any major alteration of U.S. policies regarding 
democratisation in the region and in Jordan. The Jordanian regime also knew what most 
worries the U.S.A in the region, which is the Islamists. Therefore, the regime’s best 
interest and strategy in this regard is to publicise the Islamists demands and the U.S. 
demands for reform simultaneously, which enabled the Jordanian regime to mitigate the 
U.S. demand for reform as discussed in the chapter. Some may even argue that the 
commonality of Islamists’ and U.S. demands for reform raise suspicion of the Islamist’s 
credibility, which led to the unprecedented criticism of the Islamists of the U.S.A to deny 
such a link between them.  
 
The chapter argued that the Jordanian regime showed skilful political management in 
appeasing all the parties involved in the issue of reform, especially the Islamists and the 
U.S.A. The inclusiveness of the Islamists within the Jordanian political system helped 
Jordan in maintaining internal stability. Interestingly, the chapter highlighted that the 
Islamists in Jordan are reasonably moderate and non-violent, and additionally, the 
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Jordanian government and different security establishments proved to be capable of 
containing the Islamists by peaceful means, which questions the rationale behind the U.S. 
reluctance of pressuring Jordan for reform while there is possible reconciliation and 
coexistence between the Islamists and opening up the political system in the country. It is 
possible to argue that the Jordanian domestic policies, especially those which are related 
to political reform and its foreign policy, such as its relations with the U.S.A, are with 
remarkable reciprocal effect, as a result the Jordanian regime as discussed in the chapter 
proved to be very skilful in manoeuvring within these relations and realities to make his 
interests considered and to modify U.S. policies in order to be more compatible with the 
regime’s interests and calculations. 
 
This is not to say that Jordan managed alone to influence U.S. policies in the issue of 
reform without the impact of regional context and the incompatibility of reform and 
counterterrorism, it shows however the ability of the Jordanian regime in exploiting and 
exaggerating these issues to mitigate U.S. exigencies. The fact that the U.S.A remained 
unwilling to pressure Jordan regarding reform despite of the facts that Jordan is a major 
recipient of U.S. aids and a good candidate for reform bearing in mind its location as 
model for reform in the region and its Islamists’ characteristics as more moderate than 
those in other countries indicate how really considerate and how far sympathetic the 
U.S.A is to the Jordanian regime’s sensitivities, priorities and preferences in controlling 
its reform and democratisation process. This indicates that the U.S.A, as a hegemonic 
superpower, is willing to be flexible and considerate with its partners regardless of their 
size and power, even regarding issues of high importance such as political reform in an 
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era of unprecedented international radicalisation in which democratisation is believed to 
be its best solution.  
 
To conclude, it is clear that there is a significant impact and connectedness between 
Jordanian security cooperation with the U.S.A in the battle against terror and political 
reform, which have been explored in this chapter and the previous chapter. However, 
these two issues and U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s in general cannot be fully 
investigated without the obvious impacts of the significance of Israel and its relations 
with both the U.S.A and Jordan, which have been highlighted through this chapter and 
the previous one. Therefore, the subsequent chapter will explore these relations and their 
impact on both U.S. Jordanian security cooperation and the obstacles for political reform 
in Jordan, leading to more sophisticated understanding of the current features of U.S.-
Jordanian relations in the 2000s.  
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Chapter Six: The Tri-Dimensional Relations Between Jordan, Israel and the U.S.A 
in the 2000s 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter investigates the tri-dimensional relations between Jordan, Israel and the 
U.S.A in the 2000s. The chapter discusses the special relations between the U.S.A and 
Israel and how they influenced U.S.-Jordanian relations since 2000 regarding many 
issues of concern to the three countries. Although U.S.-Jordanian relations have 
developed remarkably since the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994, as 
discussed in the background chapter, this chapter does not tackle the particular impact of 
the peace treaty, which has been covered by many other researchers (Lukacs, 1999; Al-
O’ran, 1999; Quandt, 2005). Rather, the chapter focuses on the interactions between the 
three countries on more contemporary issues which are affecting the current relations 
between them and will do so in the years to come. These interactions are complementary 
and profoundly relevant to other topics that have been already explored in the previous 
two chapters of security cooperation and democracy promotion. The researcher believes 
that these three topics cannot be fully understood independently; moreover, 
understanding the nature of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s requires covering all the 
dynamics and pillars that shape these relations, such as the significance of Israel for the 
U.S.A as well as for Jordanian security policies and other Jordanian internal issues, 
particularly the issue of political reform.  
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The main aim of this chapter is to determine the extent to which U.S.-Jordanian relations 
have been influenced by the Israeli relations with both Jordan and the U.S.A The chapter 
also intends to highlight the limitations of the impact of the Israeli significance for the 
U.S.A on its interactions with Jordan. While Israel and its conflict with the Palestinian 
has had a great impact on Middle Eastern stability as well as on the policies of many 
Arab countries that are close to Israel, particularly Jordan (Virost, 2003: 178), the chapter 
intends to find out to what extent the Israeli policies have shaped the nature of Jordanian 
relations with the U.S.A and how Jordan copes with different Israeli and U.S. policies 
that are of great impact, such as the peace process and the two-state solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
 
The originality of this chapter derives from the findings of the interaction between two 
ideas that are shaping the argument of this chapter. These ideas are: while U.S.-Israeli 
relations are unquestionably very strong and distinctive (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006) 
and while the theoretical framework of this thesis assumes that the U.S.A is a faithful 
hegemonic power that does not abandon its allies (Ikenberry, 1999), the originality results 
from figuring out how far Ikenberry’s claim is applicable to U.S.-Jordanian relations 
regarding Jordan’s concerns and relations with Israel and its policies that are of great 
impact on Jordan. Thus, it is worth mentioning here that, given its special relations with 
the U.S.A, Israel and its relations with Jordan are the best area of research to assess the 
strength of the theoretical framework under the given realities and circumstances. In 
addition, this chapter is original in the sense of being complementary to other main 
Jordanian foreign policies associated with the U.S.A since the 2000s, such as those that 
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have already been discussed in previous chapters. No less importantly, the interviews that 
the researcher conducted added unique findings regarding the Jordanian relations with 
both Israel and the U.S.A.         
 
The chapter starts with explanations of the U.S., and more precisely the 
neoconservatives’, perceptions of Israel and the consequences of the special relations 
between them on the U.S. policies in the Middle East. This will provide the thesis with 
the basic realities in which Jordan is interacting regarding this tri-dimensional relations. 
Then the chapter moves on to discuss the major issues that are shaping Jordanian-Israeli 
relations in the 2000s, such as security cooperation, with attention given to the U.S. 
interaction with such cooperation between the two countries. After that, the chapter 
focuses on the current vital issues that concerning Jordan in its relations with Israel, such 
as the peace process, the two-state solution and the Jordanian option. In these topics, the 
reaction of the U.S.A to the interaction between the two countries in these vital issues 
will be provided in order to enable the researcher to assess the extent to which the reality 
of Israeli-Jordanian relations are compatible with the argument of this thesis regarding 
the considerate feature of U.S. relations with Jordan, while Jordan a trustworthy ally for 
the U.S.A, and its different strategies such as the security of Israel. 
 
Although the water issue between Israel and Jordan is a major concern for the two 
countries that has been a major theme of the peace treaty in 1994 and will influence the 
relations between the two countries in the future (Schwarz, 2004: 43), this issue will not 
be covered in this chapter mainly because it is merely a mutual issue that has a very 
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limited impact on U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s compared to other issues that will 
be covered in this chapter.       
 
6.2 Israel From a U.S. Perspective 
 
The neoconservatives as well as many other U.S. politicians believe that Israel was the 
best U.S. strategic ally in the Middle East during the Cold War. This paradigm evolved 
after the Israeli victory in 1967 against the Arab countries, mainly Egypt and Syria, who 
were the Soviet allies in the region at that time (Hadar, 2006: 95). Most of President 
Ronald Reagan’s team at the beginning of his era were the early generation of the 
neoconservative movement, who supported the paradigm that the U.S.A should support 
Israel strongly, especially during the tension with the Soviet Union. Needless to say, at 
that time the PLO was perceived by the West as a Soviet terrorist tool. However, the 
neoconservatives’ influence on U.S. foreign policy towards Israel decreased after the 
mid-1980s after Reagan’s recognition of the cost that such policy caused to the U.S. 
interests with other actors in the region. Nevertheless, the events of 9/11 and the Second 
Intifada in 2000 made the neoconservatives’ paradigm of the Israeli strategic asset regain 
its power among the U.S. policymakers (Hadar, 2006: 96). 
  
Since Israel’s creation, the U.S.A has contributed substantively in maintaining Israel’s 
qualitative military superiority to the Arab countries (Wunderle and Briere, 2008: 1). In 
the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), President Bush 
stated that Israel is a bastion of democracy and defender of Western values in the Middle 
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East, as such, Bush insisted that Israel’s survival is in the best interests of the U.S.A 
(Wunderle and Briere, 2008: 1). Moreover, the U.S. diplomat and Middle Eastern expert 
Dennis Ross asserted that a capable and strong Israel is in the best interests of the U.S.A 
in facing common threats and dangers such as terrorism and Iran, claiming that Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions would jeopardise not only Israel but also the whole world. 
Furthermore, the Israelis perceive the alliance between Israel and the U.S.A as not only 
based on mutual interests, but also as a more natural and moral alliance than other 
partners for both sides (Hadar, 2006: 20). For example, many Israeli figures such as 
Natan Sharansky believe that both countries, the U.S.A and Israel, are founded on the 
same principles such as national identity and democracy, which is not the case of other 
countries, including many European countries which are founded upon nationalism. As a 
result, some defenders of the special relations between the two countries argue that the 
strategic relations and alignment between them are based on the interlocking between 
moral values and strategic interests (Hadar, 2006: 21).       
 
The remarkable influence of Israel and the Israeli lobby on different U.S administrations 
and policies toward the Middle East resulted in unwavering and unconditional U.S. 
support to Israel on many occasions regarding different issues. This suggests that U.S. 
foreign policy makers perceive U.S. and Israeli interests as being identical (Mearsheimer 
and Walt, 2006: 30). For example, Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. economic and 
military aid, receiving $3 billion annually from the U.S.A. In addition, Israel is exempt 
from being bound by the U.S. aid roles that require the recipient country to be supervised 
by the U.S.A regarding the expenditure of these aid packages. Israel has a free hand in 
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using U.S. aid, thus it is free to use them in building illegal settlements in the West Bank 
which the U.S.A (and UN) officially opposes. Moreover, the U.S.A provides Israel with 
intelligence access and cooperation in issues that the U.S.A deprives some of its NATO 
allies of. Additionally, the U.S.A ignored Israeli nuclear capability and refusal to sign the 
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and prevents Arab countries from appealing this 
issue to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). No less importantly, the U.S.A 
backs Israel with the indispensable diplomatic support, especially by vetoing all UN 
Security Council resolutions that condemned Israel for its different offensive policies 
(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 31).  
 
Remarkably, the U.S. administration during President Bush’s years was even more 
supportive of Israel than its predecessors. In his last year in office President Bush 
proposed a $30 billion aid package to Israel for the following years to enable Israel to 
maintain its military qualitative superiority (Oren, 2008: 3). This extraordinary U.S. 
support to Israel can be explained by recognizing that President Bush was surrounded by 
strong supporters of Israel’s right-wing policies, such as Richard Perle and Paul 
Wolfowitz. Furthermore, the President’s religious beliefs and his relations with the 
Christian Right and Christian Zionism made him perceive Israel and the U.S.A to be 
joined together are in a messianic struggle against evil threats deriving from the Middle 
East (Virost, 2003: 184).  
 
In addition to the linkage between the neoconservatives and Christian Right with Israel 
during Bush’s era, President Bush was aware of the impact of the lack of American Jews 
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votes on his father’s failure to be re-elected in 1992, as a result of his father’s pressure on 
Israel to freeze settlement building in the Palestinian territories at that time (Christison, 
2004: 47). Leon Hadar argues that the neoconservatives in the Bush administration 
convinced the President to support all of Israel’s desires and demands, such as attacking 
Israel’s enemy, Iraq, in 2003 to win the American Jews’ votes in the subsequent election 
in 2004. It is worth mentioning that President Bush could not obtain these votes in the 
election of 2000, making it very difficult for him to win in the first place during that 
election (Hadar, 2006: 94).  
 
6.3 Israel and the U.S. Middle Eastern Policies 
 
The neoconservatives’ perception of Israel as a top U.S. priority in the Middle East 
affected many U.S. policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as shaping 
President Bush’s vision towards the conflict and the region. For example, at the 
beginning of the Bush era, the U.S. government vetoed a Security Council resolution to 
send UN forces to protect the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territories and insisted 
on the necessity of preventing international interference in the negotiations between the 
two parties. This resulted in many accusations that the U.S.A was biased in favour of 
Israel, and ignoring the imbalanced power between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
Moreover, at the beginning of 2002, Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. National Security 
advisor at that time, stated that the U.S. War on Terror and its preparation for the war on 
Iraq and the transformation of the Middle East are paramount to marginal issues such as 
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the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians; such policies were at the best interest of 
Israel at that time (Christison, 2004: 37). 
 
These U.S. policies resulted from the Bush administration’s belief and argument that 
Palestinian violence is the root of the conflict, not the Israeli occupation. This belief was 
magnified by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which made the main focus of U.S. strategies 
and foreign policies in the region counterterrorism, and reshaping the Middle East with 
Israel as the dominant power in it. For the Bush administration, the suffering of the 
Palestinian people is weightless compared to the Israeli readiness to aid the regional role 
of U.S. dominance in advancing U.S. global hegemony. As a result, the legitimacy of the 
Palestinian cause and the Arab perspective of the conflict were given scant regard by the 
Bush administration (Christison, 2004: 41).  
 
During the two Bush administrations the U.S.A allowed Israel to proceed in its policies of 
occupation and settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza. One of the salient 
policies of President Bush toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the extraordinary 
U.S. support to the Israeli policy that endorsed the vitality of crushing the Palestinian 
resistance and terrorism prior any negotiations with them (Benn, 2005: 88). Remarkably, 
the main U.S. policies in the region such as the war in Iraq, the isolation of Iran and 
Syria, and the temptation for the transformation of the Middle East were aiming to 
reshape the region in favour of Israel’s strategic interests. For example, in the summer of 
2006, during the war with Hezbollah, the U.S.A opposed all the international pleas for a 
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ceasefire to allow Israel to accomplish its military objectives (Mearsheimer and Walt, 
2006: 31).  
 
One of the most salient justifications that the Bush administration used to justify its 
unprecedented support of Israel after 9/11 is that the U.S.A and Israel are facing the same 
threat, terrorism. This claim explains the U.S. support to Israel in its war with Hezbollah 
and Hamas and the Israeli rejection of compromising with the Palestinian peace talks 
(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 32). It is vital to remark here that the Israeli lobby in the 
U.S.A is a major reason for most of the U.S. support to Israel in different administrations. 
This fact was more profound during Bush’s two terms. The Israeli lobby not only aimed 
to provide Israel with U.S. aid and support, but also to shape the entire U.S. foreign 
policy in the region in favour of Israel, such as the war in Iraq and the U.S. policies 
towards hostile countries such as Syria and Iran. The events of 9/11 and the role of the 
neoconservatives and their linkage with different radical Jewish organisations in the 
U.S.A paved the way for the war and regime change in Iraq as the first step of reordering 
the Middle East (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 62).  
 
The U.S.A and Israel perceive Hamas as a terrorist organisation that rejects any kind of 
contact or concession with the organisation lest such a policy would be perceived as 
compliance with terrorism (Crouch II et al., 2008: 18). More importantly, both the U.S.A 
and Israel perceive Iran as a major threat with growing regional hegemonic ambitions 
(Freilich, 2007: 3). The Iranian support of organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah 
and the insurgency in Iraq makes Iran a de-stabilizing actor in the region. A major Israeli 
 251
concern regarding Iran is its role in shaping the political future of Iraq that would allow 
Iran to have an influence on Iraq’s neighbouring countries, such as Jordan bringing Iran 
closer to Israel (Freilich, 2007: 3). However, according to the Congressional testimony of 
the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in January 11th 2007, the threat that Iran 
poses with its nuclear ambitions and ties with radical organisations such as Hamas and 
Hezbollah resulted in strengthening the strategic alignment between the U.S.A and 
regional moderate and pro-peace countries such as Jordan, Israel, Turkey, Egypt and the 
Gulf countries (Wunderle and Briere, 2008: 11). 
 
After the Israeli war with Hezbollah in 2006 King Abdullah II of Jordan, alongside the 
Egyptian and Saudi leaders, were very critical of Hezbollah and Syria during the war at 
the Arab League meeting in August 2006. In addition, the increasing Iranian influence in 
Iraq and the war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 increased the common interests 
between Israel and moderate Sunni leaders such as King Abdullah II of Jordan and the 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and also the leaderships of Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia to eliminate the influence of Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah in order to facilitate 
peacemaking between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Indyk, 2006: 7). In such an 
environment, it is argued that Jordan has a major role to play; the U.S. government wants 
Jordan to be an active, successful, and useful country in its relations and cooperation with 
both Iraq and the Israel, whether regarding stability in Iraq or peacemaking between the 
Palestinians and Israel (Interview: Bell, 2008). 
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Many people perceive that the significant U.S.-Israeli relations are problematic and 
debatable; Leon Hadar argued that Israel, as the U.S. and the neoconservatives’ strategic 
asset and proxy in the Middle East, failed to shift the power balance back to Washington 
regarding the Israeli failure in its war in 2006 with Hezbollah, the Iranian proxy, and the 
challenges that the U.S.A faces in Iraq because of Iran (Hadar, 2006: 92). In addition, 
John Mearsheimer and Stephan Walt argued that Israel was useless to the U.S.A on many 
occasions, for example, despite the Israeli exigencies to topple Saddam Hussein and to 
wage a war on Iraq, the U.S.A could not ask Israel for any help in the 2003 war lest any 
Israeli contribution would increase the flame of Arab opposition to the war, which would 
exacerbate the entire situation (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 32). No less importantly, 
although Israel has the strongest army in the Middle East, a strong economy, and has 
achieved peace agreements with key countries such as Egypt and Jordan, Israel will 
remain vulnerable and totally dependent on U.S. economic, political and military support 
in both times of crisis and peace (Usher, 2005: 27).      
 
6.4 Israeli Security and the Role of Jordan 
 
While small states behave more peacefully and less aggressively than their bigger and 
stronger counterparts, they are also more cooperative and concerned about international 
stability (Hey, 2003: 5). These arguments are applicable to Jordan’s relations with Israel. 
Remarkably, although Jordan has been involved in almost all the Arab-Israeli wars, 
Jordan and Israel have maintained communication and cooperation channels even during 
periods of crisis to prevent any escalation between the two countries. In addition, Israel 
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perceives the Jordanian state as the least hostile among its Arab neighbours, and as a 
political and geographical barrier with other more extreme and strong Arab countries. 
The nature of Jordan and Israel as pro-West (and pro-U.S.A in particular), during both 
peace and enmity, made the two countries closer to each other, leading to a smother 
peace agreement between the two sides in 1994 (Wolfsfeld, Eitan and Kailani, 2008: 
380).  
 
Jordan has the longest borders with Israel; its strategic location and professional forces 
mean that Jordan plays a remarkable role in stabilising the region by preventing friction 
and clashes between Israel and other countries in the region (Interview: Al-Raggad, 
2008). For example, Gal Luft argued that although the Syrian government showed 
restraint on many occasions by not retaliating to Israel after its conducted operations in 
Syria (targeting some alleged terrorists’ bases) and Lebanon since 2001, any possibility 
of war between Israel and Syria suggests that Jordan would not allow Syria to use its 
strategic territories to attack Israel from its eastern front or from the Jordan Valley (Luft, 
2004: 19).    
 
David Unger argues that besides the ability of the Israeli government to create a wide 
public opinion base to achieve its security strategies and continue its iron-handed policies 
with the Palestinian people, there are two major conditions that Israel always needs to 
continue these policies. Firstly, Israel always needs the uncritical and unconditional U.S. 
diplomatic, economic, and military support which both the governments of Sharon and 
Olmert received from President Bush. Secondly, the cooperation and will of Israel’s 
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neighbouring countries in preventing the passage of fighters and weapons and other kind 
of support to the Palestinian resistance groups. While this condition proved to be unlikely 
from Syria and Lebanon regarding their support to Hezbollah and other Palestinian 
resistance organisations, and while Egypt proved to be incapable of fully controlling its 
borders with Gaza to prevent weapons smuggling, Jordan proved to be the most capable 
and the most cooperative country in these kinds of affairs with Israel (Unger, 2008: 61). 
 
The Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee in 2003, Dr. Yuval 
Steinitz, argued that the Egyptian government has not been doing everything in its 
capacity to prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza from its borders. On the other hand, 
Steinitz stated that the Jordanian government is far more serious and cooperative with 
Israel in this regard, which otherwise would be very dangerous for Israel if radical 
organisations such as Hezbollah found Jordan incapable or not serious in preventing 
weapons smuggling from its territories to the West Bank. In addition, Steinitz asserted 
that the Egyptian government is also not serious in boycotting Hamas and limiting the 
organisation in Gaza’s supplies through the Egyptian border. Steinitz argued that such 
policies by Egypt aim to harm Israel in order to make Egypt the dominant actor in the 
region. The Egyptian government captures few weapons smugglers, and then only after 
U.S. pressure (Steinitz, 2003: 2). On the other hand, the former Jordanian Chief of Staff 
Abdul Hafez Al-Ka’abneh confirmed that the Jordanian forces are playing a vital role in 
controlling the Jordanian borders with all its neighbours to prevent any illegal movements 
of people or weapon and terrorists from these countries to Jordan, or from Jordan to these 
countries such as Israel and Iraq (Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008).  
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The Israeli mistrust of the efficiency and will of the Palestinian security forces in fighting 
radical groups resulted in the need of an external force to achieve order and 
counterterrorism in the West Bank. However, some analysts such as J.D. Crouch II and 
Montgomery C. Meigs suggest that a Peace Enforcement Force (PEF) composed of 
NATO and the U.S. is an undesirable option for these powers, mainly because of the high 
possibility of disagreements among the members of NATO and the U.S.A regarding the 
leadership of these forces and the nature of their tasks and missions, bearing in mind the 
challenges and disagreements that they are already facing in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
No less importantly, the deployment of such forces would result in frictions between 
theses forces and radical Israeli settlers and Palestinian organisations such as Hamas, as 
well as between these forces and the Israeli forces (Crouch II et al., 2008: 16). 
 
Some people believe that the deployment of Jordanian forces is one of the best options 
compared with other international alternatives. Given the Jordanian proximity to the West 
Bank and knowledge of the conflict and actors involved, deploying Jordanian forces in 
the West Bank would serve the goal better, to integrate with the Palestinian forces and 
upgrade the Palestinian forces’ capability to achieve order in the territories (Crouch II et 
al., 2008: 17). However, there are many crucial Jordanian concerns regarding any 
security responsibilities in the West Bank. For example, the same concerns would apply 
to these Jordanian forces regarding tensions between these forces and the Israeli forces 
that would harm the strategic peaceful relations between the two countries. Jordanian 
forces in the West Bank would also be the targets of Hamas or other Palestinian groups, 
leading even to targeting Jordan on its own soil. This could result in tensions and 
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instability within Jordan, which has a large Palestinian cohort demographic, let alone the 
sympathy of the IAF in Jordan to Hamas, as explained in the previous chapter. For these 
reasons, Jordan has always rejected any kind of involvement in the West Bank. The only 
reason that would force Jordan to take such a step is the fear that a weak Palestinian 
Authority and forces would fail, allowing Hamas to take over the West Bank, which is an 
undesirable option for Jordan and not worth risking given the fact the proximity and long 
border between Jordan and the West Bank (Crouch II et al., 2008: 18).  
 
While the importance and sensitivity of final status issues such as borders, refugees, and 
Jerusalem have been the traditional focus on the final arrangement of peace between the 
Palestinian and the Israel, the security and stability for Israel and the Palestinians are of 
no less importance to establish any durable peace deal between the two sides (Crouch II 
et al., 2008: 1). Therefore, in 2002 the Jordanian government was very active in preparing 
for the Saudi peace initiative mainly in convincing other Arab countries to endorse the 
initiative. While the initiative fulfilled all of the Arab demands, the Jordanian government 
was very aware of the necessity of addressing the Israeli concerns regarding its security 
and the issue of refugees in the initiative. As a result, Jordan managed successfully, 
alongside with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to convince other Arab countries, especially 
Syria and Lebanon, to endorse the initiative that addresses the major Israeli security and 
refugees concerns in order to make Israel and the wider international community accept 
such an initiative (Muasher, 2008: 121).  
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6.5 Mutual Security Concerns of Israel and Jordan 
 
Israel and Jordan clearly have some areas of disagreement. But they also have vital 
overlapping interests, especially in security affairs (Luft, 2004). The Israeli security 
strategy is changeable according to the events in the Middle East. After the removal of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003, devastating Iraqi economic and military capabilities, the 
isolation of Syria and the weakening of its military after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 and Egypt in 1979, most analysts asserted that 
the main threats to Israel were from terrorism and Iran (Luft, 2004: 1). For example, the 
Israeli Deputy Prime Minister in 2008, Haim Ramon, argued that the main focus of the 
Israeli policies has shifted from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peacemaking to 
fighting terrorist organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah and their Iranian and Syrian 
backing. For that reason, it is essential for Israel, Ramon argued, to maintain its 
cooperation with moderate Arab countries in the region in the battle against extremists in 
order to prepare the conditions for peace deal (Ramon, 2008: 31).  
 
In contrast to his father, one of the first steps of King Abdullah II after his succession to 
the throne in 1999 was to end the presence of Hamas in Jordan, which was perceived as a 
terrorist organisation by the U.S.A and Israel. This step had been a long standing demand 
by Israel (Wolfsfeld, Eitan and Kailani, 2008: 386). For both governments in Jordan and 
in Israel, terrorism and organisations such as Hamas are the paramount concerns. For the 
Israeli government, suicide bombs and rocket attacks by Hamas are causing enormous 
public pressure to respond. In Jordan, although public pressure on the government is 
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limited, terrorism is linked to internal stability and the government relations with the 
Islamists (Byman, 2008: 6). Hamas could also pose a danger if it controlled the West 
Bank is that its ability to launch rockets to major Israeli cities and populated centres, as 
well as its ability to increase other kinds of attacks into Israel, including providing Iran 
with a third potential proximal front to attack Israel beside Hezbollah from the Israeli 
northern borders with Lebanon and Gaza from the South (Crouch II et al., 2008: 4).  
 
For Jordan, the Palestinian character of the IAF and its closeness to Hamas made many 
Jordanian officials perceive it as a Palestinian organisation within Jordan. These realities 
and the instability of the region reminded the Jordanian regime of the deteriorated 
situation that followed the war in 1967. After that war different Palestinian organisations 
operated attacks in Israel and the Palestinian Territories from Jordan, which led to many 
clashes between the Jordanian and Israeli armies on the borders between the two 
countries. These events and the presence of these organisations also led to a civil war in 
Jordan in 1970 when Jordan expelled these organisations lest their presence would have 
removed the monarchy or caused another war between Jordan and Israel at a time when 
the Jordanian army was very weak after defeat in the Six Day War of 1967. Therefore, 
the Jordanian regime feared allowing the IAF to flourish in Jordan democratically, and as 
Jordan is the only route for the movements of Palestinian people and finance from and to 
the West Bank, Jordan restricted IAF activities and was watchful of its ties with Hamas, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, lest these ties and the instability in the region would 
lead to a situation similar to that of 1970, which would jeopardize Jordan’s strategic 
relations with Israel and the U.S.A (Brown, 2006: 15).        
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The victory of Hamas in the legislative election which led to the formation of the 
Palestinian government by Hamas in 2006 and its take-over in Gaza in the summer of 
2007 resulted in an increase of security concerns and the possibility of taking over in the 
West Bank. These realities and the increasing power of Hamas, which rejects Israel’s 
right to exist and endorses armed resistance to it, made Israel reluctant to engage in peace 
talks with the Palestinians, despite the moderate Palestinian Authority (PA) is losing 
power and popularity. These conditions made Israel and other external players such as 
Jordan and the U.S.A believe that the presence of the Israeli army in the West Bank is 
essential to prevent Hamas taking over (Crouch II et al., 2008: 4).   
 
The threats that Israel faces make it worry about the survivability of key friendly regimes 
such as those in Jordan and Egypt. Israel perceives that the replacement of these regimes 
would only be in favour of radical Islamists allied with Iran, which would exaggerate the 
threats and challenges to Israel (Wunderle and Briere, 2008: 13). Therefore, Paul Scham 
argued that there are considerable commonalities of interest between moderate Arab 
countries such as Jordan and Israel. These commonalities, Scham argues, are more 
important than the interests between these governments and some local powers such as 
the radical and religious organisations within the Arab countries, mainly because these 
organisations have undesirable and challenging impacts on domestic and foreign policies 
(Scham, 2007: 9). For example, Daniel Byman stated that the Jordanian government has 
always been worried about a Hamas victory in Gaza if a clash between Hamas and the 
Israeli forces would break out similar to the war that took place between Hezbollah and 
Israel, in which Hezbollah achieved remarkable positive publicity among the Arab public 
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in 2006. As a result, the Jordanian government called upon the U.S. administration to 
restrain the Israeli desire to crush Hamas military in Gaza, and called for the support of 
President Mahmoud Abbas to build up the capability of the PA (Byman, 2008: 3).  
 
The reduction of the threat to Israel from its eastern front would encourage Israel to 
reconsider its military presence in the Jordan Valley. Doing so would facilitate territorial 
contiguity among the Palestinian territories leading to the possibility of a Palestinian state 
with joint borders with Jordan. Such arrangements would provide the Palestinians with 
free movement of goods, services, and people, leading to a better economic development 
in these territories. However, most Israeli strategists, especially those in the IDF and 
other political figures such as the former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his Defence 
Minister Shaul Mofaz, asserted that due to unpredictable developments in the region, the 
eastern front of Israel must be permanently secured and controlled by the Israeli army in 
spite of Israel’s advantageous after the developments in the region since 2003 (Luft, 
2004: 3).  
 
Some Israelis perceive a Palestinian state in the West Bank with joint borders with Jordan 
would be a greater challenge to Jordan and its monarchy, given the fact that a huge 
portion of the Jordanian population is from Palestinian origins. Therefore, the Israeli 
military presence alongside the Jordan River and its control of the borders with Jordan 
are essential not only to prevent weapons and terrorists smuggling into Israel from its 
eastern front, but also to the insurance of the Jordanian stability and survivability which 
are a major concerns for Israel and its security (Luft, 2004: 4). It worth mentioning in this 
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regard, given the Israeli security exigencies of the importance of the Jordan Valley, that 
Jordan agreed in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in 1994 to allow Israel some military 
presence in some Jordanian territories such as Natanya and Zofar for twenty-five years 
(Luft, 2004: 31).                         
 
Although the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 gave Israel a more secured 
eastern front from a conventional military perspective, Israel is arguably still facing a 
terrorist threat from its eastern borders. While Iraq became a major centre for 
international terrorism, many terrorists tried to enter Jordan from Iraq to attack Israel. For 
instance, in August 2005 a group of terrorists entered Jordan form Iraq to attack a U.S. 
ship in the Jordanian port of Aqaba, and fired a rocket attack on Elat, an Israeli port on 
the Red Sea. Consequently, the threat that Israel is facing from its eastern front has a 
terrorist face. This highlights again the importance of the Jordan Valley and Jordan’s 
strategic location and cooperation for Israel’s security. For example, the former Israeli 
Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon stated in January 2006 that regardless of the extent to which 
the U.S. forces succeed in fighting terrorism and insurgency in Iraq, Jordan will remain 
an important country for the security of Israel, mainly because these terrorists would 
escape from Iraq to a neighbouring countries closer to Israel such as Jordan and Syria 
(Gold, 2006:1). In addition, an early U.S. withdrawal from Iraq before destroying 
terrorism there would make Iraq a main base for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
organisations. More importantly, U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could result in control of Iraq 
by the Shiites, with their Iranian backing. In such a scenario, Jordan would face severe 
security challenges that would result in destabilising the country. Not far away from these 
 262
possibilities, while Hamas is strong and has ties with the Islamists in Jordan, these 
realities make Israel more assertive of controlling its borders with Jordan to enhance the 
security of both countries by preventing insurgencies to move from Iraq to Israel. In 
another words; Jordan’s strategic location is significant for the security of Israel not only 
in conventional war times but also during the current era of international terrorism (Gold, 
2006: 2).                               
 
6.6 The Peace Process and Jordanian-Israeli Relations 
 
On many occasions during the two Bush terms, King Abdullah II emphasised that the 
central issue in the region is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not Iran, as the U.S. 
administration would like the countries of the region to believe and act. The King 
believes that the conflict has major consequences for Jordan and the region in general 
(Ottway and Herzallah, 2008: 1). The proximity of Jordan to Israel and the huge presence 
of Palestinians in Jordan as well as the issue of transfer are always worrying Jordan and 
resulted in remarkable cooperation between Jordan and Israel (Wolfsfeld, Eitan and 
Kailani, 2008:381). Dan Meridor, the former Israeli minister of Strategic Affairs in 2006 
stated that Israel perceives Jordan as its primary partner in peace and in stabilizing the 
region to enable Israel to meet its security challenges. These challenges made Israel 
consult Jordan in its policies towards the Palestinians and the peace process (Meridor, 
2006: 23).  
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The U.S.A has always been perceived by Israel and other Arab countries as the 
indispensable external actor to any Arab-Israeli settlement (Scham, 2007: 2). According 
to Josef Joffe, to have an efficient mediator for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the 
mediator should be powerful and capable of contributing to the solution. Therefore, only 
the U.S.A can be that mediator with the help of other regional actors in this conflict 
(Joffe, 2002: 175). In addition, Ahmed Abdul-Halim argued that one of the most 
significant steps to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the U.S.A building of an 
international and regional coalition to formulate a comprehensive and final agreement 
between the two parties (Abdul-Halim, 2002: 196).  
 
While Jordan recognises the role of the U.S.A in any peace settlement, since his 
succession to the Jordanian throne King Abdullah II has always attempted to convince 
and encourage the U.S. administrations and Congress to mediate actively in solving the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In his speech to a joint session of the Congress in March 
2007, King Abdullah II pleaded for U.S. leadership and support in peacemaking between 
the Palestinian and the Israelis (Sharp, 2008: 11). The King asserted that this conflict is 
the core and the main reason for the instability in the region, arguing that the Saudi or the 
Arab initiative that was launched by the Arab League in March 2002 would lead to a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East which needs the U.S. endorsement and 
leadership. On the other hand, the Jordanian government has made it clear for the U.S.A 
that the Israeli policy of settlement enlargement is undermining the possibility of peace. 
The King also supported the U.S. initiative in Annapolis in 2007 to advance negotiations 
between the two sides highlighting the danger of its failure in the growth of the power of 
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radical movements as a result of the absence of peace and their impact on radicalizing the 
people of the region, including those in Jordan (Sharp, 2008: 11).  
  
While Johan Ikenberry asserts that the U.S.A as a liberal hegemonic power allows 
secondary states to address their concerns, and takes their views into consideration 
(Ikenberry, 1999: 186), Jordan, despite its smallness, alongside Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
played a significant role in the years that followed 9/11 in encouraging the U.S. 
administrations and other international actors such as the European Union (EU) to engage 
in peace making in the region. Equally important, these countries aimed to make the 
U.S.A consider the Arab demands and perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Muasher, 
2008: 149). 
 
As Jordan is the most affected country among the Arabs by any peace agreement between 
Israel and the Palestinians, and as it is knowledgeable about the U.S. foreign policy 
making and attitude toward the Middle East, Jordan was very active and assertive in 
raising the Jordanian and the Arab concerns to the U.S.A. These efforts achieved 
considerable success in influencing U.S. policies toward the peace process. For example, 
in his meeting with President Bush in May 2002, King Abdullah II convinced the 
President to endorse and support a time framework, which was called later the Road Map, 
to achieve a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians leading to the creation 
of a Palestinian state. Such an U.S. endorsement, the King argued, would undermine the 
radical powers that were harming and slowing the peace process at that time (Nathan, 
2003: 1).  
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The Arab and the Jordanian efforts to encourage U.S. involvement in the peace process 
resulted in the U.S. endorsement of the Road Map. In his speech in June 2002 President 
Bush, for the first time, recognised the importance of the two-state solution within three 
years for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, addressing the main Arab concerns that Jordan 
has always called for. Although President Bush was very critical of Yasser Arafat in his 
speech, and called upon the Palestinians to undertake political change and moderation, 
Jordan perceived this speech as an endorsement of a Palestinian state by the U.S.A, and 
as a remarkable development in the peace process (Muasher, 2008: 154).               
 
However, the continuous violence in the region, the war in Iraq, and the influence that the 
Israeli lobby held over the U.S. foreign policy resulted in a negative impact on the U.S. 
desire to pressure Israel to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Mearsheimer and Walt, 
2006: 62). Meanwhile, Marwan Dodeen argued that the limited achievements on the 
peace track and the U.S. policies towards Israel and the peace process did not illustrate a 
weak Jordanian foreign policy. Rather, he asserts that the absence of an Arab influence is 
due to the absence of sustainable Arab collective efforts to make any difference in the 
U.S. policies. Dodeen argues that although the U.S.A has vital interests with the Arab 
countries, there is no Arab lobby similar to the Israeli one in the U.S.A that can pressure 
U.S. foreign policymaking in favour of the Palestinians or the Arabs in general, or at least 
to mitigate the Israeli influence on the U.S. administrations regarding the peace process 
(Interview: Dodeen, 2008). It is vital to remark from the above discussion that although 
the Israeli lobby practiced remarkable influence on the Bush administrations, and despite 
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the absence of an Arab lobby, Jordan managed to make a remarkable difference in Bush’s 
policies toward the conflict, as indicated above. 
 
6.7 Jordan’s Relations with the Palestinian Authority 
 
According to the former Jordanian foreign minister Dr. Marwan Muasher, King Abdullah 
II was keen to encourage the former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in the years that 
followed 9/11 to rebuild his credibility with President Bush and his administration in 
fighting terrorism. For example, Jordan tried to convince the Palestinian leadership at that 
time to arrest Palestinian insurgents and those who were responsible for the ship “Karin 
A”, a Palestinian ship captured by Israel in 2002 full of arms sent by Iran, to smuggle 
these arms into the Palestinian territories. These Jordanian efforts were designed to 
encourage the PA to change its behaviour, to persuade the U.S. administration to tolerate 
the PA and its leadership at that time, which experienced neglect and accusations from 
the Bush administration (Muasher, 2008: 118).  
 
Jordan also supported the moderate Palestinian leadership of Mahmoud Abbas and the 
Fatah faction of the PLO to prevent Hamas’s influence in the West Bank. For example, 
the Jordanian police forces trained several battalions of the Palestinian police in Jordan in 
order to enhance the ability of the Palestinian forces in achieving stability and security in 
the Palestinian territories, let alone that the capability of these forces is essential also to 
prevent Hamas taking over in the West Bank. It is vital to indicate in this regard that 
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these training programs were funded and supervised by the U.S. government (Sharp, 
2008: 12).  
 
As mentioned in the section above, Jordan perceives the resumption of the peace process, 
especially on the Israeli-Palestinian track, the most important issue in the region. This 
importance, for Jordan, derives from the fact that the longer the status quo remains, the 
worse the situation will get and the weaker the Palestinian Authority will become. These 
possibilities will result in more fragmentation among Palestinians, leading to insecurity in 
the occupied territories as well as in Israel, with harmful consequences on Jordan in 
different ways (Interview: Hassan, 2008). In his meeting with the then U.S. Defence 
Secretary Colin Powell in Amman on 11 April, 2002 during his visit to the region that 
followed the deteriorating situation between Israel and the Palestinians, King Abdullah II 
insisted on the importance that the Israeli security achievements and policies must be 
parallel and simultaneous with progress on the peace process. This, the King argued, 
would make the PA and the Palestinian people feel that there is hope for peace and 
settlement on the horizon so that the Palestinian Authority remains strong and functional 
(Shweid, 2002: 1).  
 
The Hamas control of Gaza is a salient element in radicalising the Palestinian people and 
encouraging other radical organisations in the region to increase their presence in the 
Palestinian territories. In addition, the presence and power of Hamas would result in 
radicalising moderate political organisation within the Palestinian political sphere such as 
Fatah, which would find by radical attitudes and behaviours a source of popularity and 
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political survival among the Palestinian people to counterbalance the power of Hamas 
(Glick, 2008: 8). Therefore, while Jordan is supportive of the PA in its stance and desire 
for a two-state solution, it is believed that one of the primary reasons for the Jordanian 
exclusion and continuous boycott of Hamas since 2000 is Hamas’s rejection and blocking 
of policies leading to the possibility of achieving the two-state solution. In addition, 
Jordan’s continuous policy of isolating Hamas was aiming to force Hamas to change its 
attitude and behaviour towards the peace process and Israel, as well as towards 
moderation and political sharing with the PA (Barari, 2008: 2). The Jordanian support of 
the PA has been discussed in this chapter in different sections, such as in the previous 
section regarding peacemaking and in the following section of the Jordanian role in the 
two-state solution. 
 
6.8 The Two-State Solution 
 
The Jordanian state perceives the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to 
be in Jordan’s best strategic interest. The reason for that is such a solution would 
eliminate any Jordanian involvement in any everlasting settlement for the conflict, such 
as a confederation between Jordan and the Palestinian territories, which has always been 
an aversion option for Jordan (Barari, 2008:1). 
 
In July 2007 President Bush re-proposed a plan to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 
adopting the two-state solution. He insisted upon the urgency of establishing a Palestinian 
state that is democratic, peaceful, and moderate, compatible with the U.S. strategy in the 
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Middle East (Aly, 2007: 1). The U.S. administration believed that the plan would 
advance U.S. interests in the region, such as the security of Israel, regional stability, 
undermining radical movements and states, and allowing democracy to flourish in the 
region, leading to more regional integration in the global economy. However, although 
Bush’s plan addressed the need for international and regional involvement and support 
based on meetings chaired by the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, some Arab 
countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were not enthusiastic about the plan, 
because President Bush did not commit his personal involvement in these meetings, 
leaving them to his Secretary of State, and he also categorised the initiative as an 
international meeting rather than a conference similar to the Madrid conference in the 
early 1990s; these countries were therefore sceptical of the U.S. seriousness and 
commitment to the success of the initiative (Aly, 2007: 3).          
 
The two-state solution means the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel 
between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. However, for this assumption to work 
Israel has to meet its security requirements by adopting several essential principles such 
as the following: Firstly, conditional strategic depth; because of Israel’s limited width, it 
requires in the case of a Palestinian state to be eligible of deploying some forces in 
certain eastern areas in case of a threat from the east (Yanai, 2005: 13). Secondly, the 
demilitarisation of the Palestinian state; the Israeli argument is that because of the 
security challenges to Israel in the case of establishing a Palestinian state, Israel will 
insist on the demilitarisation of such a state, and prevent it from engaging in any military 
alliance with a third party. Thirdly, any two-state solution must guarantee full security 
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cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian state, especially in counterterrorism 
(Yanai, 2005: 15). It is worth mentioning in this regard that Jordan can be a main player 
in implementing these principles, mainly because of its location to the east of Israel and 
the Occupied Territories, and its relations with both parties and its security cooperation 
record in the region.          
 
Robert Rothstein argued that the margin of time and safety that a small state has to 
overcome its challenges is limited (Keohane, 2006: 56), and the Jordanian government 
has always been sensitive and concerned about development on the ground in relation to 
its vital interests such as the two-state solution, the Separation Wall, and the power of 
Hamas in Gaza and its possible control of the West Bank. These concerns would be 
extremely serious if a Palestinian state were established under the current circumstances, 
which would lead to Hamas control of such a state. The power of Hamas and the MB in 
Jordan and the linkage between them are making the Jordanian government vigilant of 
the circumstances in Jordan as well as in the OPT could be simultaneous with the 
establishment of the Palestinian state. These fears are what the Jordanian regime wants to 
overcome by a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that would lead to a 
viable Palestinian state to end all of the Jordanian concerns (Eiland, 2008: 30). 
 
Ariel Sharon’s decision of the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and part of the 
West Bank in 2005 was aiming to melt the possibility of a Palestinian state in the future. 
Prime Minister Sharon assumed that the democratisation process promoted by President 
Bush in the Middle East after 9/11 would induce the Palestinians in Jordan and in the 
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West Bank to pressure the Jordanian government to agitate for the establishment of a 
federation with the Palestinian territories. In addition, Sharon believed that the Separation 
Wall that is dividing the West Bank into parts would worsen the Palestinians’ daily 
livelihood by making it difficult for them to enter their farms and lands and go to their 
jobs (Sussman, 2005: 1). Therefore, Nathan Brown argues that the election of Hamas in 
2006 and its consequences in Gaza, as well as the different Israeli policies under both 
Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, made a two-state solution less viable to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict (Brown, 2008: 1).  
 
According to Gary Sussman, the Israeli policies such as the expansion of the settlements 
and the Separation Wall and several security fences created major challenges and 
obstacles to the two-state solution. For example, these policies are argued to be designed 
by Israel to shape the geography of only one state. Moreover, many Israeli hardliners in 
different political parties and those in the IDF assert that Israel should only surrender the 
OPT to a reliable partner such as Jordan, leading to the creation of a federation with 
Jordan. This option has been always rejected by Jordan because of the threat it poses to 
the Jordanian identity and the political structure, as well as to the regime in the future 
(Sussman, 2004: 6).  
 
It has been argued that small states normally resort to superpowers to address their vital 
concerns and survivability (Hey, 2003: 5). As a result, in a meeting with President Bush 
in December 2003, King Abdullah II raised the issue of the Israeli Separation Wall and 
its negative consequences on the peace process and the viability of a Palestinian state, 
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which Jordan perceives as a solution for its vital concerns. Although Bush was very 
considerate of the Jordanian point, he was very critical of the Palestinian suicide bombs 
and understanding of the Israeli justifications for self-defence (Muasher, 2008: 220). 
Under such circumstances, and while Jordan perceived the Wall as a national security 
threat, Jordan used all of the diplomatic channels and legal means available to address the 
Wall issue. For example, Jordan was very active in building an international political and 
legal campaign against the Israeli Wall. In addition, although the U.S. administration 
vetoed a Palestinian proposal to the Security Council to condemn the wall, Jordan 
strongly backed the Palestinians in referring the issue to the United Nations General 
Assembly and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Muasher, 2008: 221).  
 
Although the U.S.A and Israel pressured Jordan to cease its involvement in the Wall 
issue, arguing that it is merely an Israeli and Palestinian issue in which Jordan should not 
get involved, the Jordanian government’s counterargument was that Jordan was the first 
country in the Arab world to condemn suicide bombings, which resulted in many 
domestic and regional criticisms, however, Jordan would do everything in its capacity to 
protect its national interests insisting that Israel could build the Wall in its territories, not 
the Palestinians’. In addition, Jordan argued that while the ICJ would deal with the case 
from a historical perspective, the West Bank where the wall is being built was under 
Jordanian sovereignty prior to the occupation. As a result, the Jordanian government was 
very serious in its backing of the case, despite the U.S. and Israeli dissatisfaction. As a 
result, Jordan solicited the professional services of the well-known British lawyer, the 
late Sir Arthur Watts, to support the Arab argument. These Jordanian efforts resulted in 
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the remarkable decision of the ICJ on July 9, 2004. The court decided not only the 
illegality of the wall, but also the illegality of the Israeli settlement policies, and asserted 
the fact that the West Bank was occupied from Jordan, denying by that the Israeli claim 
that the West Bank was a no-man’s land when it was occupied, and asserted the 
Palestinian people’s right to self-determination (Muasher, 2008: 226).  
 
6.9 The Jordanian Option 
 
Although there were tensions in U.S.-Jordanian relations during the Gulf War in 1990-
1991, the U.S. administration warned the hardliner Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir 
at that time not to interfere or harm Jordan as a result of indications that he was planning 
to exploit the situation in the Middle East and the regional and international isolation that 
Jordan suffered from to destabilize Jordan. On that occasion the U.S. government made it 
clear that Jordan is a red line that Israel should not consider crossing (Interview: 
Hamami, 2008). However, Barry Buzan has argued that the major threat to any small 
state is that when powerful states, such as the U.S.A and Israel in the case of Jordan, 
question its existence, legitimacy and future survival (Krudsen, 1996: 26).  
 
The neoconservative movement has Cold War origins and perceived Israel as a main 
player in undermining the Soviet’s influence in the region, and the neoconservatives still 
perceive Israel as the main strategic asset from security perspective and the Palestinians 
as a threat. This resulted in offering Israel all possible U.S. help. For example, Richard 
Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, who were the leaders of the neoconservatives during Bush’s 
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era and were known for their boundless support of Israel, stated in September 2002 that 
the shape of the Middle East after the war in Iraq will be that all of Palestine will be for 
Israel, and Jordan will be Palestine. In addition, Douglas Feith, a neoconservative figure 
in the Defence Department during that era, asserted that territorial compromise and the 
land for peace notion would lead to the destruction of Israel, therefore, for Feith, the only 
legitimate land and state for the Palestinians is Jordan (Christison, 2004: 43). 
 
The demographic problem has always been a major concern for the Israelis, especially 
those on the right wing, who perceive the Palestinian people, whether in Israel or in the 
West Bank, as a threat to the Jewishness of the state of Israel in the future. According to 
Robert Blecher, many Israeli politicians from different parties believe that the transfer of 
Palestinians outside Israel and the West Bank is the most excellent solution to many 
Israel’s problems and concerns. Although they recognize the impracticality and difficulty 
of such a solution, they believe that Israel should utilize any regional and domestic 
conditions that can facilitate such a policy, such as the war in Iraq and a major war with 
the Palestinians. As a result, regional instability combined with regime failure and 
instability in Jordan would be an adequate chance for large numbers of Palestinians to be 
transferred to Jordan (Blecher, 2002: 24).  
 
Jordan is keenly aware of these Israeli attitudes. For example, the former Jordanian Prime 
Minister Taher Al-Massry argued that Jordan is aware of the Israeli desire in preventing 
the creation of a Palestinian state in order to be able to expand Israel all over Palestine. 
Therefore, Jordan avoids disagreements and tensions with the U.S.A regarding its 
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policies in the region to preserve its relations and assets with the U.S.A, in order to 
pressure Israel in the case of a possible Israeli conspiracy or different types of aggression 
on Jordan. Al-Massry stated that while Jordan holds big numbers of Palestinian refugees, 
it cannot tolerate any Israeli temptation to pressure Jordan for confederation with the 
West Bank or transferring Palestinians from the Occupied Territories to Jordan 
(Interview: Al-Massry, 2008).  
 
The Israeli policies of occupation and siege of the West Bank since the second intifada 
and building the Separation Wall have radicalised the Palestinian people and weakened 
their economy. This makes any Jordanian involvement in the West Bank very risky, and 
increases the domestic and Arab criticism of being strongly pro-Israel and pro-U.S.A, 
something Jordan has always been accused of. More importantly, any Jordanian 
involvement, even a limited one, in the West Bank would be perceived as if Jordan is 
capable of being part of the solution for the conflict. For many Jordanians, especially the 
nationalists, such a step would be the start of a process aiming to weaken the Jordanian 
identity and Jordanian dominance of the politics of the country, in order to allow the 
Palestinians to take over power in Jordan (Lynch, 2004: 2). Therefore, the Jordanian King 
met the ex-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in March 2004 warning him of the impact 
of the Israeli policies of occupying the West Bank and building the Separation Wall. 
Jordan perceived these policies with harmful impacts on Jordan and on the peace process. 
In that meeting King Abdullah II made it clear to Sharon that any temptation or thinking 
of the Jordanian option is intolerable to Jordan in all respects, especially as the idea of the 
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Jordanian option emerges whenever Israel talks about unilateral disengagement from the 
Occupied Territories (Lynch, 2004: 4). 
 
Israel argues that the major aim of building the Separation Wall is to enhance its security 
by preventing terrorists and suicide bombings from entering and attacking Israel and its 
civilians. However, it has been argued that Israel is also aiming by building the wall to 
create conditions on the grounds that prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. For 
example, the route of the Separation Wall is separating Palestinian cities from each other, 
making the establishment of a coherent and contiguous Palestinian state impossible. 
Therefore, these policies can be seen as if Israel is creating the conditions on the ground 
for the Jordanian option by ending up with the annexation of the remainder of the West 
Bank by Jordan. In addition, some may argue that the weakening of the Palestinian 
leadership and administration will lead to worsening the people’s situation and to 
regionalising the problem, and denationalising the Palestinian question would result in 
forcing Jordan to be part of the solution (Usher, 2005: 38). For instance, Dan Dicker and 
Pinchas Inbari argued that although Jordan refuses at the present time any kind of 
engagement in the West Bank, it would be the best scenario for Jordan to do so at the 
security level in case of the collapse of the PA to prevent unbearable numbers of 
Palestinian refugees emigrating from the West Bank to Jordan (Dicker and Inbari, 2005: 
1). 
 
Jordan realised the weakness of the moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and 
the fact that the Bush administration was running out of time, and its status as a “lame 
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duck” would not enable it to launch any serious changes to the peace process. These 
realities were simultaneous with the Jordanian perception that Hamas had become a 
dominant player in the Palestinian politics that Jordan can no longer afford to exclude. 
Although Hamas has strong ties with the Jordanian IAF, the peace talks between the PA 
and Israel were halted, and the situation in the Palestinian territories was deteriorating; 
Jordan was aware of these critical circumstances (Sharp, 2008: 12). It is important to 
highlight here that David Vital believed that a small state must depend on its own policies 
that are of high quality as well as on its leadership bravery, wisdom, and smartness in 
order to achieve interests and survival (Krudsen, 1996: 8). Therefore, in the summer of 
2008 the Jordanian government conducted dialogue with Hamas through the intelligence 
services to address political and security concerns for both sides. For Jordan, it has been 
argued that regional circumstances and limited peace achievements made Jordan need to 
widen its alliances and relations with all the influential actors in the region, and not to 
bind itself with alignment only with the PA, Israel and the U.S.A (Sharp, 2008; 12). 
 
While Jordan’s dialogue with Hamas will not change its position towards peace and the 
two-state solution, not to mention its strategic relations with Israel and the PA, Jordan’s 
new contacts with Hamas are focusing on solid Jordanian security interests and priorities, 
such as to guarantee Hamas non-interference in Jordanian politics and its relations with 
the Jordanian MB and IAF; such issues Hamas can afford to cooperate in to get out of its 
isolation, and make contact with a significant player in the Palestinian issue such as 
Jordan. More importantly, it is worth mentioning in this regard that the circumstances  
mentioned above which would lead to deteriorating developments in the region made 
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Jordan perceive its contacts with Hamas as vital option to protect Jordan from any 
undesirable consequences such as the “Jordanian option” (Barari, 2008:2).                      
 
6.10 Israel and the Jordanian Domestic Front 
 
For almost all countries in the world the Palestinian question seems to be a foreign policy 
issue, but for Jordan it is a vital foreign as well as domestic issue (Interview: Abu Jabber, 
2008). As a result, for the Jordanian monarchy and East Jordanian public and political 
elite, the Jordanian relations with Israel and finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict are political survival interests. Despite criticism from opposition powers such as 
the IAF, the Palestinian community, and the Professional Organisations in Jordan to the 
government relations and cooperation with Israel, the Jordanian government and King 
have always supported the efforts for regional peace and normalising between the two 
countries in order to advance different mutual interests and solve dilemmas that are of 
vital concern for the future of Jordan (Sharp, 2008: 11). On the other hand, the Israeli 
policies and the situation in the region have been radicalising forces of some elements of 
the Jordanian people who became a challenge to the Jordanian government. This is not a 
surprise, although a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is in the best interests of 
Jordan and other moderate countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Sham, 2007: 9).  
 
The intensity of anti-Americanism in Jordan depends on the events in the region, 
especially those related to Israel and its actions toward the Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories. One of the major aspects of anti-Americanism in Jordan is the movement 
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against normalisation with Israel, which associated itself with being anti-U.S. and anti-
Israel simultaneously. It is vital to mention in this regard that the major pillar of this 
movement is the IAF. This movement was active domestically and regionally; in August 
2000 the movement organised a regional meeting in Jordan to coordinate the Arab efforts 
to isolate Israel economically and culturally (Vogt, 2006: 141). 
 
 Domestically, the movement published a list of political figures, journalists, and 
companies to mobilise the Jordanian public against them, accusing them of normalizing 
the relations with Israel, or “the enemy” as the movement preferred to call it. More 
importantly, in coordination with the IAF and other opposition powers such as the 
Federation of Labour Union, the anti-normalisation movement played a major role in 
mobilizing Jordanian public against the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003, and the situation in the 
Palestinian Territories that resulted in many demonstrations and tensions between these 
powers and the Jordanian public on one hand and the government on the other (Vogt, 
2006: 142). 
 
Furthermore, the movement mobilised the Jordanian public to boycott American products 
and to undermine a major element of the Jordanian modern economy, the Qualified 
Industrial Zones (QIZ). These zones were established as a result of the significant U.S.-
Jordanian Free Trade Agreement in 2000, which allows Jordanian companies, with Israeli 
partnership, to export goods to the U.S. market with an exemption of quotas and taxes. 
These Israeli activities and presence in the Jordanian economy were perceived by the 
movement and opposition as temptations to interfere and dominate the Jordanian 
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economy and society. In addition, the movement accused the Jordanian government of 
allowing Israel to use Jordan and its economy and market as a bridge for Israel to access 
other Arab countries’ markets and economies (Vogt, 2006: 135). However, the Jordanian 
government responded strongly to the movement’s activities by arresting its leaders and 
activists in November 2002. Moreover, the government ruled that the movement and its 
campaign against Israel and the U.S.A are illegal and harmful to Jordanian national 
interests (Vogt, 2006: 136).  
 
For the Islamists in Jordan, the most notable disagreement with U.S. policies in the 
region is the influence of the Israeli and Zionist lobbies on the making of the U.S. Middle 
Eastern policies. These influences are perceived by the Islamists in Jordan as being very 
dangerous to Jordan and to the Palestinian cause. In addition, as indicated in the previous 
chapter, the Islamists in Jordan perceive that the paramount interest of Jordan is not with 
its alliance with the U.S and its relations with Israel; rather, they argue that Jordanian 
interests are better served by more Jordanian closeness and support of the Palestinians 
and by genuine political reform in the country. They argue that the Jordanian government 
must get closer and more supportive of the Palestinians in their struggle with Israel 
(Interview: Mansour, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, many indications highlight that the major threat to Israel from Jordan 
is from such policies as the Islamists are calling for, which will reshape the structure of 
Jordanian internal politics and, consequently, foreign policy, especially towards Israel 
and the U.S.A. For example, an uncontrollable democratisation or unmanageable 
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confederation with the West Bank or a situation of anarchy in the country could 
destabilise the current political system and lead to a Palestinian/Islamist takeover in 
Jordan. Moreover, although the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza 
holds an opportunity for all parties, including Jordan, to achieve permanent stability, 
there would still be a challenge accompanying such a solution with the current situation 
in Iraq and Iran, as well as the presence of Hamas in the Occupied Territories and the IAF 
in Jordan. A Palestinian state that Israel would agree to is likely to be a small fragment of 
historical Palestine subject to extreme political control and arbitration of foreign powers 
and shorn of such accoutrements as armed forces, hardly the fulfilment of the national 
aspirations of the Palestinian people after their long and bloody struggle for a state of 
their own. This would keep the Palestinians’ desire to expand their state alive. While such 
an expansion would be unlikely to take place towards the Israeli side, a confederation 
with Jordan, where there is a demographical advantage in the form of a massive 
Palestinian population (with more influence and power than that in Israel, called the 
“Israeli Arabs”), would be compatible with the Palestinian vision, and Jordan will remain 
alert about the development of any alternative solution (Luft, 2004: 23).  
 
According to the Israeli defence analyst Ze’ef Schiff, a Palestinian expanded state on 
both sides of the River Jordan is a strategic threat to the survival of Israel and Jordan 
alike, insisting on the importance of the Israeli control of Jordan Valley. Therefore, Israel 
perceives the stability of Jordan, ruled by the Hashemite Royal family, as an essential 
requirement for regional stability and the security of Israel whether in peace time or 
during periods of conflict and instability. Therefore, Israel perceives that any peace deal 
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in the region requires a regional and U.S. commitment and guarantee of the stability and 
survivability of Jordan and its monarchy, mainly because that will increase the durability 
of any peace deal and the Israeli sense of security (Luft, 2004: 28). While such a positive 
Israeli attitude towards Jordan is not always prevalent among the Israeli elite and 
different parties, Jordan will have to be always alert of the developments at all fronts to 
secure its strategic interests. It is indisputable that Jordan’s strategic relations with the 
U.S.A have served Jordan in this regard. To sustain that, Jordan has to remain able to 
raise its concerns and to try to influence policymaking in the U.S.A.   
  
6.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the interactions of the trilateral relations between the U.S.A, Israel 
and Jordan regarding vital concerns for the three countries. The chapter explored the 
consequences of the Israeli policies on both the Jordanian foreign and domestic policies 
that are of U.S. concerns. It is clear though that Israel and the U.S have unique ties and 
advanced mutual relations and interlocking between them. Undeniably, the strength of 
these relations allowed Israel to influence U.S. relations with other countries in the 
Middle East, especially since 2000, as much as the U.S.A does so. Thus, the U.S. or the 
Israeli relations with any Middle Eastern country are affected by policies made in both 
Washington and Tel Aviv.  
 
For Jordan, however, these special relations between the U.S.A and Israel did not prevent 
Jordan being a beneficiary of such relations. Fortunately for the Jordanians, in many 
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cases, the motivations and aims of these special relations were in the Jordanians’ own 
best interests and were compatible with the Jordanian national policies and preferences, 
such as counterterrorism and containing rogue states and organisations in the region, as 
has been discussed in this chapter as well as in chapter four. Moreover, Jordan finds in 
the Israeli overall current and future security requirements and the cooperation between 
the two countries in this vital issue a strong justification to mitigate U.S. demands for 
political reform in Jordan, as discussed in the previous chapter. Jordan has also proved to 
be a very reliable and cooperative ally for both the U.S.A and Israel regarding Israeli 
security and the stability of the region, making Jordan perceived by these two countries 
as a strategic and indispensable partner, as has been proven in many instances in this 
chapter. 
 
It is essential to stress here, as has been explored throughout the chapter, that the 
Jordanian security policies in the region, as well as regarding Hamas and its domestic 
front, were not designed to serve the Israeli security and the U.S. preferences and 
interests for their sake; all of these policies were serving the Jordanian national security 
in the first place, as well as tangentially concurring with those of Israel and the U.S.A. 
Hence, the Jordanian strategy as well as its survivability and well-being was in the 
interests of both the U.S.A and Israel. These realities illustrate that Jordan is aware of the 
regional and international environments in which it operates, making it attentive to its 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as a dynamic player in seeking its stability and future 
survival, even if that has resulted in disappointing Israel and the U.S.A on some 
occasions. 
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The chapter explains that there are some serious Israeli policies and desires that clash 
fundamentally with the Jordanian priorities and national interests, such as some policies 
regarding peacemaking with the Palestinians, the two-state solution, the Separation Wall 
and the Jordanian option. Interestingly, Jordan has not fled from facing these crucial 
Israeli challenges. It raised these issues assertively with both the U.S.A and Israel as 
discussed in each topic, in order to achieve its interests and to make itself present in the 
heart of all these issues, of which it has profound knowledge, as they significantly affect 
Jordan’s preferences and national interests. As a result, Jordan raised all of these issues 
skilfully with the U.S.A and made its voice heard without compromise or hesitation given 
the seriousness of these issues for Jordan’s national interests, thanks to the understanding 
and faithful features of the U.S. hegemony, despite of the undeniable ascendancy of the 
Israeli lobby during the neoconservative era of the presidency of G.W. Bush.  
 
The U.S.A on its part showed considerable support to Jordan, although Israel is its main 
strategic ally in the region. For example, Jordan did not face serious challenges on the 
ground during Bush’s era regarding the Israeli focus on the Jordanian option, the gravest 
concern for Jordan. It is worth mentioning in this regard that although Jordan faced 
remarkable challenges from Israel regarding the issues mentioned above, it has never 
shown any kind of usurpation regarding its cooperation with Israel or with the U.S.A to 
address its demands regarding these issues. By that Jordan shows considerable deal of 
rationale and insight. In addition, the new Jordanian ties with Hamas illustrate the ability 
of the Jordanian government to practice a margin of manoeuvrability with the U.S.A, 
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which acted in a restrained manner with Jordan concerning this move. It is vital to stress 
here that this move was not designed to blackmail Israel or the U.S.A; rather it was solely 
aiming to ensure Jordanian internal stability and security.   
 
In summary, although Jordan is the weakest side in this triangle, it was able to preserve at 
least a modestly influential position, especially with the strongest side, the U.S.A, to 
address its concerns and interests. This is not to suggest though that Jordan achieved all 
of its concerns and preferences regarding these tri-dimensional relations. It suggests 
rather that Jordan has had realistically high expectations, and success, from its relations 
with these two countries. These expectations kept Jordan energetic in utilizing its position 
within these relations.  It also shows that Jordan has the ability to manage in dealing with 
such sophisticated and unique relations between the U.S.A and Israel in an unpredictable 
and unstable region of great importance for both parties, especially in the 2000s. This 
indicates that Jordan has learned from its experiences with both the U.S.A and Israel. 
This ability resulted from two main pillars: the vigilance, assertiveness, and faithfulness 
of Jordan, despite of its smallness; and the consideration, faithfulness, and self-restraint 
of the U.S.A in dealing with its allies, despite of its unprecedented status and paramount 
interests in the Middle East, let alone its extraordinarily staunch support of Israel during 
the neoconservatives’ era.    
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 Overview and Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis sets out to investigate the features of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s and 
the solidity of the relations between the two countries. It has aimed to examine the 
dynamics and interactions between the two countries, given the undeniably huge power 
disparity between them, in order to assess the liberal features of the relations between the 
U.S.A and Jordan in recent historical context. 
    
The thesis started by exploring the main components and motivations of U.S. foreign 
policy towards the Middle East in different historical contexts. Within these historical 
contexts, the thesis highlighted the place of Jordan and the nature of its relations with the 
U.S.A based on the pillars that shaped U.S. Middle Eastern relations and policies. Then 
the thesis moved on to discuss the theoretical approach in chapter two and the 
methodology in chapter three that were used for the remaining chapters that explored 
U.S.-Jordanian relations empirically. 
 
The background chapter and the two chapters of theory and methodology are intended to 
outline the pillars of the relations between the two countries and the theoretical 
framework and research characteristics applied to tackle this academic investigation. The 
rationale of this intention derived from the research problem and questions that are 
derived from the grounding and embodiment of the usage of the critical theory and the 
research characteristics of this thesis regarding the bases of U.S.-Jordanian relations that 
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are discussed in chapter one. Therefore, the theory and methodology used in this thesis 
aimed to demonstrate and assess the current nature of the relations between the U.S.A, 
the sole superpower in the current years, and Jordan as a small state. 
 
The issues covered in the empirical chapters which are concerned with the current U.S.-
Jordanian relations are to a great extent a continuance, but in new dimensions and nature, 
of the main issues that shaped U.S.-Jordanian relations in other historical contexts that 
are covered in chapter one, whether regarding the Cold War and fighting terrorism, the 
stability of the Middle East and U.S. allies, or regarding Israel and its significance to the 
U.S.A. These empirical chapters are overlapping and complementary to each other as a 
result of the connectedness of these issues and their enduring importance to contemporary 
U.S.-Jordanian relations.         
 
This research is based on a range of resources such as academic materials, empirical 
reports that were conducted by specialists and well-known centres and think tanks in the 
U.S.A and the Middle East, news reports and elite interviews in Jordan. The publications 
of these centres in the U.S.A and Israel that were used enriched this thesis with the 
perceptions of different commentators and bureaucrats about the Middle East and 
Jordan’s relations with both the U.S.A and Israel. These resources are important in so far 
as the researcher has been unable, due to financial and other restraints, to conduct 
extensive interviews other than in Jordan. However, a wide range of supporting evidence 
has been gathered, and the conclusions drawn recognise the limitations of sources 
appropriately. The choice of this range of different resources and materials aimed to 
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provide the researcher with a full range of data in order to obtain valid data that are 
required to accomplish a valid assessment and comprehensive understanding and 
explanation of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. Some of the materials used were 
influenced remarkably by the infamous events of 9/11, especially those published in the 
aftermath of those terrorist events. Others were exploring the democratic reform of the 
Middle East and in Jordan from Western perspective and in light of the end of the Cold 
War and 9/11, let alone the limitation of accessing intelligence resources. As a result, the 
researcher had to rely on as much as possible different resources and methods in order to 
obtain the critical lenses required for the accomplishment of a this academic enterprise.   
  
The interviews that were conducted in the summer of 2008 in Jordan are of high 
importance for the findings and originality of this thesis, and they provided the 
researcher, who is knowledgeable about the policymaking in Jordan due to his seven 
years of career experience in the Jordanian Parliament, with the substance of fresh 
empirical experiences of high ranking politicians and experts in Jordanian foreign policy 
and its relations with the U.S.A. These elite interviews added to the findings of the thesis 
the voices of personal experiences of U.S.-Jordanian relations in different areas and from 
different Jordanian political backgrounds. The interviewees represent different political 
parties and ideologies in Jordan who were able to express freely their different 
perspectives about the relations between the two countries, whether regarding Jordan’s 
security concerns, democracy and the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Jordan. 
The list of interviewees included politicians from different backgrounds as well as 
military and security experts, academics and researchers involved in the topic. Many of 
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the interviewees were highly experienced and had been involved in the Jordanian foreign 
policymaking in previous eras, and are still active intellectually; these interviewees 
provided the researcher with the voice and judgment of aged experts in the topic who 
witnessed previous eras of U.S.-Jordanian relations in order to increase the impartiality of 
the research. While these aged experts are well-known in Jordan for their academic 
knowledge and previous political professionalism, they enabled the researcher to filter the 
attitudes and judgments of other interviewees who are currently involved in the topic and 
Jordanian political life.  
 
The timing of the interviews, the summer of 2008, was precisely compatible with the 
purpose, originality and argument of this thesis. The events that concern this thesis, such 
as 9/11, the war in Iraq in 2003 and U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East were 
the focus of the literature while these events were fresh; the interviews however were 
conducted after adequate time of these major events allowing the interviewees to have 
extra time to observe and analyse the impact of these events and their consequences on 
Jordan, resulting in making this thesis original in the sense that it is complementary to the 
literature used.  
 
 The year 2008 was the eighth and last year of the presidency of President G.W. Bush and 
the ninth year of King Abdullah’s II reign in Jordan. Therefore, the interviewees had 
sufficient observations of the subject matter regarding the Jordanian relations with the 
U.S.A in order to provide reliable and balanced analysis of the topics covered during the 
interviews. At the same time, the interviewees were able and enthusiastic to provide the 
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researcher with detailed and precise answers to the questions without preservations or 
anticipations. It must be highlighted in this regard that the responses of the interviewees 
to the research questions varied according to the specific issue being asked about. 
However, apart from the Islamists that the researcher interviewed, most of the 
interviewees were aware of the details that shaped the relations between the two countries 
and were relatively satisfied regarding U.S.-Jordanian relations. They have realistic, high 
expectations of the level of independence that Jordan enjoys in its relations with the 
U.S.A This indicates that Jordanian policymakers have learned how to respond to U.S. 
foreign policy toward the region. Interestingly enough, the Islamists were not willing or 
able to provide precise cases that show the invalidity of the argument of the theoretical 
framework of the thesis; rather their argument was driven by general rhetoric and 
regional circumstances that are remarkably anti-American and anti-Israeli, with little 
reflection on the process and outcomes of the interactions between the Jordan and the 
U.S.                
 
7.2 The Theoretical Argument of the Thesis      
 
The main argument of this thesis is based on a theoretical framework that assumes the 
U.S.A is a liberal hegemonic power in its dealings with its allies, including the small ones 
like Jordan, who are aware of their weaknesses and vigilant of the international 
environment they operate in. These assumptions expect small allies of the U.S.A to be 
aware of the importance of practicing a considerable margin of freedom in their relations, 
as Ikenberry has argued that the more powerful and capable of dominating others the 
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dominant state is, the more the small state becomes aware of its manoeuvrability and 
about U.S. power restraint (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008: 157). Therefore, the thesis 
hypothesised that the maintenance and durability of U.S. relations with other countries, 
including the small ones like Jordan in the case of this thesis, are not attributed only to 
the commonality and consistence between the two countries regarding their shared 
interests, as many realists would perceive them. They are also derived from both the 
practices of manoeuvrability of these allies within their relations with the U.S.A and from 
U.S. strategic restraint with its allies and overriding their fears of domination or 
abandonment, which Ikenberry addressed in his liberal hegemonic assumption 
(Ikenberry, 2001).  
 
For Ikenberry, the stability of the relations between the U.S.A and its allies is attributable 
to the fact that the U.S.A is a reluctant hegemonic power in its relations with its allies. 
The U.S.A allowed its allies to penetrate U.S. policymaking as a result of the liberal 
feature of the U.S as a polity resulting in the absence of referring to power in the relations 
between the U.S.A and its allies (Ikenberry, 2002: 224). By applying such a framework to 
U.S.-Jordanian relations it is expected that there is considerable and useful margin of 
manoeuvre for Jordan in its relation with the U.S.A, as has been argued in many 
occasions throughout this thesis and as has been asserted in the findings summarised in 
the remainder of this conclusion below. 
 
The usage of this theoretical framework was comprehensive in the sense it provided the 
researcher with the necessary tools in covering the multiplicity of U.S.-Jordanian 
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relations, whether concerning Jordan’s foreign policy as a small state or concerning the 
U.S.A as a liberal hegemonic power. The applicability of this theoretical framework to 
U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s is evidenced by the facts that this theoretical 
framework enabled the thesis to tackle the main interactions and pillars of the subject 
matter and by providing successfully the essential empirical, broad and inclusive 
argument and explanation for the understanding of the current realities of U.S.-Jordanian 
relations in the 2000s, as discussed in the empirical chapters. 
 
By testing the combinability of the works of both small states’ politics and John 
Ikenberry of U.S. liberal hegemony in the set up of this theoretical framework, this thesis 
found that the theoretical framework is coherent enough to claim that such a framework 
is providing an influential detailed and critical analysis of the relations between countries 
that are witnessing substantial power disparity, which is also the case of the relations 
between the U.S.A and many countries in the current International Politics. Such an 
analysis is more adequate than the one that would have been provided by another theory 
of IR especially by neorealism or by only one of the works that made up this theoretical 
framework. The applicability of this theoretical framework to the topic of U.S.-Jordanian 
relations in the 2000s with its complexity of different issues such as security affairs 
reminds us of the mixture of real politics and the liberal features of such relations which 
are an important indicator for the scholars of IR of the dynamic and evolutionary 
characters of the discipline itself, and an indicator of the possible future advancement of 
its different flexible theories.     
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7.3 The Findings of the Thesis  
 
Although the main issues that shaped U.S.-Jordanian relations during the Cold War and 
the 1990s were basically the same as those that shaped the relations between the two 
countries in the 2000s, such as security and stability, they differ in their level of intensity 
and the nature of the interaction between the two countries as hegemonic power and a 
small state. U.S.-Jordanian relations during the Cold War, as discussed in chapter one, 
were influenced to a remarkable extent by the structure of the international system at that 
time and its consequences on the region. In the 2000s, however, the relations were more 
intense, more liberal, and had more reciprocal effect between the two sides, as has been 
argued in this thesis. 
 
While Jordan has remarkable credibility with the U.S.A and predictability in its policies 
(Interview: Al-Momani, 2008), it was able to conduct some policies that differ from U.S. 
preferences. This ability was based on the U.S.A being assured that these policies were 
not aiming to challenge the U.S.A or to counter its interests; rather they were only 
serving the sensitivity of Jordan as a major small ally in the Middle East. Noticeably, 
there are obvious occasions that Jordan managed to avoid U.S. exigencies regarding 
different issues in which the U.S.A did not pressure Jordan excessively (Interview: 
Masarweh, 2008). It has been illustrated in different places and issues through this thesis 
that such a combination of shared interests and features of U.S. liberal hegemony are the 
driving forces behind U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. 
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It is clear that due to domestic and regional reasons Jordan had to have a free hand in 
cooperating with the U.S.A on some issues and had to free itself from the U.S.A in 
others. This cooperation, as discussed in chapter four, was vital for the U.S.A in its War 
on Terror as well as for Jordan’s stability. For example, King Abdullah II rejected the 
U.S. war in Iraq in 2003 but ended up helping the U.S. government in its difficulties 
during the war, especially in issues that were compatible with the Jordanian interests in 
that war such as fighting terrorism (Luft, 2004: 21). On the other hand, during 2006, the 
U.S. Secretary of State at that time, Condoleezza Rice, tried to form an anti-Iranian 
alliance composed of the six Gulf Cooperation Council as well as Jordan and Egypt, 
which used to be called (the Gulf Countries + 2) to counter the Iranian challenge in the 
region. Although these countries met in Kuwait in January 2007, their meeting did not 
result in any clear commitments to regional cooperation or security arrangements against 
Iran without any convention until the time of writing this thesis (Ottaway, 2008: 1).  
 
More interestingly, Jordan conducted many steps forward in improving its relations with 
some major U.S. competitors such as Russia to address Jordanian interests with these 
countries; King Abdullah II has met President Dmitry Medvedev three times during the 
first eight months of his Presidency to increase cooperation between the two countries, 
including in military affairs (Hamid, 2008). Another striking example of Jordan’s 
freedom of action is its new ties with Hamas, as discussed in chapter six; Jordan 
established dialogue with Hamas in the summer of 2008 when Jordan perceived such a 
dialogue to be in its interest, without jeopardizing its ties with the U.S.A and Israel, 
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which perceived Hamas as one of the most dangerous and hated organisations in the 
region at that time.      
 
King Abdullah II proved to be a moderate leader with the remarkable ability of 
controlling the Jordanian domestic front and to preserve a balance between Jordan’s Arab 
identity and its commitment to peace and strong ties with Israel and faithfulness to the 
U.S.A, despite serious disagreements with some policies of both countries. In addition, 
during the high tensions with Israel that occurred during the Palestinian Second Intifada, 
Jordan maintained its diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, King Abdullah II has 
shown also remarkable ability in maintaining internal stability in Jordan regarding the 
Islamists and the Palestinian community, as well as containment of the economic 
hardship of the country to a bearable level (Luft, 2004: 21). Certainly, as discussed in 
chapters four and five, the manageable democratisation process that Jordan practiced 
during Bush’s two terms facilitated the security cooperation between Jordan and both the 
U.S.A and Israel, and allowed the Jordanian government to address its own and 
preferable political reform programme. It is vital to stress in this regard, as discussed in 
chapter five, that the Jordanian government managed to make its preferences concerning 
reform and security collaboration in the region significant in the calculations of the 
U.S.A. 
 
Jordanian security cooperation with the U.S.A in the region and its response to the 
democratisation initiatives discussed in chapters four and five respectively are affecting 
the Jordanian relations with Israel in different dimensions. As has been argued in the 
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empirical chapters, especially chapter six, Jordan is playing remarkable role in 
contributing to Israeli security, whether regarding counterterrorism or preserving stability 
and preventing friction in the region.  In addition, the Jordanian control of its political 
reform process and its preferable support of east Jordanian in political life are aiming to 
prevent the Islamists from controlling the political life in Jordan, which would lead to 
less cooperation with Israel and the U.S.A. These policies aim to prevent Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin from gaining a greater political role in Jordan. These Jordanian policies 
simultaneously aimed to put off any temptations of the Palestinians, whether in the West 
Bank or in Jordan and other external actors, especially Israel and the U.S.A, of imposing 
any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the current Jordanian political system, 
such as a confederation between Jordan and the Occupied Territories or the Jordanian 
option.  
 
On these grounds, it is not surprising that the Jordanian government is attentive to events 
in the region and vigilant of all the parties and the mechanisms involved as they shape 
their policies regarding issues of concern. For example, while Israel is aware of the 
events in the Occupied Territories and the internal situation in Jordan, and the U.S.A is 
watchful of the unpredictability of the region, the Jordanian government is very sensitive 
to the Jordanian Islamists’ ties with Hamas. Although the Islamists in Jordan illustrate 
their commitment to Jordanian security and the rejection of the “Jordanian option”, the 
unpredictability of events in the region might lead the Islamists in Jordan to break their 
commitment, which would affect the policies of major players like the U.S.A and Israel, 
leading to a potentially disastrous scenario for Jordan. Therefore, these realties and 
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Jordanian concerns and calculations make Jordan perceive its manoeuvrability within its 
relations with the U.S.A as a matter of national survival, not only a foreign policy or 
diplomatic matter. 
 
While Jordan was cautiously cooperative with the U.S.A during the Cold War due to 
domestic and regional grounds, its cooperation with the U.S.A became more overt and 
institutionalised in the 2000s as a result of the development of the U.S. status in the 
international system and the impact of that on its policies with its allies. The U.S. 
fearlessness of its friends and allies of joining a counterbalance coalition against the 
U.S.A allowed it to offer its allies a greater margin of mutual influence. As argued in the 
empirical chapters, Jordan supported many U.S. strategies but at the same time was able 
to avoid some policies that would be harmful for its interests and considerations, and 
those of the U.S.A accordingly. Therefore, contrary to Waltz’s neorealist theory, which 
assumes that the foreign policy of states change according to the changes to the structure 
of the international system (Waltz, 1979), we find from this thesis that Jordan and the 
U.S.A remained allies in the 2000s with stronger incentives and motivations from both 
sides, not only from Jordan, to do so, even though Jordan has little impact on the current 
structure of the international system.  
 
As the sole super power in a unipolar era, it is natural that the U.S.A tends to behave in a 
hegemonic manner. However, Husam Hamami, a former Jordanian ambassador to the 
U.S.A (1988-1992) and the current head of the Jordanian Institute of Diplomacy, asserted 
that in practice the system in the U.S.A is open and liberal, where the administration 
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recognises and allows its counterparts to express their views related to mutual interests 
(Interview: Hamami, 2008). In addition, as explained in the thesis, Marwan Muasher, the 
Jordanian ambassador to the U.S.A (1996-2002) and the Jordanian foreign minister 
(2002-2004) used to raise strongly Jordanian concerns regarding Middle Eastern affairs 
with key figures in different U.S. administrations. More importantly, Muasher asserted 
that Jordan was able to convince the U.S. administration regarding different issues in the 
Middle East that are in the interests of both Jordan and the U.S.A (Muasher, 2008).  
 
It can be argued therefore that Jordan, as a small state, proved to be able to achieve its 
priorities and interests within its relations with the U.S.A. These Jordanian achievements 
were achieved not only by the Jordan’s own policies and abilities, nor exclusively by 
U.S. support, which was in some occasions and on some issues difficult to obtain; rather 
they were accomplished by the combination of the Jordanian policies, which are based on 
the identification of both the realities and preferences of the regional and international 
order (that the U.S.A is on the top of them), and Jordan’s vulnerabilities and faithfulness 
to the U.S.A, which in its part allows Jordan to practice a sufficient margin of 
manoeuvre, initiative and reciprocal effect to overcome its weaknesses and challenges 
when necessary. As a result, the activeness of Jordan as a small state in the international 
order and its vigilance of the mechanisms that determined the priorities of the hegemonic 
power were essential to overcome its concerns and are major components in shaping the 
relations between the two countries.    
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This thesis also found that the U.S.A became profoundly involved in the Middle East in 
the 2000s more than any previous era, and as a result, and while Jordan was an important 
actor in the region, and had strong relations with the U.S.A during different historical 
eras such as during the Cold War to contain the Soviet presence, and in the 1990s to 
achieve peace and stability in the region, its role was even more important during the two 
Bush administrations. In this regard Jordan showed a grasp of the features of U.S. foreign 
policies with its allies and managed to address its preferences within the U.S. strategies 
regarding the renewable threats and challenges in the region which are, fortunately, of 
major concern to Jordan as well.  
 
This tells us that the U.S.-Jordanian relations are profound enough to maintain the 
sustainability of the relations between the two countries that have endured since the 
beginning of the Cold War. The evolution of these relations is compatible and 
simultaneous with the increased involvement of the U.S.A in the region and Jordan’s 
necessities and vulnerabilities. This resulted in more activeness of Jordan regarding 
different U.S. strategies, making Jordan a major focus of U.S. policies in the region with 
increased importance. Remarkably, Jordan proved to be a reliable ally to the U.S.A with 
the notable ability of achieving its interests and influencing U.S. policies on issues that 
are of major concern to Jordan, despite its smallness.  
 
What makes these realities striking is the ability of a small state like Jordan to assume 
such a role during one of the most unilateral eras of U.S. foreign policy. Such an ability 
of a small state however cannot be attributed only to the small state itself, it is also due to 
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the permission of the U.S.A for such a relationship to function in such a way. Therefore, 
it is vital to stress in this regard that in an era of globalisation and U.S. preponderance 
there is great mutual interlocking between states in different regions in the globe with the 
U.S.A, contrary to the assumptions of both Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky of the 
limited connectedness between the politics of the advanced countries and developing 
countries (Nueman, 1998: 4).  
 
By and large, this thesis found that regarding security cooperation, democratisation and 
Jordan’s relations with Israel, Jordan finds itself able to achieve most of its vital interests 
in its relations with the U.S.A with reasonable costs. Jordan proved to be able to make 
good use of the U.S.A about other interests that the U.S.A has the upper hand regarding 
them leading for better bargaining position for Jordan on other issues. These interests 
would not have been achieved without U.S. liberal hegemony. Indeed, the U.S. liberal 
hegemony is marked by transparency and decentralization. The accessibility of other 
countries to U.S. policymaking enabled Jordan to manage to raise its concerns and make 
a difference in U.S. preferences regarding domestic issues in Jordan, or issues affecting 
Jordan in the region. It can be argued that the Jordanian policies and relations, whether 
with the U.S.A or with Israel, regarding security cooperation, democratisation or the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict serve Jordanian interests, not only those of Israel and the 
U.S.A. These realities make Jordan perceive U.S. liberal hegemony as desirable, 
especially in a fragile region like the Middle East. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
Jordan places its relations with the U.S.A as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, which 
will remain the case for the foreseeable future.  
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7.4 The Originality of the Thesis 
 
The originality of this thesis derives from achieving the main aim of this project which is 
to assess the applicability of liberal hegemony combined with small states politics to 
U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. Therefore, with regard to the project questions, 
critically and empirically, the prevailing attitude among many scholars that U.S. policies 
with its small partners in the 2000s were based to a great extent on a unilateral approach 
and dominant ambitions by the U.S.A. For these reasons, this investigation is a focussed 
study on a major contemporary concern and debate among scholars of IR and U.S. 
foreign policy in particular. While this concern and debate has loaded the capability of 
many scholars in a Western and advanced countries context, this thesis provides a new 
perception of U.S.-Jordanian relations in a particular Middle Eastern context, where such 
a perception has been avoided and neglected. Such an unusual perception and 
interpretation of these relations added new understanding of the nature of these relations 
that are associated with the intensity of the increasing reciprocal interactions between the 
two countries on different issues since 2000.  
 
This sharp interpretation would be constructive in making sharper calculations by 
policymakers of each country leading to higher predictability of the foreign policy of 
each state.  In addition, this thesis broadens our understanding of U.S.-Jordanian relations 
in the sense that it provides an optimistic interpretation of these relations that make us 
more aware of the importance of the details and continuous interactions between the two 
countries. This interpretation of the U.S.-Jordanian relations is timely and original; while 
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U.S.-Jordanian relations experienced different historical contexts which required different 
interpretation that lasted for decades during the Cold War and for years in the 
transformational 1990s, this thesis provides a well-timed, rich, and innovative 
interpretation of U.S.-Jordanian relations that is appropriate for an era which is expected 
to last for significant amount of time.  
 
Finally, this thesis is a unique one as a result of its focus not only on the outcomes of the 
interactions between the U.S.A and Jordan, which have been the prevailing focus of most 
of the materials that are used in this thesis, but also on the nature of the interactions 
between two countries different in size, power and importance. Because of the problems 
of neorealism and the inconvenience of neoliberalism to the study of such relations, and 
as a result of the findings of this thesis which confirm the level of autonomy of a small 
state and the role of the liberal hegemony in U.S.-Jordanian relations, it can be argued 
that such a combination of small states’ politics and liberal hegemony added to the 
literature of this area of IR a new dimension to the understanding of these relations and 
other similar relations. For example, by using an imitative theoretical approach and by 
focusing on the features of the interaction between states and not only on the outcomes, 
investigating other cases will lead to the inferring of the outcomes of these relations, 
leading to better and more accurate calculations of policymakers of these countries and to 
the understanding of the relations between these countries and the U.S.A.     
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7.5 Concluding Remarks  
 
After the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 and the decision of the Libyan 
leadership to renounce its unconventional weapons and turn to the West, the Arab 
governments have neither the desire nor the capacity to challenge or antagonise U.S. 
policies in the region, including Syria and Sudan, which are in reality seeking better 
relations with the U.S.A, which for its part was reluctant to do so during Bush’s two 
terms. However, despite of the undesirability and inability of the Arab countries to 
challenge the U.S.A, many countries in the Arab world, including those who are 
categorised as traditional U.S. allies, were reluctant to follow all of Bush’s policies in the 
Middle East, especially those policies which are related directly to these countries’ 
crucial interests. In other words, despite their faithfulness to the U.S.A, many countries in 
the Middle East have their own agendas. For example, the Gulf and other Arab countries 
avoided building an anti-Iranian coalition designed against Iran and to isolate Syria, as 
the U.S.A wished them to do (Ottaway, 2008: 1).  
 
Meanwhile, as discussed in chapters five and six, Jordan and other actors in the region 
are concerned about U.S. abandonment or the unlikely decreased involvement in the 
region such as an untimely withdrawal from Iraq; therefore, as Ikenberry argued, the U.S. 
allies in Europe and Asia do not fear U.S. domination, rather they fear its abandonment, 
lest they lose the vital services that the U.S.A is providing them, making these countries’ 
demand for the U.S. hegemony and presence high (Ikenberry, 2002: 231). The same 
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concept can be applied to Jordan in its relations and perceptions of the U.S.A, as has been 
proven from the discussion of this thesis. 
 
Democratisation and reform were successful U.S. policies toward major powers like 
Germany and Japan after the Second World War in order to make them prosperous and 
liberal, so they would not desire to challenge or balance the U.S.A. (Owe VI, 2002); 
interestingly, as discussed in chapters one and five, after 9/11 the U.S.A promoted 
democratic reforms in the Middle East and there was the analogy and perspective among 
U.S. policymakers of the requirement for a Marshall Plan in the Middle East. In the case 
of Jordan, these U.S. policies proved to be considerate to Jordan’s own preferences for 
vital reasons for both countries, as discussed in depth in chapter five. Consequently, 
while Ikenberry claims that the connectedness and commonality between the U.S.A and 
other democratic, advanced and industrialised countries such as those in Europe and Asia 
led to the liberal feature of the relations among them, it can be argued from the findings 
of this thesis that some small developing countries, such as Jordan, due to their 
smartness, progress and integrated policies in the U.S. orbit can establish relations with 
the U.S.A based on the same principles that are shaping U.S. relations with these 
advanced countries.  
 
Nevertheless, this thesis does not claim that U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s are 
similar to those of U.S. relations with European countries or Japan regarding their 
solidity and intensity, or are going to be so in the foreseeable future; rather it claims that 
the motivations of the two countries are similar and the interactions between them are 
 305
witnessing the commencement of the applicability of the same principles that are shaping 
U.S. relations with these countries, as discussed through the thesis. In addition, the 
practices of these principles in the relations between the two countries are evolving and 
enhancing the intensity and solidity of the relations, leading to the same path of the 
current relations between the U.S.A and other advanced countries. Such principles and 
practised policies would result in more integration between the advanced countries and 
their developing counterparts, regardless of their size, in an era of more globalised 
international relations. 
 
While these assumptions were applicable to U.S. foreign policy during the Bush era, 
when the neoconservatives and their preferable unilateral tendency had been at their 
apogee and maximum influence over the policymaking of the U.S.A, especially towards 
the Middle East, it would be more promising to evaluate the applicability of these 
assumptions and principles during the Presidency of Barak Obama, who appears more 
liberal in his foreign policy even to those who used to be termed “rogue states” and “axis 
of evil”, not to mention to a historical ally to the U.S.A like Jordan.  The findings and 
limits of this project in terms of time and size suggest that such an approach should not 
be passed over; it is recommend though that such an approach should be revaluated in 
further studies over time and for events of concern to Jordan and the U.S.A. It is also 
recommended that using a similar approach in further research for other U.S. relations 
with other countries is essential in order to come to a decision of the extent to what we 
can make a generalisation of this approach to U.S. relations with other countries, 
especially in the Middle East.     
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Historically, U.S.-Jordanian relations since 2000 have been at their best stage at all 
levels. There is strong cooperation and agreement between the two countries upon the 
principles that are shaping these relations, and what needs to be done in the region 
strategically, although there are bearable disagreements in the priorities for each country 
in some occasions (Interview: Hassan, 2008; Interview: Bell, 2008). The satisfaction of 
both sides of the current relations indicates the functionality and the solidity of the 
principles and pillars that shape these relations. Finally, the progress of these relations in 
the future depends to a great extent on the two countries’ adherence to the principles and 
pillars that have shaped the current relations between them, which have also shaped the 
core argument of this thesis.   
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